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Anyone who has never written a dissertation may be forgiven for believing 
that writing one is a solitary enterprise, done in isolation over countless hours 
hunched above a book or laptop.  Nothing could be farther from the truth, however.  
This dissertation was anything but an individual exercise.  In this endeavor, I owe 
many debts, especially to those who offered support and guidance throughout this 
exceptionally trying ordeal.  Thankfully, I have been fortunate to have a superior 
dissertation committee.  They took a leap of faith and trusted me to conduct one of 
the most challenging and dangerous dissertation projects ever conducted at The 
University of Texas at Austin.  At my prospectus defense, my committee somberly 
joked about signing my death warrant, and at times it appeared such fears were 
entirely warranted.  As such, I am grateful for their support and their confidence.  
My dissertation committee has been active and helpful throughout this process. 
Zoltan Barany provided needed perspective when navigating both the world of 
rebels and refugees and academia and government service.  His high standards 
helped make this a better project than it would have been without his guidance. 
Tom Garza, as a fellow Caucasus scholar and traveler to Chechnya, understood 
better than most the inherent challenges of conducting a systematic research study 
in a region as perilous as the North Caucasus.  His endless enthusiasm and good 
cheer were welcome respites from the rigors of writing.  As a fellow researcher on 
terrorism and political violence, Ami Pedahzur recognized the inherent difficulties 
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of this work and lent his expertise to the transformation of data collection into data 
analysis.  It is rare that dissertators have one of the leading experts in their chosen 
field serve on their committee, and I was extremely fortunate to have Ami on the 
project.  In the same light, R. Harrison Wagner has been a constant inspiration and 
source of knowledge on issues of organized political violence.  I have enjoyed our 
many hours together in the classroom since my undergraduate days.  The only 
negative aspect of our relationship was the surplus of new research ideas that 
inevitably filled my head after our conversations.  As Harrison correctly observed, 
the paradox is that although there are a number of interesting research puzzles, 
there is simply not enough time to read everything necessary to answer them.  This 
is especially true when writing a dissertation.  Finally, my chair and longtime 
mentor, Rob Moser, offered constant support and advice throughout my 
undergraduate and graduate career.  It is hard to put into words the appreciation I 
have for Rob’s efforts over the years.  It is no exaggeration to state that without him, 
this dissertation would probably never be written.  I am forever grateful for his help. 
I know how truly fortunate I am to have such an amazing mentor and committee.  
All contributed to the completion of this dissertation.  Any mistakes and deficiencies 
that remain are the results of my own limitations and errors, and not theirs. 
 I am also grateful to the many organizations that funded my fieldwork 
research, my dissertation writing, and foreign language training, respectively.  The 
Summer Institute of Political Psychology at The Ohio State University provided an 
excellent forum to better understand the cognitive aspects of political behavior.  A 
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prestigious multi-country Fulbright IIE Fellowship funded eleven months of 
research in The Republic of Georgia and Azerbaijan.  The Government Department 
at the University of Texas at Austin sponsored my MacDonald-Long and William 
Livingstone University Continuing Fellowships, both of which allowed me to 
continue my research in Poland and Belgium.  My language training in Russian and 
Chechen was generously funded by a Fulbright-Hays Fellowship, by The American 
Councils, and by two Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Fellowships, one 
for an academic year (Russian) and another for a summer session (Chechen), both of 
which were administered through the Center for Russian, Eurasian, and East 
European Studies (CREEES) at UT.  The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) has 
been especially generous in allowing me to participate in two separate Eurasia 
Dissertation Development Workshops.  The first, held at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison in 2005, addressed the topic of Mobility in Eurasia; the second, 
held at Yale University in 2007, focused on Political Violence in Eurasia.  These 
workshops were invaluable in helping me hone my research design and provided an 
excellent forum to meet fellow young scholars interested in similar issues, many of 
whom I still count as close colleagues.  An SSRC Dissertation Write-Up Fellowship in 
2010/2011 afforded me the opportunity to focus on actually writing this 
dissertation, no small task given the copious amount of notes I collected in two and 
a half years in the field.  An SSRC Short Term Travel Grant in the summer of 2011 
allowed me to return to The Republic of Georgia to further explore some unexpected 
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puzzles.  I appreciate the generosity of all these organizations and institutions and 
am humbled by their investments in my work. 
 In the spring of 2010, I was invited to participate in the IREX Regional 
Security Symposium on Central Asia and the Caucasus in Washington, DC, an 
opportunity which allowed me to share my research findings with a policy-oriented 
audience and meet fellow junior and senior scholars conducting similar research in 
the region.  As part of the symposium, I was able to present my research to at the 
United States Department of State.  Thanks to the always generous support of Cindy 
Buckley, a US Department of State Title VIII Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
grant the following winter brought me back to Washington, DC to present my 
research findings in a private briefing with the US Department of State.  In the 
summer of 2010, I was fortunate to win an open-pool selection with the prestigious 
Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research (IQMR) at Syracuse University.  
I am grateful to the IQMR director, Collin Elman, and especially to faculty participant 
Sidney Tarrow, who took the time to read a draft of this dissertation and provided 
much needed support and advice.  
Throughout my time in the field, I greatly enjoyed the hospitality for which 
the Chechens are famous.  Even when they had nothing, they always shared 
everything.  In Chechnya, I am grateful to Janneta, Selena, and Fatima.  In Georgia, 
many thanks to Rizvan, Khassan, Rizoudi, Mavsur, Vaka, and Umar.  In Duisi, Kameta 
and Mansur were always generous hosts.  I owe additional thanks to the countless 
others who made what could have been a very difficult stay in Pankisi enjoyable and 
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relatively safe.  In Baku, I am indebted to Ruslan, Idris, Aulodi, Khamzat, Milina, and 
Abdul-Rakhman, my tenacious yet gentle teacher, Dok barkalla.  My work in Poland 
would have been impossible without Monkia and Malika’s valuable assistance.  
Special thanks to Seda and Seleko in Wolomin for showing that despite the horrors 
of war children can still smile.  In Belgium, Magomed and Karim-Sadulayev proved 
that friendships can form fast.  
Many friends kept me sane and necessarily entertained during this entire 
endeavor.  In Rhode Island, thanks to my long-time friends, Fran Domenici, Dave 
Narcavage, DJ Scott, Brian Roles, and Rob Muehlberg for making me feel like I never 
left home.  In Texas, special thanks to my closest rugby mates, Abel Varney, Chris 
Cole, Gabe Manzutto, Nick Nespeca, Dave Comerford, Griffin Myers, and Ty Landry. 
In Ohio, during my “Academic Exile” years, special thanks to Vasabjit Banerjee, 
Andris Zemelis, and Beth Young: thanks for great times and camaraderie during the 
early years of graduate school.  Thanks as well in Ohio to my first co-author, Vaughn 
Shannon.  At the University of Texas, many thanks go to Roy Germano, Manu Balen, 
and Steven Brookes.  Special thanks to Jim Enelow as well, a true friend.  I owe a 
great deal to my “Extended Russia Crew”, Julie George, Charles King, and Tim 
Blauvelt.  My deepest thanks go to my comrades in the US Marine Corps, my fellow 
infantrymen in the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 11th Marine Expeditionary 
Unit/Special Operations Capable.  Joe Williams, Travis Hines, Matt Pena, and Darrick 
“Jack” Nicholson were my fellow grunts who shared innumerable hours of stress 
and abject misery from the steep hills of Camp Pendleton to Somalia and Rwanda.  
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Our surprisingly erudite and philosophical conversations started me on the trail of 
higher education in both academia and life. Thanks as well to my fellow grapplers 
on the All-Marine Wrestling Team, William Tesdahl, Phil Eiberger, Preston Barrett, 
and Butch Hindman who showed that hard work can overcome any obstacle.   
Throughout my academic career, my parents, Mike and Susan Dennis, have 
consistently supported my work and, even when I knew better, expressed sincere 
interest in even the most mundane details of my work.  They have been supportive 
throughout this long endeavor.  The greatest debt, however, is owed to the love of 
my life, Kim-Anh Nguyen.  This dissertation is devoted to her.  Kim has been a 
constant source of inspiration and motivation.  In the final week, she read my 
dissertation chapters as if they were her own, casting a keen and critical eye on 
every sentence and every table.  After many hours, she still joined me in trading 
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of humor and levity which gave necessary perspective to the entire enterprise.  
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What drives refugees displaced by war to hold attitudes supporting violence 
to achieve political ends?  The conventional wisdom suggests that refugee 
communities are breeding grounds for the emergence of political violence, 
terrorism, and radicalism.  Yet, the literature on refugees and political violence 
offers little empirical evidence of such a connection or systematic investigation of 
the root causes of attitudes toward political violence among refugees.  My research 
addresses the following questions:  1) What are the sources of politically violent 
attitudes?  2) Can these sources be traced to specific aspects of the refugee 
communities  themselves?  3) Can they be traced to certain experiential events or 
demographic factors?  4) Are attitudes towards political violence related to actors’ 
political goals?  This analysis is based on nearly three years of fieldwork in Chechen 
refugee communities in The Republic of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Poland, and Belgium.  
Methodologically, this inductive study employed a mixed-methods approach, 
utilizing qualitative and ethnographic methods, such as direct participant-observer, 
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to conduct 310 structured-interviews with a range of Chechen refugees.  For 
independent variables I asked a battery of questions related to demographic 
profiles, grievances, political goals and preferences, and preferences for regime 
type.  The dependent variable, attitudes towards political violence, was gleaned 
from structured-interviews which called on subjects to offer general assessments of 
their position on the acceptability of political violence as well as express their views 
on the legitimacy of four concrete events related to the conflict in Chechnya:  the 
2002 attack on Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater; the 2004 attack on School #1 in Beslan, 
North Ossetia; the 2004 attack on military and police personnel in Nazran, 
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A Note on Transliteration 
The majority of Russian and Chechen words were transliterated using the 










Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people. 
Mao Tse-tung 
 
What drives refugees displaced by war to hold attitudes supporting violence 
to achieve political ends?  Despite the recent attention given to the root causes of 
political violence there remain significant theoretical and empirical gaps.  The 
conventional wisdom suggests that refugees are vulnerable to militarization and 
that refugee communities are breeding grounds for the emergence of political 
violence, terrorism and radicalism.  Yet, given the inherent difficulties of conducting 
primary research, the literature on refugees and political violence offers little 
empirical evidence of such a connection or systematic investigation of the root 
causes of attitudes toward political violence among refugees.  This dissertation 
contributes to this literature and furthers our understanding of why political 
violence emerges.  This work also has implications for state policy regarding 
militarized refugee communities. 
It is well recognized that states prepare, and presumably prefer, to wage 
conventional wars against other states.  Accordingly, scholars’ traditional focus was 
on inter-state war, particularly among great powers (see, for example, Mearsheimir, 
2003; Wagner, 2007; Waltz, 2001).  The most common form of warfare is not 
between states, however, but rather within them (Fearon and Laiten, 2003; 
Licklider, 1995).  Civil wars and insurgencies are the most common kind of warfare 
in the modern world.  Often classified as irregular warfare, insurgent methods are 
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the preferred choice of non-state actors incapable of directly challenging 
disproportionate state resources.  As recent history reveals, insurgencies pose a 
vexing problem for international security (Fearon and Laiten, 2003; Heiberg, 
O’Leary, and Tirman, 2007; Killcullin, 2005).  Most insurgent movements are 
promptly defeated, yet protracted insurgencies, although comparatively rare, are a 
significant contributing factor to regional instability causing, among other things, 
mass displacements.  Forced migrations, in turn, often generate further conflict, 
creating vicious spirals of violence (Betts, 2009; Lischer, 2006; Lischer, 2009; 
Stedman and Turner, 2003; Weiner, 2003; Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1992).  
As American forces draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan, ending a decade-long 
counter-insurgency campaign, her erstwhile ally in the so-called “War on Terror”, 
Russia, remains bogged down in the quagmire of a protracted and growing 
insurgency in the North Caucasus (Cornell, 2006; King and Menon, 2010; 
Sagramoso, 2007; Toft, 2010).  To operate successfully, insurgents require 
significant support from non-participants, both locally and from those abroad 
(Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan, 2001; Galula, 1964/2006; Kasfir, 
2002; Kushner; Collier and Hoeffler, 2001; Ross, 1993; Shafiq and Sinno, 2008; 
Shapiro and Fair, 2009; Tessler and Robbins, 2007; Weinstein, 2005).  Displaced 
peoples have been shown to be integral in supporting insurgent movements and just 
as Russia must grapple with an effective balance of coercive and “hearts and minds” 
strategies to quell the mounting violence in the Caucasus, it is equally important for 
American policy-makers to not lose sight of the inherent security challenges posed 
 
3 
around the world by displaced peoples, especially those driven from ethno-
nationalist conflicts over territorial disputes.1  In particular, America must remain 
attentive to insurgent movements that invoke militant Islamic slogans to mobilize 
recruits, funding, and supporters.  As recent history reveals, transnational terrorist 
organizations are often opportunistic in utilizing local conflicts to pursue their own 
political objectives against Western interests (Kilcullen, 2005).  
There are myriad assumptions about the relationship between people 
displaced by war and political violence.  Refugees and diaspora communities are 
both, respectively, purportedly vital components of protracted insurgent 
movements, providing material resources, like funds and recruits, and ideational 
ones like legitimacy (Salehyan and Gleditch, 2006; Salehyan, 2007).  Another major 
supposition is that forced displacement has a homogenizing effect on communities, 
especially in regard to political attitudes and views towards the legitimacy of 
employing violent means (Lischer, 2006; Tishkov, 2004). This is thought to be the 
result of either the physically and psychologically traumatizing process of war and 
displacement, or from the frequently deplorable conditions forced migrants 
confront in host-states.  As conditions perceivably worsen, grievances emerge and 
multiply, inevitably creating climates which resemble the proverbial “swamps” of 
mass discontent, itself a purportedly significant factor in driving individuals to 
either engage in political violence or, at the very least, support or tolerate its 
perpetuation in the name of the group (Zolberg, , Suhrke, and Aguayo, 1989).  This 
                                                 
1 Disputes over territory are considered especially difficult to resolve. See Topf, 2003. 
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dissertation problematizes these assumptions, arguing that displaced peoples often 
display significant variation in their attitudes towards political violence.  It studies 
the sources of variance among displaced peoples, specifically Chechens, in their 
attitudes towards political violence and their motivations for supporting or rejecting 
violent means to effect political change back home in Chechnya.   
Displaced Chechens in the Caucasus and Europe are arguably a hard case 
given that they, of any contemporary displaced group, should expectedly hold pro-
violent attitudes towards Russia.  Displaced Chechens display significant variation in 
their support for political violence, however.  In particular, major cleavages exist 
along gender lines and between those desiring divergent political goals and regime 
type preferences.  Chechen men are presumed to be disproportionately pro-violent 
as too are a now sizeable number of Chechen women as part of the so-called Black 
Widow suicide bombers.  As such, one would expect only slight attitudinal variation 
between the genders.2  Further cleavages exist between select political goals and 
regime type preferences.  Those who desire moderate political goals, like Autonomy 
within Russia, are less likely to support political violence, while those espousing 
maximal goals, like the establishment of an Islamic Caucasus Emirate, are more 
likely to accept political violence.  Moreover, those who reject religious authority as 
                                                 
2 Males, especially young males, are presumed to be attracted to risk-taking and violence, particularly 
in small bands.  It is presumed that human genetics and evolutionary pressures have privileged these 
traits (Hayden and Potts, 2008; Hudson and Thayler, 2009).  In the contemporary world, it is claimed 
that such genetic facts suggest empowering women will have a significant effect on dampening 





political authority correspondingly reject the idea that violent means are legitimate, 
while those supporting theocracy hold overwhelmingly pro-violent attitudes.  Here 
too, gender has an interactive effect in that displaced Chechen women are more 
likely to reject both maximal goals and religious authority.  Finally, it is assumed 
that Chechen refugees supporting political violence do so out of cultural or emotive 
considerations, particularly revenge.  Yet, it is strategic considerations which 
determine non-participant support for militant activity.  These findings should help 
better inform state policy formation.  
My dissertation research addresses the following questions:  1) What are the 
sources of politically violent attitudes?  2) Are attitudes towards political violence 
related to actors’ political goals?  3) Can they be traced to certain experiential events 
or demographic factors?  4) Can these sources be traced to specific aspects of the 
refugee communities themselves?   
I examined these questions through a close ethnographic examination of 
Chechen refugees.  Chechnya is a noteworthy case in its own right since it involves a 
long-standing secessionist conflict in Russia, unquestionably one of the most 
strategically and politically important countries in the world, but it is important to 
note the broader theoretical and empirical implications of my work.  My findings are 
potentially applicable to a diverse range of refugee communities around the world 
that have engaged in some form of political violence.  Moreover, my work can 
contribute to the literature on political violence by elucidating the sources and 
theoretical significance of attitudinal determinants of violent behavior and the 
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globalization literature which views refugee flows and transnational migration 
increasingly as security threats.  As such, this study will be one small empirical part 
of the larger puzzle on the potential causes of political violence, particularly among 
refugees.   
This analysis is based on nearly three years of fieldwork conducted between 
2006 and 2009 and in the summer of 2011 in Chechen refugee communities located 
in The Republic of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Poland, and Belgium.  Methodologically, this 
inductive study employed a mixed-methods approach, utilizing qualitative and 
ethnographic methods, such as direct participant-observer, to conduct 301 
structured-interviews (in the Chechen and Russian language) with a range of 
Chechen refugees: political elites, average civilians, former fighters, and Chechens 
still active in the separatist movement.  
For independent variables I asked a battery of questions related to 
demographic profiles, grievances, political goals and preferences, and preferences 
for regime type.  The dependent variable, attitudes towards political violence, was 
gleaned from structured-interviews which called on subjects to offer general 
assessments of their position on the acceptability of political violence as well as 
express their views on the legitimacy of four concrete events related to the conflict 
in Chechnya: the 2002 attack on Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater during a performance 
of Nord-Ost (hereafter referred to as Nord-Ost); the 2004 attack on School #1 in 
Beslan, North Ossetia (hereafter referred to as Beslan); the 2004 attack on military 
and police personnel in Nazran, Ingushetia (hereafter referred to as Nalchik); and 
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the attack on military and police personnel in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria 
(hereafter referred to as Nalchik).  These latter two attacks primarily targeted 
representatives of the state, while Nord-Ost and Beslan exclusively targeted 
civilians.  
I make three principle arguments:  1) Refugees who desire maximal political 
goals, such as the establishment of a Caucasus Islamic Emirate, are more likely to 
support political violence; 2) There is a correlation between refugees who embrace 
religious authority (sharia) as political authority and support for political violence; 
3) Male Chechen refugees will be more likely to support political violence than 
female Chechen refugees.  
My results suggest the following three main findings: First, political goals do 
determine support for political violence.  Second, regime type preferences drive 
attitudes supporting political violence.  Third, gender has discernable patterns.  
Males are more likely to desire maximal political goals.  They are more likely to 
accept religious authority as political authority in the form of a sharia regime, and 
they are more likely to accept all forms of political violence.  I argue that these 
gender effects are driven by differential political goals between males and females 
based on social status.  Female Chechen refugees desire different political goals and 
regime types because, unlike males, they will likely suffer in terms of social status in 
a Caucasus Islamic Emirate and/or under sharia.  Consequently, women’s material 
interests drive them to less extreme political goals, such as Autonomy in Russia, and 
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less tolerance for political violence as a means.  This suggests an instrumental 
theory of political violence. 
The implications of this study should help inform state foreign policy.  In 
recent years, governments around the world have grappled with implementing 
effective anti-terrorism policies.  However, what are the unintended consequences?  
Do certain counter-terrorist policies actually radicalize individuals and/or their 
communities?  Does detention – in either prison camps (e.g., Guantanamo Bay) or 
the informal incarceration that refugees experience in camps – radicalize detainees?  
If so, what are the causal mechanisms?  There are many assumptions about the 
causes of political violence and terrorism, but these assumptions are not easily 
tested.  I contend this study provides a potential template for future research on 
these vital security phenomena. 
In Chapter 2, I first survey the literature on political violence, exploring the 
theoretical relationship between forced migration and conflict, and the role of 
displacement (and displaced peoples like refugees or diaspora communities), in 
fueling protracted insurgent movements.  Some scholars and policy-makers see 
political violence as rational and strategic (Abrahms, 2006; Bloom, 2005; Crenshaw, 
1988; Kalyvas, 2006; Kydd and Walter, 2006; McCormick, 2003; Pape, 2005); others 
argue it is the manifestation of certain cultural norms or religious orientation or 
emotive determinants (Crawford, 2000; Huntington, 2007; Petersen, 2002; Post, 
1997; Tishkov, 2004).   Recent scholarship has claimed intra-state violence is 
primarily caused by either “greed or grievance,” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001; Collier 
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and Sambilis, 2009), while challengers argue that such an approach over-simplifies 
the phenomena (Heiberg, O’Leary, and Tirman, 2007).  Students of terrorism have 
also weighed in, advancing a range of explanations from aggression and frustration 
to abnormal psychosis (see Bonger, Brown, Beutler, and Brekenridge, 2006; Horgan, 
2005; Victorrof and Kruglanski, 2009; Reich and Laqueur, 1998; Silke, 2003).  This 
dissertation is attuned with the belief that political violence, and the support for 
political violence, is driven primarily by strategic and material considerations rather 
than emotive factors like fear or revenge.  It is certainly not irrational nor the result 
of psychopathology.  Emotive factors can certainly play a role, especially in ethnic 
conflicts like the wars between Russia and Chechnya, yet these are not as significant 
as strategic considerations (see Fearon, 1995).  
The debate over how best to study political violence extends to arguments 
over which level of analysis is best for exploring these issues (King, 2010:69-73).  
On the one hand, some favor macro-studies, utilizing large-n quantitative datasets to 
flesh out causal relationships.  On the other hand, new work at the micro-level, 
incorporating deep ethnography and fieldwork, shows particular promise.  
According to Laitin (2002), the future of the comparative  study of political violence 
is found in an integration of each approach, wedding large-n studies with the 
insights gleaned from micro-level fieldwork, all of which is then subject to formal 
theoretical analysis.  I concur that approaches like the latter seems to hold the most 
promise in bettering our understanding of the causes of political violence.  My 
critique remains, however that the preponderance of literature focuses on groups 
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and organizations or individuals, usually elites, and thus ignores the vital role of 
communities.  
The literature on refugees as security threats is a growing field.  This focus 
has come from Globalization and Migration studies to explore more fully the causes 
and consequence of refugee flows.  This has implications for more than just 
humanitarian aid groups.  It has been shown that refugee communities in one state 
increase the likelihood of new inter-state wars and increased regional insecurity 
Salehyan and Gleditch, 2006; Salehyan, 2007).  In particular, states and 
organizations are confronted by the twin-problems of manipulation and 
militarization, both of which can lead to the creation of “refugee warrior” 
communities (Adelman, 1998).  As more and more refugees are created, 
understanding the underlying mechanisms of radicalization is an increasingly vital 
task for policy-makers and scholars alike.  So too is better understanding the role of 
displaced peoples in protracted insurgency movements.  In Chapter 2, I make the 
claim that the displaced Chechen community is beginning to look less like refugees 
and more like a nascent diaspora community.  This evolution, I contend, gives 
scholars a unique opportunity to explore how politics matter and which politics 
matter, particularly those involving the use of violence, in the early stages of an 
emergent community.  We know that diasporas are a significant contributing factor 
to home-state politics and affairs, including continued military actions against the 
ruling regime (Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan, 2001).  Observing 
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these developments as they happen will hopefully increase our understanding of 
these vital dynamics and relationships. 
I will also discuss the methodological approach utilized in the dissertation, 
paying particular attention to ethnographic research instruments and the particular 
challenges inherent in conducting dangerous fieldwork with hidden and vulnerable 
populations.  I refer to these specific challenges as the “Three T’s”: Time, Trust and 
Trauma.  Finally, I discuss the specifics of my structured interview and provide an 
overview of the displaced Chechen community in The Republic of Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Poland, and Belgium.  
In Chapter 3, I present a brief case history of Chechnya and her relations with 
Russia.  Russia has fought a number of Islamic guerrilla campaigns in the North 
Caucasus over the centuries and this turbulent history has clearly affected modern 
relations.  As such, it is important to contextualize the current violence in light of 
these historical precedents.  For many Chechens, this past is viewed as being an 
integral part of contemporary relations and future outcomes.   
In Chapter 4, I explore the general attitudes displaced Chechens express 
when speaking about political violence.  Contrary to the prevailing assumptions 
(Bodansky, 2009; Hahn, 2011; Murphy, 2010; Tishkov, 2004; Zaurbekova and 
Yandarov, 2001), displaced Chechens are more likely to either support or reject the 
legitimacy of select politically violent acts due to strategic considerations instead of 
emotive factors like revenge or fear.  Next, I reveal how individual political goal 
choices and preferences for certain regime types influence attitudes supporting 
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political violence among Chechen refugees. My findings suggest that refugees who 
hold maximal goals, like the establishment of an Islamic Caucasus Emirate, are more 
likely to support political violence than those who desire more moderate goals such 
as Autonomy.  One controversial finding is that there is a relationship between those 
who desire religious authority (sharia) as political authority and higher levels of 
support for political violence.  My data reveals that such views are driven less by 
religious piety, but rather, as is the case with support for an Islamic Caucasus 
Emirate, by strategic and material considerations.  This insight has important policy 
implications for states grappling with effective anti-terrorism policies.   If, as these 
findings suggest, purportedly transnational jihadist groups are more concerned 
with local politics and grievances, more appropriate foreign policy approaches can 
be crafted and critical mistakes avoided.  I make this case with evidence from both 
the displaced Chechen community and from the actions of the insurgent leadership.  
Finally, I address the potential role that level of education and living location (urban 
versus rural) have on both attitudes towards political violence and choice of 
political goals and regime type. 
The expectation, as stated above, is of a uniformly, pro-violent community.  
There is considerable variation, however.  In addition to the differences discussed in 
Chapter 4, there is also significant variation between displaced Chechen men and 
women in both their attitudes towards violence and in their political views.  Chapter 
5 explores the role of gender in influencing attitudes towards political violence and 
in generating political goals choices and regime type preferences.  Women are less 
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likely to support political violence and they are less likely to desire either an Islamic 
Caucasus Emirate or sharia as a regime type.  As I reveal in this chapter, women 
make these decisions based on the perception that they have no material interest in 
an Islamic world.   This chapter further explores how gender roles have evolved 
during the war and in exile, empowering women and challenging traditional 
Chechen patriarchal norms, and discusses the role of women in the conflict, 
exploring in particular the so-called “Black Widow” phenomenon.   
Chapter 6 explores the so-called “country effects”.  Country effects are the 
general term used for the expected state of displaced peoples.  However, most 
Chechen refugees do not reside in what we typically assume to be camps.  In this 
chapter, I provide a description of the Chechen refugee populations in The Republic 
of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Poland, and Belgium, discussing their living conditions, 
central concerns, views on political violence, political goals, and regime type 
preferences, respectively.  The theoretical expectation is that refugees who live in 
the most squalid of refugee communities, those which have the least hope, will be 
more likely to produce more extreme views on political violence (Lischer, 2006:38-
40).  I will discuss daily life and living conditions and illuminate the challenges and 
problems refugees face, discuss their views and perceptions about life in exile, their 
hopes, youth life, etc.  In doing so, I will explain why in Georgia, so few wished to 
discuss any political questions related to violence, while in Azerbaijan the Chechen 
refugees were disproportionately pro-violence.  Proximity is also expected to 
influence attitudes.  Refugee communities both closest to the conflict and farthest 
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away are purportedly more likely to support political violence (Salehyan and 
Gleditch, 2006:335-344; Salehyan, 2007:791).  Proximity seems to also play a role in 
generating political views, turning certain refugee communities into more 
“moderate” communities.  However, in Belgium we see a surprising trend towards 
increased acceptance of religious authority as political authority in the preference 
for sharia.  
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation by analyzing the meaning of the central 
findings.  I will discuss the policy implications of my study and the potential avenues 
for future research, addressing the broader theoretical and policy questions this 















Chapter 2:  Literature and Methods 
Dispossessed, aggrieved, and rootless populations are a potential breeding ground for 
radical terrorism inside and across borders… permanent refugee camps give rise to 
enmity among the displaced and provide a source of insurgency and instability 
elsewhere… [and these peoples] are preyed upon by people with evil intent and the 
means to sway followers and carry out destructive plans. 
Edward Newman and Joanne van Selm 
 
There are a number of purported causes of political violence and terrorism.     
Some claim that political violence is strategic and instrumental, employed by actors 
or groups to achieve some known and desired goal (Abrahms, 2006; Bloom, 2005; 
Crenshaw, 1988; Kalyvas, 2006.; Kydd, 2006; Kydd and Walter, 2006; McCormick, 
2003; Pape, 2005)  Others, however, claim that political violence is driven primarily 
by culture or emotive factors (Boehm, 1984; Huntington, 2007; Petersen, 2002; 
Post, 1997; Tishkov, 2004; Volkan, 1997; Zaurbekova and Yandarov, 2001).  Still 
others claim that political violence is the consequence of abnormal psychology 
(Bonger, Brown, Beutler, and Brekenridge, 2006; Horgan, 2005; Kellen, 1990; Post, 
1997; Reich and Laqueur, 1998; Victorrof and Kruglanski, 2009).   Violence is 
complex and it may be impossible to disentangle the myriad overlapping casual 
mechanisms. Yet, the competing literature give us a framework in which to better 
understand, and ideally, predict the situations in which political violence is more 
likely to occur.   
DEBATES ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
The study of social and political violence has long interested academics and 
policy-makers alike. Today, terrorism and counter-insurgency join ethnic conflict 
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and nation building as major research themes in the field.  In this endeavor, 
International Relations scholars and Comparative Political theorists have begun to 
work together in exploring the vast complexities of intra-state war.  As Charles King 
notes, they have “…found common ground in trying to understand why people kill 
each other in large groups outside of a declared interstate war” (2010:56).   
Beginning in the late 1990s, scholars sought to bring back the study of 
violence to its origins, exploring problems of social order, mobilizations and state-
society relations (see for example, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 1997; Rapoport, 
1995).  At its core, the enterprise seeks to develop elegant models of violence and 
problematize the core assumptions about political violence.  Despite the renewed 
attention, the competing claims and literature on the root causes of political 
violence3 remains underdeveloped principally because of two main deficiencies.  
First, much of the literature seeking to explain political violence, especially in recent 
years with an eye towards suicide terrorism and unconventional warfare like 
insurgencies, approaches it at the macro level, conceptualizing it in the domain of 
states and/or organizations which employ political violence as a purposeful action 
meant to achieve a desired political objective.  Political violence is conceived of as 
strategic and rational behavior and the unit of analysis is the organization or 
network organizing attacks.  Although these studies attempt to explain why 
individuals join such groups, discussing humiliation, isolation, “brainwashing”, 
                                                 
3 Given the normative implications and subjective nature of the term “terrorism”, I define all violent 
actions, including those which deliberately or exclusively target non-combatants, as political 




religion, and/or narcissism, the focus remains on how the organization or network, 
as a strategic actor behaves – not on the formation of the individual attitudes that 
precede either the decision to join a terrorist group or subsequently commit an act 
of terrorism.4   
 Conversely, at the micro-level, studies focus on either contextual or 
ideational factors, but rarely on both factors combined.  These explanations posit 
cognitive, ideational and/or emotive determinants of behavior and range from 
cultural arguments to studies in deviant psychology (Bonger, Brown, Beutler, and 
Brekenridge, 2006; Crenshaw, 1992; Horgan, 2005; Kellen, 1990; Post, 1997; Reich 
and Laqueur, 1998; Victorrof and Kruglanski, 2009).  Some suggest that politically 
motivated violence is driven by either “greed or grievance,” (see Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2001;, Collier and Sambalis, 2003) while additional studies have attempted 
to look at the root causes of existing political violence by focusing exclusively on 
individuals who have already chosen to operate outside accepted institutional 
frameworks and engage in political violence (Post, 2008; Sageman, 2004).  These 
studies trace the contextual or grievance-based factors to which a person has been 
exposed and highlight patterns across and within subject populations.  Some claim 
this line of inquiry especially problematic because for every individual identified as 
a supporter of or participant in of political violence, there are a number of people 
similarly exposed to the same ideational and contextual forces who do not behave 
                                                 
4 For examples, see Bloom, 2005; Pape, 2005; Pedahzur, 2005; and Sageman, 2004. 
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violently (Wiktorowicz, 2005).  I disagree with this assessment, however.  As I 
discuss below, the micro-comparative study of political violence, although in its 
nascent stages, has proven to be a necessary corrective to the usual large-n studies 
which dominated the study of violence. King (2010:160) offers his own “micro-
political turn in the study of social violence: a concern with uncovering the precise 
mechanism via which individuals and groups go about trading in the benefits of 
stability for the inherently risky behavior associated with violence – and how, as 
Thucydides knew, they often do it at the expense of people whom they previously 
called friends and neighbors.” 
Given that war and political violence is costly and that outcomes are rarely 
certain, under what conditions do organized groups and/or individuals engage in 
such behavior?  Frequently, material considerations are cited as key determinants, 
even in conflicts which are purportedly driven by emotive factors (Fearon, 1995; 
Kalyvas, 2006; Mueller, 2000).  Material factors alone do not always help explain all 
aspects of political violence.  Petersen (2002) explores the role of key emotions in 
driving and escalating ethnic conflicts, especially when such violence targets 
minorities, arguing that emotional mechanisms explain target variation and timing 
of attacks.  Yet, although emotions can play a role in political violence, many 
conflicts are driven by strategic or material interests. Indeed, even in genocides and 
ethnic wars, conflicts presumed to be driven by emotions like ancient hatreds, are 
often times driven more by material considerations.  
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In an examination of ethnic war in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 
1990s, Muller (2000) notes that such violence had little to do with ideational factors 
like emotion.  Ethnicity itself was little more than an ordering device. These conflicts 
in actuality resembled other non-ethnic wars.  These wars were not “Hobbesian” 
wars of all against all, neighbor on neighbor, nor were they spurred by primordial 
hatreds.  Rather, violence was implemented by small bands of thugs and marauders 
who were recruited by opportunistic political elites.  Once such criminal groups 
began to target a different ethnic group or nationality, the broader kin-group 
population feared a subsequent backlash from the targeted groups, and as such, 
sought protection from the very same ones who instigated the violence. Muller’s 
work encourages us to problematize exactly who is committing violent acts and to 
better understand the strategic and material basis for violence. 
Kalyvas (2006) too discusses the instrumental use of political violence. He 
posits that violence functions as an instrumental way to obtain allegiance, 
cooperation, and/or information from the civilian populace.  Violence is a necessary 
tool in garnering select resources and, depending on the circumstance; such 
violence will be employed selectively or indiscriminately.  Deliberate violence is 
reserved for enemies, including collaborators.  Yet knowing who is and who is not 
an enemy depends on the amount of available information.  When such information 
is readily available, the likelihood of using violence diminishes.  On the other hand, 




The main insight of Kalyvas’ work is to demonstrate the instrumental and 
rational function of violence.  He reveals that even ostensibly random acts of 
violence are little more than just another tool in the repository of potential 
instruments necessary to achieve some known and desired goal.  In conflicts each 
side may employ a number of different tools, including harsh violence.  The point is 
to remember that all of these are rational.   
In the study of terrorism, a range of cognitive factors are explored.  Horgan 
(1981) noted in an early literature review of terrorism studies that psychopathology 
was the dominant feature.  Psychopaths, narcissists, paranoids and other deviants 
were considered to be the backbone of violent organizations.  Subsequent research 
has shown, however, little evidence of this claim.  McCauley (2001:1) notes that 
perpetrators of terrorism and political violence,  
…did not differ from the comparison group…in any substantial way…indeed, 
terrorism would be a trivial problem if only those with some kind of 
psychopathology could be terrorists.  Rather we have to face the fact that 
normal people can be terrorists, that we are ourselves capable of terrorist 
acts under some circumstance.  This fact is already implied in recognizing 
that military and police forces involved in state terrorism are all too capable 
of killing non-combatants.  Few would suggest that the broad range of 
soldiers and policemen involved in such killings must all be suffering some 
kind of psychopathology.  
 
Silke (2003) too argues that perpetrators of political violence do exhibit 
normal psychology and that “their involvement in political violence is a result of a 
series of understandable factors which combined result in a process of deepening 
involvement in violent extremism.” According to Silke, perpetrators of violence 
represent only a marginal element within the broader social group, sharing many if 
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not all of the same values and views on violence. When such social support is 
removed or eroded, the perpetrating individuals or groups do not often survive (see 
Gurr 1998).  The role of public support for political violence and militant activity 
will be discussed in greater detail below.  
The support for political violence is claimed by some to be the result of social 
learning.  A social learning theory of aggression claims that violence follows 
observation and imitation (Bandura, 1978). This is a different model than ones in 
which innate aggression leads to violent behaviors. In this model, for example, 
teenagers may witness certain forms of violence, as well as the potential public 
glorification of such events, and then feel that violence is socially permissible, thus 
making them arguably more likely to engage in violence.  This work has been used 
to explain certain dynamics in the Palestinian community (Crenshaw 1992; Taylor 
and Quayle 1994; Kelly and Rieber 1995).  
Social learning of the acceptability of political violence can come from a 
variety of other sources. In Islamic cultures, particularly those associated with 
political violence, Madrasas (Kepel, 2002; Atran, 2003) and Internet 
communications are claimed significant. However, this cognitive restructuring 
model fails to account for the large numbers of people who are similarly exposed 
and/or indoctrinated yet do not go on to perpetrate an act of political violence.  
As social learning relates to Chechnya, war has ravaged Chechnya essentially 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  There were periods of relative peace 
from 1991 to 1994 and from 1997 to 1999, but the vast majority of Chechen youth 
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have grown up knowing little more than war, death, violence, hate, and rage.  In 
Chechnya and throughout the scattered refugee communities these children and 
young adults have become socialized into a world where violence is often a 
legitimate means to achieve some desired good.  To say that they are de-sensitized 
to violence is an understatement, but this is all part of a complex psychological 
process, actually the result of several inter-related processes, the dynamics of which 
are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Theorists and scholars of terrorism offer still more explanations (Victoroff 
and Kruglanski, 2009): Frustration-aggression; Relative Deprivation and Oppression 
Theory; psychoanalytical theories such as Identity theory, Narcissism theory, 
Paranoia theory, Absolute/Apocalyptic theory; and non-psychoanalytic 
psychological theories such as Cognitive theories, Novelty-seeking theory, and 
Humiliation-Revenge theory (Bonger, Brown, Beutler, and Brekenridge, 2006; 
Horgan, 2005; Victorrof and Kruglanski, 2009; Reich and Laqueur, 1998; Silke, 
2003). 
What do we make of these approaches?  I acknowledge that each approach 
offers insights on political violence; yet, I contend that each fails to adequately 
address or properly emphasize the essential role that attitudes and beliefs play in 
political violence.  Scholars like Pape (2005) use a macro approach to give us 
valuable insights into how violence can be employed strategically and 
instrumentally.  In this case, Pape showed how suicide terrorism had little do to 
with religion, but was rather a deliberate strategy employed by territory-seeking 
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militants against democratic governments.  However, this level of analysis fails to 
satisfactorily explain how attitudes and ideas influence individual incentives to 
engage in or actively support political violence, preferring instead to construct 
predictive models which downplay the significance of cognitive factors.5 
 Recent scholars like Lyall (2009), Kalyvas (2006), King (2010), Sinno (2010), 
and Wood (2003), respectively, have used micro-level explanations to illustrate how 
individual-level processes influence political violence.  This line of inquiry shows 
particular promise in contributing to our understanding of political violence, 
especially when mixed with on-the-ground ethnographic research.  The short-
comings of micro-level studies is that they fail to consider the role of elites and/or 
networks or account for how these actors can influence and manipulate the emotive 
reasons for adopting certain attitudes or behaviors.  Micro-level studies also might 
not be able to generalize findings beyond their particular research focus.  In general, 
I contend that it is critical to recognize the causal role of attitudes and beliefs in 
influencing political violence and to examine the multiple causes of such attitudes.  
In this dissertation I contribute to this broader goal by focusing on the causal 
variables, which lead to the emergence of attitudes that view political violence as an 
acceptable form of political behavior.   
More troubling, the preponderance of literature dealing with political 
violence deals with a specific subset of actors and a specific step in the process and 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that macro studies which view political violence as a strategic behavior do 
acknowledge the central role that elites and networks play in influencing individual behavior, but do 
so in such as way as to subsume cognitive processes to the causal power of the elites or networks 
themselves; See Sageman, 2004. 
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evolution of violence (Post, 2005; Sageman, 2004).  This extant literature deals 
primarily with groups, organizations, or leaders, all of whom may act and interact in 
a variety of ways and employ, for any number of causal reasons, violent means 
towards some desired goal.  In this, communities are seen as being vital only insofar 
as they serve as repositories for recruitment, physical support, and/or psychological 
support by the aforementioned actors; the community can help replenish active 
membership ranks, can help finance operations, can provide vital information, and 
can offer sanctuary to avoid government detection; at worst, communities are 
simple arenas in which various actors operate.   
SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE  
Non-participant support has both ideational and material consideration.  
Militants need to constantly mobilize support and maintain their support bases 
(constituents).  If they lose support then they are likely to be found, arrested, or 
killed by the opposing government.  To move freely among their people, they must 
sustain their support base and the peoples’ goodwill (Bloom, 2006:26-27). 
Policy-makers too have tended to underestimate the significance of better 
understanding how communities develop certain norms of behavior, especially 
those which prescribe and proscribe the limits and legitimacy of political violence as 
a means to achieve some select objective.  To most policy-makers, refugee 
communities are viewed pejoratively as “swamps” in which the main agitators, the 
“mosquitoes”, align with one of the above sub-set groups and then move on to infect 
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the surrounding areas (Rumsfeld, September 19, 2001).  The policy prescriptions 
here are clear: drain the swamp and thus deny the “mosquitoes” a necessary area to 
breed and feed.  This view tacitly acknowledges the significance of communities, yet 
the policy prescription is seldom achievable.  I argue that communities are more 
essential than commonly acknowledged and my contribution helps us better 
understand this critically understudied social actor.  By moving the unit of analysis 
to the community, I contend that we can glean a better insight into the nature of 
community dynamics driving violent means and also glean a greater understanding 
of the subset groups which emerge from the community to go on and actually 
perpetuate the violent acts.  In this sense, engaging in political violence may indeed 
“take a village” and as such, we should not ignore critical players and settings.  
Studying non-participant support for insurgencies and militant activity has 
both theoretical and policy implications.  It has been noted that social support is 
integral for maintaining protracted insurgent movements, yet “one notable lacuna in 
the literature on the duration of conflict is the role of social forces in duration or 
resolution…Current scholarship has examined these matters in bits and pieces…” 
(O’Leary and Tirman, 2007:13).  The policy world contends dampening popular 
support for militant activity dampens actual militant activity.  Yet, as Shapiro and 
Fair state,   
…how much of a concern reducing support should be… is unclear given the 
state of knowledge.  There are no rigorous studies that demonstrate a linkage 
between expressed support for militancy and the supply of militants, much 
less studies that show a linkage between expressed support and realized 
levels of militant violence.  Identifying such relationships requires research 
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designs that move beyond examining public attitudes towards militancy.  
That said, the fact that militant organizations cannot engage in meaningful 
levels of violence without some measure of popular support remains a first-
order concern (Shapiro and Fair, 2009:84).  
 
Although Shapiro and Fair claim that there is no evidence that decreasing 
non-participant support for militant activities reduces militant violence, I 
demonstrate how non-participant rejection can decreased subsequent levels of 
militant activity, particularly in regard to target selection.  As we will see, the 
overwhelming rejection of the attack on schoolchildren in Belsan spurred a re-
evaluation about targets and methods among Chechen militants that led to a three-
year gap in terrorist attacks against civilians.  This clearly illustrates the potential 
power of non-participants have on militant behavior.  
Despite these assertions, little work has been done on the actual relationship 
between non-participant support and militant activity and even less exploring the 
sources of variation among vulnerable peoples.  Exploring the sources of variation 
in attitudinal support for political violence complements previous work on the 
particular characteristics of genuine militants.  Overwhelmingly, research on 
terrorism and insurgent violence privileges the accounts of elites and militants.  
However, like Shapiro and Fair’s work on understanding support for Islamic 
militancy among Pakistanis, this dissertation focuses exclusively on non-
participants to explore insurgent movements at the “grass roots” level of average 
individuals.  It is clear that academics and policy-makers alike need to better 
understand the relationship between non-participant support and militant activity.  
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Accordingly, like Shapiro and Fair’s work, this study too breaks new ground in 
identifying the correlates of support for specific acts of political violence among 
displaced Chechens by exploring the conditions under which displaced individuals 
find political violence an acceptable form of behavior. 
DEFINING DISPLACED CHECHENS:  THE NEW DIASPORA  
Displaced Chechens in the Caucasus and Europe do not resemble 
stereotypical refugees.  They do not occupy crowed tent camps bound by fences.  
The vast majority of displaced Chechens, especially those in Western Europe, live in 
middle to low class flats.  Some live proximate to one another, but there are no 
“Little Grozny’s” as most are scattered throughout various towns and cities.  Status-
wise, they are refugees and/or asylum-seekers, but I contend the current situation 
more closely resembles that of an embryonic diaspora community.  Indeed, most 
displaced Chechens express little desire to return home, contently quiescent to 
remain in place.   The reasons for this vary, but the fact remains that there is, and for 
some time will be, a sizable community of displaced Chechens, especially if they 
mimic their kin back home and retain high birth rates. 
Accordingly, I contend the displaced Chechen community gives scholars a 
unique opportunity to explore the transformation and evolution of a community 
from refugees to diaspora.   Significant insights can be gleaned by relaxing the rigid 
categories of refugee or diaspora.  Extant literature treats these as dichotomous, yet 
does not have an adequate conceptual framework for identifying when a refugee 
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community becomes a diaspora.  By relaxing boundaries, I assert that we can 
observe which politics matter and how politics matter, particularly those related to 
political goals, regime type preferences, and attitudes towards the use of militant 
violence in achieving those objectives.  Civilian support is paramount for successful 
counter-insurgency operations (Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan, 
2001; Galula, 1964/2006; Kilcullen, 2005; Petraeus and Amos, 2007).  As such, we 
need to better understand what motivates non-participant support, especially 
among communities not proximate to the conflict.  
DISPLACEMENT, VIOLENCE, AND PROTRACTED INSURGENCIES 
As noted, more research needs to be conducted to understand and account 
for variance among non-participants in support a range of politically violent 
behaviors, like terrorism, suicide bombings, and guerilla and insurgent tactics.  
Indeed, if rebel groups, guerillas, insurgents, and terrorists alike all need at least 
some degree of non-participant support, foreign policies should be directed towards 
dampening the attractiveness of such behaviors (Tessler and Robbins, 2007:305).  
This reality is reflected in the numerous writings of both classical and contemporary 
counter-insurgency (COIN) theorists and practitioners (Petraeus and Amos, 2007).  
All protracted insurgencies have constituents from whom they seek approval 
and legitimacy.  Modern day insurgent movements like the Irish Republican Army, 
the Basque ETA, Algerian GAM, and Columbian FARC all necessitate popular 
support.  Yet, the social base of support is rarely homogenous. It is full of individuals 
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who support the cause highly along with any means necessary, and with individuals 
who reject certain means, such as violence, and, indeed, even political objectives 
(Heidberg, O’Leary, and Tirman, 2007).  “Policy makers eventually realize that 
winning the battle of ideas may be as important as the use of weapons in keeping 
insurgencies from monopolizing the representation of the constituents” (O’Leary 
and Tirman, 2007:397).  Identifying who supports certain militant behaviors and 
the reasons for such support is the first step in formulating sound foreign policy 
responses.  
Despite the purported agreement on the necessity of popular support for 
militants, there is comparatively little agreement on the causes for such support.  
More troubling, there is comparatively little systematic research conducted on 
explaining why some individuals support political violence, while others do not.  
Indeed, much of our limited knowledge about the social support of insurgent 
movements and militant activity comes from the inherent difficulty in doing 
fieldwork with political violent groups.  It is a rarity for social scientists to operate in 
conflict and conflict adjacent regions (O’Leary and Tirman, 2007:14).  Indeed, as 
O’Leary and Silke note in a review of the literature that scholars tend to rely on 
“easily accessible sources of data” (O’Leary and Silke, 2007:390-391).6  And 
unfortunately, what studies that do exist rely almost exclusively on survey 
                                                 
6 For O’Leary, and Silke, our best knowledge comes from individuals who spend significant time 
devoted to a given conflict, live for extensive periods in the area, learn local languages and access 
both militants and non-participants (2007:394).  In doing so, they acknowledge that many 
researchers who immerse themselves as such projects are frequently threatened and even targeted, 
situations which happened repeatedly to this researcher in the course of this study.    
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questionnaires (Tessler and Robbins, 2007; Nachtwey and Tessler, 2002; Shafiq and 
Sinno, 2010; Shapiro and Fair, 2010).   Survey questionnaires can help shed light on 
various aspects of non-participant support, yet I contend that scholars must also 
incorporate thick, ethnographic work to create a fuller picture and better 
understanding of the various social dynamics among vulnerable populations.  This 
type of research is inherently dangerous and the results can be “messy” yet such 
work is absolutely vital to bettering our understandings of both non-participant 
support and the causes of variance.  This study is one attempt to conduct such a 
research project.  
Of course, it is important to note a less obvious reason for the dearth of 
studies on social support for insurgencies is the relative scarcity of protracted 
insurgent movements. Insurgencies, especially those that employ terrorist methods 
against a regime, are usually defeated rather quickly (O’Leary and Tirman, 
2007:390).  This makes understanding protracted insurgencies a critical issue for 
foreign policy decision makers and should encourage more “boots on the ground” 
among social scientists.  It is vital to better understand the nature of insurgent 
political goals and how they evolve over time.  We also need to be better attuned to 
the nature of non-participant social support.  The assumption, as in Mao’s famous 
dictum about insurgent fish swimming in an acquiescing sea, is that insurgencies 
with little social support will be short-lived.  But what determines support or 
rejection?  This dissertation attempts to answer these questions. 
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POLITICAL DISSATISFACTION – GREED, GRIEVANCE, OR POLITICS 
Until recently, the extant literature on intra-state conflicts posits that 
violence is driven by either greed or grievances (Collier and Sambalis, 2009).  
Although many proponents of this framework now recognize the need for a more 
nuanced approach, much of the debate remains centered on the purported role of 
environmental factors.  The grievance approach suggests that socio-economic 
deprivation leads to frustration, which leads to both support for political violence 
and actual political violence.  Such an explanation might seem particularly 
appropriate when discussing displaced peoples, but much recent work has cast 
significant doubt on the purported relationship between poverty and violence 
(Berrebi, 2007; Kreuger, 2002; Kreuger and Maleckova, 2003).  Of course, some do 
add a caveat that such mechanisms may work is such deprivations can be attributed 
to some exogenous group, thus provoking “collective distress” and feelings of 
hopelessness which produce pro-violent attitudes by making such actions appear 
legitimate and justified (Tessler and Robbins, 2007:310). 
I believe that Shafiq and Sinno’s work (2010) exploring the relationship 
between wealth and higher education and the support or political violence provide a 
more useful analytical framework for understanding non-participant support for 
militant activity.  A key part of their model is the role of political dissatisfaction in 
generating attitudes supporting political violence.  They argue that the more 
political dissatisfaction there is the more likely an individual is to support political 
violence.  Basing their conceptual model on Lerner (1958), “…educated individuals 
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have more at stake in political outcomes and thus adopt extremist political 
attitudes…” (Shafiq and Sinno, 2010:150).  Wealthier individuals are less likely to 
support political violence because they are purportedly more satisfied (Shafiq and 
Sinno, 2010:152).  Thus, by the same mechanism, in this study I contend that 
maximal political goals, like the desire to establish an Islamic Caucasus Emirate in 
the Caucasus and the desire to establish sharia as a regime type, are in fact a signal 
of extreme political dissatisfaction with the contemporary regime and status quo.  
Consequently, the higher the levels of political dissatisfaction, the more likely 
individuals support for political violence.  For these Chechens the stakes could not 
be higher; indeed, these individuals feel that they are facing an existential threat by 
co-existing within the Russian Federation.  Just like the past, the Russians will soon 
enough turn their aims once again on annihilating the Chechen people.  In short, 
establishing such an alien form of political organization signals the utter rejection of 
the past and of the idea that there are any commonalities with the Russian system.  
There are alternative explanations regarding the determinants of non-
participant support for militant activities.  Revenge (Boehm, 1984; Chagnon, 1988; 
Chirot and McCauley, 2006; Volkan, 1997), nationalism (Lake and Rothchild, 1996;  
Posen, 1993; Snyder and Ballentine, 1996; Snyder, 2000; Van Evera, 1994, and 
desire for group cohesion (Crenshaw, 1987; O’Rourke, 2009)  are all purported 
casual variables.  It is believed there is also a correlation between religiosity and 
support for militancy.  Purportedly, this relationship is particularly true in relation 
to Islamic militancy (Shapiro and Fair, 2010).  Support for certain political goals is 
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purportedly correlated with non-participant attitudes towards militant activity.  
Those who support democracy, for example, are thought to be less supportive of 
both violent means and militants than those espousing theocracies (Shapiro and 
Fair, 2009).  This latter proposition is now the basis for certain American and 
Western foreign policies in the Muslim world.  Many foreign policy leaders argue 
that democracy is diametrically opposed to Islamism and militancy (Shapiro and 
Fair, 2009:105).  Yet, as Shapiro and Fair note, “…none of these conventional 
wisdoms rest on a firm evidentiary basis, yet they dominate in varying degrees 
popular media accounts…debates in US Congress and polices adopted by Western 
states…”(Shapiro and Fair, 2009:80).  This dissertation explores these wisdoms 
through an underutilized research method in the study of insurgencies and militant 
activity, namely systematic, micro-level, ethnographic fieldwork.  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREAT AND DISPLACEMENT: REFUGEES AND DIASPORAS 
Protracted insurgencies are one of the more troublesome problems of 
international relations; yet, our understanding of the social and political dynamics 
driving such conflicts, as well as the relationship between war and displacement in 
general, remains surprisingly incomplete.  Human displacement is a major factor in 
international and regional instability.  Since the end of the Cold War, many 
politicians have viewed refugees and asylum seekers in negative terms as threats.  
Consequently, the shift has been from protecting refugees to seeking protection 
from them.  The attacks on September 11, 2001 accelerated the move towards more 
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restrictive asylum policies.  Over time these restrictions may lead to widespread 
frustration and radicalization of refugees, especially for those trapped in squalid 
camps that are unable to return home.  There is a fear, borne out by the increase in 
radicalism and political violence in Europe, that terrorists will use the refugee 
channels to gain access to new markets for potential recruits.7  For host countries 
understanding the mechanisms and conditions that produce political violence is 
essential, especially since the existence of refugee communities has been shown to 
increase the likelihood of war and instability (Salehyan and Gleditch, 2006; 
Salehyan, 2007).  In particular, the most serious security threats are posed by 
militarization of refugee communities and the emergence of “refugee warrior” 
communities (Adelman, 1998). 
Due to the increasing number of refugees worldwide, understanding how 
communities adapt to these new environments and why they seem to be especially 
prone to political violence demands further attention.  Why do refugees matter?  
Forced movement of peoples has profound effects on individuals, communities, host 
countries, and regional politics alike (Helton, 2003; Newman and van Selm, 2003).   
With the exception of casualties and war dead, refugees are the most visible victims 
of a political conflict.  Protracted exile is expected to produce radicalization and 
political instability, yet, although the majority of the world’s refugees never engage 
in political violence it does not mean that they are passive.  Refugees in various 
                                                 
7 It has been noted that although not all refugees or immigrants are terrorists, individuals who were 
immigrants have perpetrated all terrorist acts committed against the West in recent years; See 




contexts can be the product of violence and its cause and can be a factor in the 
continuation of a conflict and/or the obstruction of peace processes.8   Refugees can 
be weapons or threats and they are a manifestation of instability in world politics.   
Indeed, many refugees do continue to engage in politics which affect their 
homeland.  We are now just beginning to recognize that refugee communities are far 
more politicized and militarized than originally thought.  Violent entrepreneurs and 
militants find the refugee communities ideal places to recruit and use them as an 
operational base or sanctuary as well as a source of food and medicine.   
Human displacement is a major factor in international and regional 
instability.  Since the end of the Cold War, many politicians have viewed refugees 
and asylum seekers in negative terms as threats.  Consequently, the shift has been 
from protecting refugees to seeking protection from them.  In the public and 
political discourse, the predominant sentiment towards refugees is captured by the 
December 2000 Human Rights Watch report claiming,  
Increasingly refugees are equated with threats to national and regional 
security…Many refugee hosting countries have legitimate security concerns, 
including cross-border incursions, militarization of refugee camps, and the 
fear of conflicts spilling over from neighboring refugee-producing countries. 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 accelerated the move towards 
more restrictive asylum and refugee policies.  Over time these restrictions may lead 
to widespread frustration and radicalization of refugees, especially for those 
                                                 
8 Refugee camps may be especially vulnerable to violence because, as Volkan (1997) argues, violence 
is frequently driven by fear, stress, and anxiety, all conditions endemic to refugee communities. 
Moreover, Crenshaw (2002) notes that engaging in violence can provide “psychic rewards” that 
satisfy revenge and give perpetrators a degree of control, something refugees rarely possess.  
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trapped in squalid camps that are unable to return home.  There is a fear, borne out 
by the increase in radicalism and political violence in Europe, that terrorists will use 
the refugee channels to gain access to new markets for potential recruits.9  For host 
countries understanding the mechanisms and conditions that produce political 
violence is essential, especially since the existence of refugee communities has been 
shown to increase the likelihood of war and instability (Salehyan and Gleditch, 
2006; Salehyan, 2007).  In particular, the most serious security threats are posed by 
militarization of refugee communities and the emergence of “refugee warrior” 
communities. 
Militarization is not new. However, the United Nations High Commission on 
Refugees (UNHCR) recently noted that militarized refugee communities currently 
present “the single biggest threat to refuge security”(Adamson, 2006).  Nearly 15% 
of all contemporary refugee crises, in places like Afghanistan, Bosnia, Burundi, East 
Timor, Gaza and the West Bank, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sudan, are experiencing some 
degree of refugee militarization.  Militarization can significantly undermine and 
threaten host state and regional security, increasing the likelihood of both intra-
state and inter-state war.  The existence of refugee communities in neighboring 
states has been shown to be a positive and statistically significant predictor of 
conflict continuation and civil wars (Salehyan and Gleditch, 2006; Salehyan, 2007).  
                                                 
9 It has been noted that although not all refugees or immigrants are terrorists, all terrorist acts 
committed against the West in recent years have been perpetrated by individuals who were 




This an especially serious security threat in the contemporary era when states, with 
the help of IGOs and NGOs, can now support large numbers of displaced peoples for 
extended periods of time (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1992).  It is clear that policy-
makers ignore refugee crises at their peril. 
Manipulation of refugees effects international and regional security by 
making refugees resources.  These resources become vital in prolonging civil wars.  
They can also serve to threaten broader regional stability.  If an armed group loses 
on its native soil, the existence of a large refugee or diaspora community in a 
neighboring state gives the defeated groups a sanctuary to rest, heal, and re-group.  
International aid is diverted from needy refugees to support the armed struggle 
(Lischer, 2006:19).  In cases where this dynamic has played out, the wars have been 
especially bloody and protracted.  The home-state army is denied the opportunity to 
declare full battle-field victory, while the force in exile has created a new bargaining 
situation in which the refugees themselves may be used as a kind of “demographic 
bargaining chip” (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1992:277).  Manipulation is not new, 
and using refuges as a tool of statecraft is not only for non-state actors.  During the 
Cold War both the United States and the Soviet Union used refugees to further their 
own political agendas and strike back at their adversaries (Weiner, 1992).  
Militarization is part of a deliberate strategy employed by violent 
entrepreneurs or militants to ultimately bolster their own protection.  Militants’ 
view the refugee communities as resources and potential rear-bases to launch 
attacks against the home or sending state and the longer refugees are forced to live 
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in exile, the more likely the chances of militarization.  Inevitably, refugees will 
become increasingly distressed, anxious, and frustrated and may come to see 
violence as a more attractive alternative.  Over time, militants will infiltrate refugee 
communities and manipulate these circumstances to harness refugee angst and 
channel it into political action, including violence, most often against the home 
regime, but also potentially against the host state (Salehyan, 2007:791). This is 
especially true in situations in which co-ethnic communities are present (Lischer, 
2006:98-99). 
The perception of refugees as passive victims has long been disproved.  To 
paraphrase Charles Tilly’s famous quip about the relationship between war and the 
state, it appears that while war makes the refugee, the refugee in turn often makes 
war. In particular, “refugee warriors” have been shown to be instrumental in 
generating political violence.  Refugee warriors are: 
Usually the citizens (or the children and grandchildren) of one state who 
have crossed a border as a refugee and live in a neighboring state, often in 
camps on the borders of their native state…they are refuge warriors if they 
have fled their homeland and live in neighboring states, most often in refugee 
communities, and launch attacks against the regime in power in their 
homeland from bases in the neighboring states (Adelman, 1998:2). 
 
 
The majority of refugee warriors tend to be estranged political elites who 
seek to use sympathetic co-ethnics and diaspora communities, as well as any 
favorable host governments, to arm themselves for continued struggle against the 
home-state regime.  After enduring at least one significant defeat against the home-
state regime, these elites seek to use “the suffering of refugees for its own political 
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purpose: to siphon off aid, establish the international legitimacy of their cause…As 
long as [these disaffected political elites] control refugee populations, they can 
demand a seat at the bargaining table…” (Stedman and Turner, 2003:3). 
Refugee warriors require community support for not just material concerns, 
like recruits and logistics for engaging in political violence against the sending 
regime, but also to help establish a state-in-exile, a political organization which 
necessitates broader legitimacy for survival.  For refugee warriors, communal 
support is critical for international legitimacy.  Indeed, according to Zolberg, et al., 
the “language of politics is democratic and  representative,” so, elites use the 
existence of large numbers of displaced co-ethnics to legitimize both their rule and, 
in some instances, the use and necessity of political violence as a tool essential to 
avoiding outright extermination (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1992:277).    
Refugee warriors are symptomatic of the economic and political crises 
inherent in the modern globalizing world in which economic inequalities grow ever 
larger and where increased political repression leads to increasingly radicalized 
political actors.  In many instances, such repression forces opposition leaders to flee 
their home states (Adelman, 1998).  Of course, this is nothing new, but what is 
unique to the contemporary era is that the world today can support large numbers 
of displaced peoples for extended periods of time.  Moreover, the political realities 
of today’s world in which the langue of politics is democratic and representative, 
political leaders in exile use the existence of large numbers of displaced co-ethnics 
to legitimize both their rule and, in some occasions, the use and necessity of political 
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violence as a tool necessary to avoid outright extinction (Zolberge and Benda, 
2001:277).  In short, the refugee warriors and the refugee political activists/would-
be leaders, both require community support. 
There is abundant empirical evidence of the relationship between refugee 
communities and political violence: Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, 
Jordan and Lebanon eventually turned their frustrations into political violence 
(Berrebi, 2007).  Rwandan refugees in the Congo and displaced Afghans in Pakistan 
have similarly picked up the sword (Stedman and Turner, 2003).  In fact, these latter 
groups formed the core of hardened reserve armies which made an immediate 
impact on the very conflicts which displaced them; yet, not every refugee 
community becomes militarized or produces refugee warriors.  Most refugees care 
only about the most pressing and basic needs: food, clothing, shelter, water, 
medicine, sanitation, education for their children, and electricity.  Other scholars 
believed that the determining factor is based on how the refugees were driven from 
their home state and how politicized they were during the displacement.  Those 
refugee communities, which underwent particularly violent displacement as well as 
those, which had built-in political institutions were, therefore, more likely to 
experience increased militarization once in their host states (Lischer, 2006: 18-30; 
Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1992).   
Not every refugee community becomes militarized.  What explains this 
outcome? Some scholars believed that the determining factor was based in how the 
refugees were driven from their home state and how politicized they were during 
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the displacement (Lischer, 2006:18-30; Stedman and Turner, 2003:6-8). Those 
refugee communities which underwent particularly violent forced migrations as 
well as those which had built-in political institutions were, therefore, more likely to 
experience increased militarization once in their host states.  However, scholars 
such as Adelman (1998) and Lisher (2006) reject an “origins” thesis, instead arguing 
that militarization has more to do with host state circumstances.  These scholars 
claim that militarization is more likely to occur when the host state itself either 
ignores refugee crises or actually foments militarization and/or the formation of 
refugee communities to further its own parochial foreign policy objectives.  This 
claim has clear policy implications.  
Host states which use refugee communities as tools in their own statecraft 
against rival and adversarial states are the most likely candidates to produce 
militarized refugee camps and refugee warrior communities (Salehyan and Gleditch, 
2006; Salehyan, 2007).  These governments may even arm refugees and actively 
encourage cross-border incursions.  In doing so, they may fail to realize the 
ramifications of such actions: guns can be pointed both ways and there is little 
guarantee armed refugees will not take aim against the host state government in the 
future.  More importantly, as noted above, cross-border attacks by refugees against 
the home state often increases the likelihood of reciprocal attacks, potentially 
spiraling into new interstate wars which eventually destabilize regional security 
(Salehyan and Gleditch, 2006; Salehyan, 2007).  Refugees in these states will also 
suffer other deprivations: because these host states look to the short-term, refugee 
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communities in these places are more likely to be disorderly and squalid (Lischer, 
2006). 
Conversely, a well-governed state with robust political institutions and civil 
society is less likely to permit refugees to do as they please, especially in regards to 
launching military incursions into neighboring states.  These hosts actively dampen 
the conditions which produce militarization and manipulation by violent political 
entrepreneurs. In doing so, they separate armed refugees from the broader 
community and act as a protector for the community overall.  They provide aid and 
assistance, but also are aware that over the long term refugees must not be 
dependent exclusively on external aid (Salehyan and Gleditch, 2006; Salehyan, 
2007).  Refugees must be given opportunities for self-sufficiency and afforded the 
chance to establish productive livelihoods (Stedman and Turner, 2003:6).  Refugees 
may be encouraged to integrate into host state societies, although in some 
circumstances this may increase the likelihood of competition between refugees and 
locals over jobs and other resources (Lischer, 2006).  
In addition, Lischer posits four policy prescriptions for preventing refugee 
militarization: first, international donors must provide substantial humanitarian aid. 
Second, host state must resist the temptation to build actual camps.  Third, refugees 
should never be forced home against their will.  Finally, western states and the USA 
must expand and expedite the resettlement process (Lischer, 2008:113-118).10 
                                                 
10 In a recent article on Iraqi refugees, Lischer reveals how refugee communities are susceptible to 
manipulation and militarization. Most of the Iraqi refugees were received in neighboring states as 
unwelcome guests. Facing local resentment and government restrictions, with little real hope for 
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Proximity is important (Lischer, 2006:36; Salehyan and Gleditch, 2006; 
Salehyan, 2007).  Many refugees end up in camps or communities close to home. 
They leave because of direct experiences of persecution or political violence and 
thus have strong reasons to oppose the regime they fled.  Although refugees are 
victims of violence, they are also prime-candidates for recruitment involving rebel 
factions; rather than simply being a consequence of fighting, they may also be 
contributors to conflict.  Because they have suffered violence and often have 
endured substantial losses – livelihoods, property, family members, and/or 
homeland – refugees have clear grievances or motives for opposition activities.  
Because of these losses refugees have lower opportunity costs for fighting.  Those 
refugees residing in squalid camps and who are dependent on foreign assistance 
have very few productive alternatives to joining rebel organizations which may 
offer a better quality of life and a sense of purpose.  Finally, because they aren’t 
within their home state’s political jurisdiction, the state can’t directly monitor or 
repress the refugee communities (Lischer, 2006:36; Salehyan and Gleditch, 2006; 
Salehyan, 2007).   
Rebels may try and use refugee communities as a launching-pad for 
insurgent strikes against the home state.  But this can only happen when the 
communities are located in close geographic proximity to the target state.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
returning home, the Iraqi refugee communities are potentially prime candidates for political 
manipulation and increased militarization, both of which increase the likelihood that this will soon 
be a community of refugee warriors. Of course, even if they do not become refugee warriors, this 





nature of the host state matters as well.  A well-governed state with robust political 
institutions and a strong, vibrant civil society is less likely to let refugees living on 
their soil free reign top do as they please, especially in regards to launching military 
incursions into neighboring states (Lischer, 2006:6-9; Lischer, 2009:104-107; 
Salehyan and Gleditch, 2006:360) .  Empirically, these are the kinds of host states 
which actively seek to dampen the militarization and manipulation of the refugee 
communities by violent political entrepreneurs.  In doing so, these host-states will 
seek to separate armed refugees from the broader community and act as a protector 
for the refugee community.  They will provide aid and assistance, but also be aware 
that over the long term the refugees must not be allowed to rely exclusively on 
external aid (Salehyan, 2008791-792).  The refugees must be given opportunities to 
be self-sufficient and establish productive livelihoods.  They may be encouraged to 
integrate into the host state societies; although the host state maybe concerned that 
this will increase the likelihood of competition and friction between refugees and 
local over jobs and other resources (Stedman and Turner, 2003:179-190).  
Rebels may further manipulate refugee communities by forcibly moving 
people to gain territory or resources.  This demographic engineering is better 
known as ethnic-cleansing (Lischer, 2008:116).  This is instigated because armed 
groups want to homogenize the territory under their control as a way of securing 
their won position.  By moving out the “un-desirables” and moving the “desirables” 
in, they can manufacture a “shared experience of persecution.” Much like 
nationalism rests of a history of shared trauma; in this way too can rebel leaders 
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socially construct new, deeper in-group ties.  As new bonds form, people are more 
receptive to military propaganda.  Second, they can encourage a security dilemma 
mentality among the people.  This is comparatively simple since people recognize 
they may never return home and are vulnerable, a condition will only worsen with 
time.  Leaders can present themselves as legitimate protectors and that the group as 
a whole must arm themselves and eventually act to protect themselves and prevent 
future threats. 
On the contrary, host states which seek to use the refugee communities as 
tools in their own statecraft against rival and adversarial states are the most likely 
candidates for producing militarized refugee communities.  These host governments 
may arms the refugees and encourage cross-border raids and incursions.  These 
governments may fail to realize the ramifications of such actions: first, guns can be 
pointed both ways and there is no guarantee the now-armed refugees will not 
someday take aim against the host state government (Salehyan and Gleditch, 2006).  
More importantly, as noted above, cross-border attacks by refugees against the 
home/sending state often increases the risks that such attacks will spark a new 
interstate war and, ultimately, destabilize regional security.  Because these states 
look to the short-term, refugee communities in these places are more likely to be 
disorderly and squalid.  
Beyond security, refugees undoubtedly impact their host countries in other 
ways.  It has been noted that statistically, the world’s poorest states harbor most of 
the world’s refugees (Bakewell, 1999; Dowty and Loescher, 1996).  The 
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“uncontrolled flow across borders produces additional stress on already weak state 
institutions, heightens competition over scarce resources, and exacerbates ethnic 
and sectarian tensions” (Bakewell, 1999; Dowty and Loescher, 1996).  Refugees that 
mix with host societies can fundamentally affect local economies, influence foreign 
policies, and, especially in multi-ethnic states, modify individual and communal 
identities.  Refugees can be a political resource to host states if they contribute to 
the economy or are able to be used as a foreign policy tool.  Indeed, host countries 
often encourage refugees to engage in home state politics and conflicts, although the 
potential dangers of such policies have been discussed (Stedman and Turner, 2003: 
167-177.  
Refugees flee their homelands primarily to escape direct persecution or 
violence.  However, threats and insecurity often follow refugees into exile.  Even 
refugee communities which do not support militants may find themselves targeted 
by their home government, which may go so far as to conduct military operations, 
bombing camps or conducting raids and strikes.  When ethnicity is a factor is the 
displacement, rival ethnic groups may harass and target refugees, employing 
violence and threats of violence to maintain the new status quo.  This has happened 
with Sunni Iraqis refugees in Jordan and Syria (see Lischer, 2009) and has happened 
to Chechen refugees. 
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Chechen refugees have been targeted in almost every country.11  In Georgia 
and Azerbaijan, male Chechen refugees accused of being active or former militants 
have been targeted by the Russian special services.  These individuals are abducted 
in extraordinary-renditions, seized from foreign states and brought back to the 
Russian Federation.  Some abductees are never seen or heard from again; the 
remains of most are found along roads or in ditches in Chechnya bearing signs of 
repeated torture and execution.  Russian authorities use to existence of these bodies 
to bolster assertions that such individuals were active militants killed in anti-
terrorist operations.12  In Europe, Chechen refugees and asylum seekers have been 
targeted for assassination for speaking out against the gross human rights violations 
still occurring in Chechnya.  Even in the Middle East, prominent Chechen leaders 
have been assassinated.  Regardless of intent or locale, these policies have instilled a 
wide-spread climate of fear among Chechen refugees.  As we have seen in other 
cases, this situation, coupled with deplorable living conditions, increases the 
likelihood that Chechen refugee communities will become susceptible to increased 
radicalization and militarization in the future.  
It has been noted that refugee crises generate serious threats to state and 
regional security.  Some argue that the danger has a much longer reach given that 
9/11 was partly facilitated by one particular refugee group (the Taliban) from one 
                                                 
11 Author’s interviews, Baku, 2007; Warsaw, 2007; Brussels, 2008; Tbilisi, 2011.  These incidents are 
usually ignored in major western media outlets, however, they have been noted by Kavkaz Center, 
www.kavkazcenter.org; and The Jamestown Foundation, www.jamestown,org   
12 Author’s interviews with Chechen refugees and UNHCR representatives in Tbilisi, Georgia and 
Baku, Azerbaijan, 2006 to 2008. 
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particular region, Northwest Pakistan (see Schmeidl, 2002).   As such, it is important 
that we not ignore the processes of radicalization.  Lischer (2006; 2009) and 
Stedman and Turner (2003), respectively, discuss the conditions under which 
refugee communities can be militarized.  Yet, they do so primarily with a material 
focus.  They acknowledge the role that a perceived security dilemma can play in 
increasing the likelihood of militarization, but I contend there is still much more to 
contribute to the debate.  I believe that by better understanding how political goals 
and regime type preferences influence political violence, we can also glean insights 
into the levels of politicization within refugee communities.  This is important for 
understanding militarization. 
Currently, Chechen refugee communities are not overtly militarized.  No 
organized bands of political elite have attempted to establish a state-in-exile and, 
with the possible exception of Georgia and Azerbaijan, Chechen refugee 
communities are not producing significant numbers of refugee warriors.  This could 
change.  Chechen refugees, especially those living in the latter two countries, have 
little hope for third country repatriation to Europe and their chances of returning 
home grow increasingly small the longer they remain in exile.  Indeed, pro-Kremlin 
Chechen President, Ramzan Kadyrov has claimed that the war is over and all 
displaced Chechens should return home.  According to Kadyrov, individuals who 
remain abroad have “something to hide” and are thus considered enemies of the 
state (Gilligan, 2009).   
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Living conditions for most Chechen refugees are deplorable and, with 
increased donor fatigue and fewer resources, conditions will continue to 
deteriorate.  These are the very same material conditions which Adelaman (1998), 
Lischer (2006; 2008), and others warn will eventually produce militarization and 
refugee warrior communities, the first steps in the spiral of violence and instability.  
In this, communities will either be unwilling hostages to the process or willing 
participants.  I posit that my study can, therefore, do two additional things: first, it 
gives us a contemporary snapshot of refugee attitudes toward political violence and 
establishes the overall level of contemporary politicization.  If these levels are 
shown to be held by a significant number of refugees in a given location, it is, 
arguably, more likely that that community will have a greater propensity to become 
militarized and/or produce large numbers of refugee warriors.  Second, my study 
provides a foundation for future work in these communities.  If, over time, we see an 
increase or decrease in the number of refugee respondents accepting or rejecting 
political violence, we should know more about the likelihood of militarization. 
It is not clear that militarization is unidirectional or irreversible.  If 
conditions improve, we may witness a decrease in the number of respondents in 
favor of political violence.  The events in refugee communities may very well be 
driven by home state and/or host state conditions as well.  It has been shown that 
grievances alone are not enough; politics matter too.  Future studies must be 
attentive to all of these variables. 
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Finally, elites too play a role in influencing communal attitudes.  Elites can 
promote and propagate attitudes acceptant of political violence in refugee 
communities, which give communal elites, an opportune environment to 
indoctrinate a susceptible population psychologically primed by traumatic 
experiences.  Under normal conditions these elites would be theoretically hindered 
by collective action problems.  Yet refugee camps dampen the main impediments to 
collective action by bringing together victims and fighters and creating new in-
group bonds of solidarity and increasing uniformity in beliefs, all of which elites can 
instrumentally manipulate.13  In this scenario, elites frame political violence as 
necessary, persuading individuals that the costs of engaging in risky action are 
lower than inaction – a choice which would only serve to maintain what is already 
an untenable status quo.  They could also seek to create new in-groups by 
contrasting the refugee “us” against an ever expanding “them” that may now include 
not only the original enemy, but also other actors in the camp of the host country.  
Moreover, the more dramatic the elite goals, the more drastic and intensive the 
indoctrination process may be.  Elites will endeavor to use charisma and framing to 
sway potential recruits in an attempt to fundamentally change their general 
worldview.  In doing so, they often resort to appeals to the nation or religious group, 
                                                 
13 There is empirical evidence of this dynamic.  Indeed, the case of Nelson Mandela and the apartheid 
movement is illustrative because it reveals how government actions to contain and fracture a 
movement by incarcerating political dissidents ironically facilitated a stronger organization that was 
more united and dedicated to the cause. 
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brainwashing, or even physical force.14  In short, these elites exploit their 
circumstances as a way to mobilize resources.   
But why should this matter for attitudes?  First, the refugee experience itself 
increases the likelihood that individuals will come into regular contact with elites 
and social networks espousing political violence simply by bringing a large number 
of war victims together in a very small geographic location.  Elites and social 
networks with agendas of political violence are bound to be prevalent in refugee 
communities either due to displacement from war or because they strategically seek 
out such sites as prime recruitment grounds.  Such organizations could very well 
form the informal power structure within the camp, and thus be in a position to 
influence the refugee population.  As such, refugee communities may provide 
violent-minded elites certain select resources and other advantages that they 
otherwise would not have in their home country.  Furthermore, over time a critical 
mass of individuals holding violent attitudes could produce a type of group-think 
that promotes the widespread expansion of such beliefs among the general refugee 
population.  As more and more refugees agree that political violence is acceptable, 
psychology tells us that there will be immense pressure for even reluctant 
individuals to adopt congruent beliefs to remain a part of the group.  There will be a 
tipping point at which so many refugees have violent attitudes that it produces wave 
of violent attitudes or even the outbreak of actual political violence. Thus, we would 
see a similar dynamic as the first model: the more influence elites, normative 
                                                 
14 See Pedahzur, 2005.  
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entrepreneurs and networks there are in a camp, the greater the likelihood that we 
will witness the emergence of politically violent attitudes and possible violent 
action.  I will discuss this below in more detail. 
My study offers us a way to explore variation in the attitudes toward political 
violence among refugees and the conditions which lead to politically violent 
attitudes.  I do this primarily by exploring individual political goals and preferences.  
Still, it is important to recognize that the trauma of war and displacement are not 
enough to explain the root causes of attitudes supporting political violence.  If the 
trauma of war and displacement were so significant, it follows that we should 
observe a homogenizing effect on the communities, therefore witnessing only 
modest variation among or between refugee communities.  However, among 
Chechen refugees we do observe variation and this is a noteworthy finding, which 
challenges both cultural and emotive explanations for the social support of political 
violence in Chechen refugee communities. 
METHODS  
The goal of this empirical and inductive study is to explain the roots of 
political violence within a susceptible subset of a population that has adopted 
attitudes supportive of political violence.  Methodologically, this inductive study 
employed a mixed-methods approach, utilizing qualitative and ethnographic 
methods, such as direct participant-observer, to conduct 301 structured-interviews 
(in the Chechen and Russian language) with a range of Chechen refugees:  political 
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elites, average civilians, former fighters, and Chechens still active in the separatist 
movement.  
This analysis is based on nearly three years of fieldwork conducted between 
2006 and 2009 and again in the summer of 2011 in Chechen refugee communities in 
The Republic of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Poland, and Belgium.  The dissimilarities 
among these cases provided a unique opportunity to explore whether and how 
displacement into diverse environments has affected the propensity to actively 
support political violence or find it an acceptable means of behavior.   
CASE SELECTION 
In making my case selections, I was attentive to proximity, host-state politics 
and religion, and host-state history.  The research design planned to use each 
country as a unique laboratory to explore how these latter factors might play a role 
in influencing attitudes towards political violence.  To ensure the viability of my 
work, I conducted pre-fieldwork research trips to each country and made critical 
contacts in each respective Chechen refugee community.  I discuss these countries in 
greater detail in Chapter 6.  
The Republic of Georgia is the only country that shares a border with 
Chechnya.  It is a highly nationalist, Christian country and was a part of the former 
Soviet Union.  Relations with Russia today remain acrimonious.  The displaced 
Chechen community in Georgia resides mostly in the infamous Pankisi Gorge, 
although a smaller number live in Tbilisi.    
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Azerbaijan, is also a former Soviet Republic and proximate to the conflict.  
Azerbaijan is a Muslim country with great oil wealth, but also significant poverty.  
The Azeri government maintains close ties to the Kremlin and this relationship has 
caused a number of problems for the Chechen refugees in Baku, most of who exist in 
abject poverty and squalor and face continuous security threats, such as renditions 
and kidnappings, from the Russians. 
Poland was a part of the Soviet sphere, but maintained most of its distinct 
national culture throughout the Cold War.  Like Georgia, it too is a predominantly 
Christian country with less than cordial relations with Russia.  Poland is, for many 
Chechen refugees escaping along the northern route from Chechnya, the first stop.  
Many Chechens arrive illegally, smuggled through the Ukrainian forests.  For all 
Chechens, life can be difficult.  They are consigned to old Soviet Army barracks or 
military bases.  The conditions are cramped and crowded and many refugees try to 
escape to better living conditions farther west in Europe. 
In Belgium, Chechen refugees have a comparative paradise.  Belgium is a 
non-Muslim country with a rich mix of ethnic groups.  Belgium is the only country in 
this dissertation that was not a part of either the Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact.  
Firmly located in the “first world”, Belgium has prospered economically.  Chechen 





In the best of circumstances, conducting survey research can be challenging.  
There are a number of potential methodological pitfalls.  Researchers must control 
for population size, representative sampling, question framing, etc.  The vast 
majority of survey research occurs within organized, peaceful political units.  In 
refugee camps and communities, the usual methodological suspects do exist, but the 
more significant obstacles come from the inherent difficulties of working with a 
traumatize people still facing security threats.  Conducting research in refugee 
camps can be daunting; conducting research in Chechen refugee communities can 
be fatal.  There are risks specific to Chechens which need to be further discussed.  
These risks often complicate data collection and pose unique challengers to the 
researcher.  But they also function as a window into the nature and scope of 
violence endemic to refugee communities, revealing the true politicized and 
militarized nature of certain displaced populations.  Given these concerns and 
considerations, I employed the use of ethnographic research instruments to conduct 
a systematic exploration of the conditions under which displaced Chechens find 
political violence an acceptable form of behavior.  
One of the main instruments of ethnographic research is the role of direct 
participant-observer.  Ethnography seeks to study individuals and groups from the 
closest vantage point and as such, research is conducted through close interactions 
with ground-level processes and interlocutors.  Given the inherent challenges of 
conducting a methodologically rigorous, systematic study of refugees from ongoing 
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conflicts (security, harsh conditions, and isolated communities) ethnography 
provided the most appropriate method for ascertaining the attitudinal support for 
political violence among Chechen refugees.  Given security concerns, it was not 
possible to conduct a random sample survey.  As such, this study utilized “snowball” 
sampling, an acceptable ethnographic practice used to collect data from so-called 
hidden populations.  This method involves using initial meetings and interviews to 
secure subsequent interviews. This sampling method was invaluable in helping me 
gain trust in the refugee community. 
Fenno (1990) first popularized ethnographic research, breaking ground with 
his “Soak and Poke” approach to the study of politics, which privileged face-to-face 
interactions, an approach few political scientists embraced at the time.  Yet, it has 
since been noted that ethnographic research has long informed political science, 
especially among comparativists conducting fieldwork abroad.  Ethnographers 
argue that “close person-to-person contact that is attuned to the worldviews of the 
people we study is invaluable for a science of politics.  Taken as a 
whole…ethnography helps ensure an empirically sound, theoretically vibrant, 
epistemologically innovative, and normatively grounded study of politics” (Schatz, 
2010:4). 
ETHNOGRAPHY IN CONFLICT ADJACENT ZONES WITH VULNERABLE POPULATIONS  
It goes without saying that any scholar conducting fieldwork in conflict and 
conflict-adjacent zones faces unique methodological and practical challenges 
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(Grima, 2004; Nordstrom, 1997).  The first challenge is of course security, for both 
the researcher and the respondents, as well as for the collected data.15  Personal 
security was not as significant an issue in Poland or Belgium, although there were 
instances in the latter when suspicions of my true intent led some former fighters 
and high-level members of the Chechen resistance to voice violent threats against 
me.  I later learned that some of the individuals I met in Belgium were later arrested 
on suspicion of plotting terrorist attacks against Russian and Western targets.  The 
same was true of the Chechen refugees labeled as “Wahhabis” by their peers.16  
Fieldwork in Georgia and Azerbaijan was far more dangerous.  In Georgia, some of 
my research took place very close to the Chechen border in the infamous Pankisi 
Gorge.  The Gorge has traditionally been something of a “wild west”, a lawless 
frontier long the Georgian-Chechen border that has long been home to arms and 
narcotics smugglers.  During the two recent Russo-Chechen wars, Chechen 
resistance fighters used Pankisi as sanctuary for rest and re-supply and as a way to 
move from one theater of action in Chechnya to another without drawing Russian 
attention.  In particular, prominent warlord, Ruslan (Khamzat) Gelayev, the Black 
Angel, operated from the Gorge with full knowledge of both the Chechen refugee 
community and local Kists (an ethnic cousin of the Chechens and Ingush).  There 
were numerous exchanges between Gelayev’s band and the criminal gangs and local 
                                                 
15 This dissertation was conducted under the approved protocols of the human subjects review board 
at The University of Texas, Austin and all data was collected and stored accordingly. 
16 As of this writing, a recent raid in Belgium arrested a dozen Chechen refugees as part of a plot to 
raise funds and recruits for the fight against the Russians and for as yet to be released targets in 
Belgium (New York Times, November 2, 2010).  
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police.  After the September 11th attacks on America, the US provided Special Forces 
and Marines to train Georgian Anti-Terrorism units to enter and take control of the 
Gorge, leading to more firefights (Nichol, 2003).  
In Azerbaijan, most of the Chechen refugees live in squalid apartments or 
cardboard shanties in the ghettos of prosperous Baku.  These places are rife with 
petty criminals and murders, but the real danger came from one faction of Chechen 
refugees.  I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 6, but for now suffice it to say 
that the Chechen refugee community in Baku has split between the old moderate, 
national secularists aligned with Dudayev and a more radical, increasingly religious 
group.  The former operate a secular learning center funding by international aid 
groups, while the latter provide an austere religious instruction in a large mansion 
funded by Arabs and Turks.  In short, these were not easy places to access and to 
conduct systematic research.  However, it was not impossible and this fieldwork 
required “certain precautions and incredible delicacy” (Adler, 1992:229, as citied in 
Wood, 2003:40). 
THE “THREE T’S”:  TIME, TRUST, TRAUMA, AND SECURITY 
Asking questions about political violence from a community that has suffered 
a tremendous level of violence can be a daunting task.  In doing so, I was confronted 
by a series of impediments which I call, the “Three T’s”: Time, Trust, and Trauma.  
The first considerable obstacle was time.  It took an extensive amount of time 
to conduct these interviews.  First, it took time to actually travel to refugee 
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communities, especially those in the farther reaches of Pankisi Gorge.  In Poland and 
Belgium, I used Brussels and Warsaw, respectively, as a base of operations and often 
had to take busses or trains several hours to other cities to conduct interviews.  
Once arriving at a refugee dwelling, I was, as per the Chechen culture of the guest, 
fed a meal and served tea.  I was usually asked a number of personal questions.  
Often, after a couple of hours of this informal vetting, I was told that the family or 
individual had decided to grant me an interview, next week, thus causing the entire 
process to repeat.  Beyond the physical time to travel, it took time for me to gain the 
community and individual Trust.  At first, in many settings I was viewed as being a 
spy or CIA agent.  I was viewed with deep suspicion for my ability to speak Chechen 
and for the political nature of the questions I sought to ask.  Over time, especially in 
the Caucasus, the longer I stayed and lived among the people, the more I was 
trusted.  The more I endured the same physical hardships – sleeping in the freezing 
cold of the mountains, drinking the same “crunchy” calcium-laden water, suffering 
lice, stomach ailments, and what the Chechens jokingly referred to as “The Chechen 
Cough,” the more I was trusted.  In short, the more miserable my physical condition, 
the more likely the refugees were to speak with me.  Of course, I must note that in 
Belgium the opposite happened.  There, the longer I stayed the less I was trusted, 
being viewed with each passing day with growing suspicion.  Displaced Chechens in 
Belgium live good lives, and they recognize this.  In part, a sizeable number suffer 
from “NGO fatigue,” the natural exhaustion that comes with the countless hours of 
bureaucratic paperwork and forms necessary for third-country repatriation.  Among 
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another part of the population, individuals were seeking to protect criminal 
enterprises.  
The role of Trauma was an unexpected one.  In crafting my research design I 
did not initially pay adequate attention the role that trauma would play in my 
research.  The Chechens pride themselves on being a “people without tears.”  
Chechens try to not complain about their problems and, has been well documented 
by various human rights organizations, a number of Chechens suffer from a range of 
post-traumatic stress disorders and other psychological problems related to the 
war, many of which are exacerbated by communal cultural norms prohibiting 
speaking of ones problems.  As a result, in many instances a respondent had not 
spoken of his or her time in the war or during their forced migration.  Finally doing 
so often proved emotionally overwhelming, with some crying profusely.  From my 
point, I always tried to be sensitive to respondent’s emotional needs.  These 
incidents, although rare, also affected my own psyche.  I did, by the nature of this 
kind of research, become close with many Chechen refugees and it was not easy to 
hear personal stories of tragedy.  Psychologists are trained to distance themselves 
from their patients.  Political scientists conducting fieldwork in conflict and conflict 
adjacent zones are not and I raise this issue as both a caveat to contextualizing and 
understanding the inherent challenges and difficulty in conducting this kind of work 
and as a cautionary tale to future researchers.  
Finally, Security played a considerable role in this work.  First, as noted, all 
efforts were made to protect the identity and information of respondents.  This 
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study was given the full support and clearance of the IRB.  Personally, I made the 
decision that it was better to try and fit in with the Chechen refugee communities.  It 
is important to note that kidnapping is a cottage industry in the Caucasus and 
foreigners are viewed essentially as “walking ATMs”.  As such, I grew my beard long, 
cut my hair short, and wore local clothing, usually a black skullcap, an olive-drab 
army coat or sports wind-breaker, dark jeans, and black leather boots.  The result 
was that many people thought I was Chechen, including the authorities.  On 
innumerable occasions I was stopped and harassed by local security forces and 
authorities.  In the cities these stop and searches were usually little more than 
documents checks and attempts to solicit bribes.  In the mountains, things were 
different.  On several occasions I was held at gunpoint by purported special forces 
and security personal.  Thankfully, I was always able to talk my way out of these 
situations, but was told repeatedly that I was suspected as a foreign jihadist 
mercenary.  Despite the natural anxiety such encounters invariably caused, they did 
tend to increase my status and esteem with some members of the Chechen refugee 
community.  For others, especially in Belgium, these stories proved my employment 
with the American intelligence agencies.  Indeed, they reasoned, how could someone 
escape from so many encounters if they were not CIA? 
I again highlight these challenges to underscore the nature and difficulty of 
conducting such research.  It is, therefore, important to appreciate the work that can 
be done.  The alternative is to do nothing at all and, as noted, too little work of this 
nature is done as it is.  
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THE STRUCTURED-INTERVIEW PROCESS 
Research conducted in circumstances where conflict and violence are 
endemic must be done with careful deliberation and the utmost care.  My goal was 
to better understand specific attitudes, namely those pertaining to the use and limits 
of political violence.  In doing so, ensuring the safety and security of all parties was 
paramount.  Many Chechens rightfully fear for the safety of their families and I have 
taken significant precautions to ensure the anonymity of all respondents.  
For independent variables, I asked every respondent the same battery of 
questions related to demographic profiles, grievances, political goals and 
preferences, and preferences for regime type.  The dependent variable, attitudes 
towards political violence, was gleaned from structured-interviews which called on 
subjects to offer general assessments of their position on the acceptability of 
political violence as well as express their views on the legitimacy of four concrete 
events related to the conflict in Chechnya: the 2002 attack on Moscow’s Dubrovka 
Theater during a performance of, Nord-Ost; the 2004 attack on School #1 in Beslan, 
North Ossetia; the 2004 attack on military and police personnel in Nazran, 
Ingushetia; and the 2005 attack on military and police personnel in Nalchik, 
Kabardino-Balkaria.  These latter two attacks primarily targeted representatives of 
the state, while Nord-Ost and Beslan exclusively targeted civilians.  Questions 
regarding views on political violence are often susceptible to social desirability bias, 
a condition in which participants may be wary of expressing their true views in 
front of the researcher or may give answers they think the researcher wants to hear.  
 
63 
To avoid social desirability bias, I framed questions about political violence as such, 
“Certain members of the Chechen resistance claim that acts such as Nord-Ost, 
Beslan, Nalchik, and Nazran were both legitimate and necessary.  Do you think they 
are correct?” 
My structured interviews used both open and closed ended questions and 
were broken down into three sections.  Each respondent was asked the same 
questions in the same order.  In the first section, I asked basic demographic and 
personal information:  date of birth; previous residency; previous occupation; levels 
of education; personal loss, status as a fighter or veteran, history of torture or 
personal injury, etc.  In the second part of the interview I asked a series of questions 
about life as a Chechen refugee and about the challenges of maintaining Chechen 
culture during displacement, especially into presumably alien host countries and 
cultures.  I asked about their most pressing problems, about expectations and 
relative deprivation, about whether they were harassed by either the locals or local 
authorities, and about their general views and attitudes about life and family, 
religion and politics.  In the final section, I asked questions specifically pertaining to 
politics and political life.  In order to gauge and measure individual perceptions of 
political efficacy, I asked about voting patterns and, for example, whether they voted 
in the 1997 Chechen Presidential election and if so, for whom;17 I asked about Doku 
Umarov, constitutional successor to Aslan Maskhadov and Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev 
                                                 
17 Different presidential candidates represented very different views. Maskhadov was considered a 
moderate while Yandarbiev was an Islamic theologian and Basayev was considered the radical 
choice.   
 
64 
(both assassinated by Russian special services) and current leader of the Chechen 
separatist movement,18 and about which course of action he and his followers 
should pursue (e.g., should they continue to fight or lay down their arms); I asked 
about what should Chechnya be politically:  a part of Russia;  a part of Russia, but 
Autonomous, like the republic of Tatarstan; Independent; or part of a Caucasus 
Emirate.  This latter political entity would be an Islamic state composed of 
Ingushetia, Dagestan, parts of northern Georgia and Azerbaijan with Chechnya at the 
political and administrative apex.  I asked which form of governing institution was 
best for Chechnya.  Finally, the last four questions asked about the legitimacy of four 
concrete acts of political violence, two directed at civilians and two directed at 
representatives of the state:  the 2002 hostage taking at the Dubrovka Theater in 
Moscow, the 2004 Beslan school tragedy, and the attacks on military and police 
personnel in Nazran in 2004 and Nalchik in 2005.  Each of these events occurred 
after the respondent had settled into a refugee community.  The final chapter 
explores the relative influence of various “country effects”.  This analysis looks at 
the relationship between levels of relative deprivation, the extent of harassment 
from police and/or local populations, rates of employment, opportunities for 
education, access to social benefits and services, assessment of current living 
conditions, hopes for the future, and pressing concerns. 
                                                 
18 Umarov also holds the title of “Emir”, an Islamic-inspired military title, which reflects his stance on 
the establishment of a Caucasus caliphate as well as the growing shift towards international jihadism 
among the Chechen separatists.  
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All interviews began with an introduction by someone known to the 
refugees.  This was sometimes an aid worker, but more often than not it was 
through a local contact, fellow refugees.  In Georgia the son of a prominent 
resistance leader assisted me in my research.  I met this young man in a previous 
trip to Georgia to study the Chechen language and our friendship undoubtedly 
paved the way for most of my interviews.  It was through this contact that I was put 
in touch with a group and some individuals in Baku.  I was fortunate that my contact 
was a familiar face to both sides of the intra-communal split and as such I was able 
to easily conduct a number of in-depth structured interviews.  In Poland and 
Belgium I relied on my contacts from The Chechnya Advocacy Network.  In Poland I 
was eventually put in touch with the eldest daughter of a village elder.  This man 
and his village were rather famous for their stand against Russian aggression in the 
two wars, providing me again with a trusted endorsement.  In Belgium my contact 
was a former spokesman for Dudayev.  All of the individuals spoke fluent English as 
well as Russian and Chechen (both written and spoken).  
All interviews were conducted in whichever language the respondent 
preferred, usually Chechen.  Many Chechens from urban areas have only a 
rudimentary knowledge of Chechen since the Soviet authorities banned it.  Chechens 
from rural areas are more literature in both spoken and written Chechen.  Most 
interviews involved an initial meeting, often with a group or entire family, in which 
my project and security protocols, especially anonymity for the interviewee were 
discussed.  In essence, these were opportunities for the potential respondents to 
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evaluate and vet me.  Very few individuals refused an interview after such a session. 
Refusals were more common when the request was made by my contact 
independent of my knowledge.  The structured interview utilized both open and 
closed ended questions and was divided into three sections.  In the first section, I 
asked questions related to basic demographics.  In the second section, I asked about 
culture and daily life.  Finally, in the third section I asked about political views and 
attitudes towards violence.  The interviews lasted anywhere from a few minutes to 
several hours depending on the respondent.1 In all instances, the structured 
interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis.  This includes interviews with 
displaced Chechen females.  In some interviews with women, Chechen male 
relatives demanded to remain in visual proximity of the interview but out of 
earshot, thus increasing the likelihood of more accurate responses from female 
respondents. 
The goal of this research was, like most micro-comparative studies of 
political violence, to disaggregate the “community,” expand the number of 
observations, and generate new hypotheses about the relationships of different 
variables.  There are, however, still empirical expectations about various 
relationships between certain groups or individuals and the support of political 
violence and militant activity.  The following are the original hypotheses, based on 




H1:  Young men will be more acceptant of political violence than other 
demographic groups within Chechen refugee communities. 
The expectation is that young men are both more likely than others to have 
directly participated in the war (thus increasing their pre-camp grievances) and 
more likely to be subject to elite persuasion as recruits for future acts of political 
violence.  More importantly, young men are viewed as being the most prone to 
violent group in many societies for a number of genetic or biological, social, or 
cultural reasons (Hayden and Potts, 2008).  These are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5.    
H2:  Chechen refugees who have lost immediate family members in the war will 
be more acceptant of political violence than other refugees. 
Numerous psychological studies have shown that victims of violence often 
resort to violence.  This dynamic in Chechnya is compounded by the predominant 
social norm of a “blood code,” which demands reciprocal vengeance for murdered 
kin (Boehm, 1984; Bodansky, 2007; Tishkov, 2004; Volkan, 1997; Zaurbekova and 
Yandarov, 2001). 
H3:  Chechen refugees who hold maximal political goals (e.g., support for an 
Islamic Caucasus Emirate) will be more acceptant of political violence than refugees 
who hold more modest political goals. 
I have argued that attitudes supporting political violence are based on both 
emotive and rational considerations.  Emphasizing the latter, it should be the case 
 
68 
that those refugees who support maximal political goals such as the complete 
independence of Chechnya from Russia would be more apt to find violence as an 
acceptable instrument of political action. 
H4: Chechen refugees from rural areas and mountain teips (clans) will be more 
acceptant of political violence than other Chechen refugees. 
According to several sources, Chechens from rural areas and the mountain 
teips were more likely than Chechens who lived in the northern plains and urban 
centers to support the war effort against the Russians and thus more likely to have 
been active participants in the fighting (Tishkov, 2004).  Besides providing the 
opportunity to investigate this link between local identities and violent attitudes, 
questions regarding place of birth and residence may also be used as a proxy for 
battle experience.   
H5:  Chechen Refugees will be more likely to support acts of political violence 
directed at authorities and representatives of the state and reject acts directed 
exclusively at civilian targets.  
This assumption follows from the logic of natural human aversion to 
violence, thus placing non-combatants outside the acceptable framework for 
legitimate targets (Silke, 2003).  This logic would not hold for representatives of the 
state, such as police of soldiers.  
H6: Chechen refugees with higher education will be more acceptant of political 
violence than other less educated Chechen refugees. 
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This hypothesis could be posed in the inverse; a number of socio-economic 
theories suggest that lesser educated individuals are more likely to support and 
actually commit violence (Berebbi, 2003; Kreuger and Maleckova, 2003; Lochner, 
2007). Of course, other evidence suggests that higher education creates more 
awareness and, consequently, more political dissatisfaction (Lerner, 1958; Shafiq 
and Sinno, 2010)..  
H7: Chechen refugees living in communities closest to the conflict and farthest 
from the conflict will be more likely to have attitudes acceptant of political violence as 
a legitimate means to achieve political goals than refugees living in other camps. 
Refugee communities closest to the conflict may be disproportionately 
populated by elites and social networks that advocate the use of violence because 
these individuals and groups can use these communities as areas of rest and re-
supply (Adelman, 1998; Salehyan, 2007; Stedman and Turner, 2003).  .  Moreover, 
the proximity of war produces an environment of endemic fear that makes engaging 
in or supporting political violence more attractive (Lischer, 2006:36).  Refugees 
living in communities farthest from the conflict may experience higher rates of 
relative deprivation, cultural isolation and/or discrimination, which translate into a 
higher probability of engaging in or supporting such behaviors.  Moreover, the 
geographical distance from the conflict reduces the threat of retaliation for 
supporting and engaging in political violence, thus altering the rational calculations 
of supporting political violence.  This logic is similar to the Irish-American’s support 
of the Irish Republican Army. 
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 H8: Chechen refugees living in communities located in non-Muslim countries 
will be more acceptant of political violence than their counterparts living in camps 
located in Muslim countries. 
Theoretically, Chechen communities in non-Muslim countries will experience 
real or perceived cultural isolation and/or discrimination which in turn will produce 
closer in-group cohesion and will make the religious and ethnic component of 
individual and communal social identities a more salient identification marker.  As 
ethno-religious identities crystallize, tensions between the minority in-group and 
majority out-group can lead to existential fears (Posen, 1993) which may make 
Chechen refugees more acceptant of political violence. 
 H9: Chechen refugees living in larger refugee communities will be more 
acceptant of political violence than refugees living in smaller ones. 
Other studies have confirmed that larger refugee populations are more often 
involved in political violence than smaller populations (Lischer, 2006:38-40).  The 
larger the camp, the worse the conditions are likely to be, increasing grievances, and 
the higher the probability that elites and networks that advocate violence will be 
present, increasing the chances for elite persuasion. 
H10:  Chechen refugees who rate the conditions of their camp as worse than 
they expected will be more acceptant of political violence than refugees who hold more 
favorable views of camp conditions.   
This hypothesis builds on our argument that the perception of poor 
conditions inside the camp can exacerbate feelings of grievance and relative 
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deprivation, which in turn should increase acceptance of political violence as a 
legitimate means to escape an intolerable situation (Lischer, 2006:38-40). 
 
The discussion thus far has presumed there would be sufficient variation 
among or within communities.  It is important to note that if my study yielded no 
variation among or within the Chechen refugee communities the result would be 
because of one of two arguments.  First, perhaps grievances arising from an 
intolerable war-time experience are so severe and widespread that all of Chechen 
society has turned to political violence as the only attractive solution.  If this is the 
case, my research would show little variation in levels of perceived victimization 
and dissatisfaction with camp conditions.  Secondly, a lack of variation in attitudes 
on political violence may lend support to a cultural argument about the particular 
nature of Chechen society.  This study starts with the assumption that certain 
subgroups within Chechen society are more amenable to violent attitudes because 
of their war-time experiences and the likelihood of being targets of elite persuasion.  
If such groups actually did not hold different beliefs about political violence than 
other, presumably less violence-prone, subgroups it may very well be due to an 
overwhelming influence of deeper cultural attitudes.  Boehm (193), Ross (1993), 
Tishkov (2004), Volkan (1997) and others argue that there are indeed violent 
ethno-national groups and that individuals socialized in a culture of shared 
meanings and understandings would be instilled with an interpretive framework 
that influences subsequent perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors.  As such, any lack 
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of variation on the dependent variable could be attributed to Chechen cultural 
norms, traditions, and symbols, all of which anthropological, historical, media and 
literary sources have suggested explain Chechen violence and belief in the 
acceptability of violent behavior.  In short, widespread acceptance of political 
violence among Chechen refugees may indicate that there is some truth to the idea 
that Chechens are a people prone to violence. Fortunately, this study did expose 
significant variation and, in doing so, provide both insights into the social support 
for political violence among displaced Chechens and give us new relationships for 
future exploration. 
POPULATION SIZE AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE 
How many Chechen refugees are there?  In general, it has been noted that it 
is difficult if not impossible, to accurately count the number of refugees in any 
conflict (see Blakewell, 1999; Crisp, 1999).  Regrettably, it is impossible to ascertain 
accurate figures for the total size of the Chechen refugee population, mainly because 
each side has an incentive to misrepresent the real numbers.  The Russians have 
traditionally underestimated the actual number of refugees while the Chechens have 
tended to overestimate the number.  In many cases, this is done out of practical 
necessity to survive.  The Chechen refugees, many of whom rely exclusively on 
subsistence from either host governments or some combination of NGO/IGO aid, 
often inflate the size of their family members so that they will receive more goods.  
The surplus can then be stored away or sold on the black-market for other 
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commodities.  This fact, coupled with the UN mandate protecting refugees, means 
that UNHCR representatives are equally wary of discussing population numbers, 
especially with outsiders.  Consequently, we can only estimate the total size of the 
Chechen refugee population.  In Georgia, there are anywhere from 500 to 2,000 
Chechen refugees (this is down from a high of 10,000 in 1999).  In Azerbaijan, they 
range from 1,000 to 3,000.  In Poland, there are between 1,000 and 3,000.   Lastly, in 
Belgium there are approximately 1,500.19  
I interviewed a total of 301 Chechen refugees.  Disaggregated by country, I 
conducted 71 interviews in Georgia, 71 in Azerbaijan, 100 in Poland, and 59 in 
Belgium.20  75% (226) were males and 25% (75) were females and 61% (184) came 
from rural areas, while 38.8 % (117) came from the urban centers and cities.  Most 
(89.3% [269]) had only secondary education with just 10.6% (32) reporting to have 
completed university or technical school.  Fifteen were tortured and six were 
amputees.  77.7% (234) were self-declared civilians and 21.9% (66) self-declared 
former-fighters or veterans.21  4.3% (13) were verified political or economic elites. 
It is not clear if there are indeed more males than females in Chechen refugee 
communities.  There is a strong possibility that this is the case.  Many Chechen males 
I interviewed had wives and children back home.  This was due to the deplorable 
                                                 
19 Author’s confidential interviews with United Nations High Commission on Refugees officials, 
various human rights groups, non-governmental organizations, and intergovernmental agencies.  
20 These numbers represent the total number of refugees I could interview in the time allocated in 
each site.  
21 These numbers are not accurate representations of the number of former fighters in the various 
refugee communities. Given the security concerns, a number of individuals who I was later told had 
indeed fought still identified themselves as civilians caught up in the war. These numbers represent 
those who actually admitted to being a former fighter. 
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conditions in the refugee communities and the males’ inability to find gainful 
employment and provide for the whole family, the traditional/cultural expectation. 
Some men sent their wives home because of their extended kinship ties which 
meant supporting the family was best done at home.  In post-war Chechnya women 
are better able to find work, thus making them the sole bread-winner for many 
families.  There is also a security element at play.  Predominantly, Chechen males are 
more likely to be targeted by the Russian or Kadyrov authorities in Chechnya, so it is 
safer for them to flee, although in the Caucasus this is not always the case.  A final 
answer is that because of the Chechens strong patriarchal norms regarding women 
and foreigners, I, as a foreign male, was not afford equal access to a proportionate 
number of female refugees.  This too happened in some instances in which I 
interviewed a male but was not allowed to interview or even be introduced to a 
wife, sister or daughter.  It has been noted that female scholars researching 
Chechens have experienced the opposite effect (see Sczepanikova, 2008). 
In this dissertation, I make three principle arguments:  1) Refugees who 
desire maximal political goals, such as the establishment of a Caucasus Islamic 
Emirate, are more likely to support political violence; 2) There is a correlation 
between refugees who embrace religious authority (sharia) as political authority 
and support for political violence; 3) Male Chechen refugees will be more likely to 
support political violence than female refugees. 
In the next chapter, I present a brief case history of Chechnya and her 
relations with Russia.  Russia has fought a number of Islamic guerrilla campaigns in 
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the North Caucasus over the centuries and this turbulent history has clearly affected 
modern relations.  As such, it is important to contextualize the current violence in 
light of these historical precedents.  For many Chechens, this past is viewed as being 




Chapter 3:  Chechnya – A History, A People, A Culture, A Tragedy 
An angel came down from Heaven and saw an old man weeping on the banks of a 
river.  “Why do you cry?” the angel asked.  “I am a Chechen,” the old man replied.  And 
the angel sat down and wept with him. 
Chechen Proverb 
 
Chechnya is a small, mountainous republic, roughly 12,000 square miles, 
located between the Black and Caspian Seas.  Its total population prior to the wars 
was approximately one and a half million, making Chechens the largest homogenous 
ethnic group in the North Caucasus.  The republic is comparatively flat in the 
northern lands, becoming increasingly rugged farther south into the Caucasus 
Mountains.  Economically, the region was distinguished for its vast petroleum and 
natural gas reserves and prior to the wars Chechnya was a major hub for petroleum 
refinement.  Still, under the Soviets the Chechens remained one of the more 
economically backward peoples (Jaimouka, 2004). 
The peoples of the North Caucasus have historically been uncompromising to 
foreign domination, yet no group has resisted as long and as ferociously as the 
Chechens (Gammer, 2004).  Under the Soviets the Chechens suffered 
disproportionate hardships, even by Communist standards, culminating in the 
forced deportation of the entire ethnic population to the frozen steppes of 
Kazakhstan during the apex of World War II, because Joseph Stalin feared Chechen 
collusion with the advancing German Army (Dunlop, 1998:61-75).  Accordingly, 
when the Soviet Union began to disintegrate the Chechens became hopeful that, like 
other conquered peoples, they too would finally receive their long awaited freedom 
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and independence.  History has repeated itself, however, in the quest for 
independence and the Chechens have endured near-constant warfare since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.   
In this chapter, I will explore the contentious relationship between the 
Russians and Chechens, chronicling the history of warfare as a way to better 
understand the current environment.  I will briefly discuss the tumultuous first 
encounters between the Russians and Chechens in the 1700s and the emergence of 
Islamic-based resistance to Tsarist forces. Then, I will chronicle the events of the 
20th Century starting with the post 1917 Revolution and attempt to break free to the 
1944 Great Deportation and later Rehabilitation under Khrushchev. Finally, I will 
chronicle post-Soviet Chechnya, paying particular attention to the 1991 Chechen 
Revolution, the surprising Chechen victory in the First Russo-Chechen War, the rise 
of warlordism and foreign Islam in the inter-war years, and the launch of the Second 
Russo-Chechen War in 1999.  In doing so, it is important to note that this chapter 
will primarily discuss military and political events.  Chechen economic and social 
issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
FIRST ENCOUNTERS 
Conflict in the North Caucasus and in the region now known as Chechnya has 
raged intermittently since the mid-18th century, although the earliest reports of 
fighting between Czarist Russian forces and local Muslim tribes in the region date 
back as early as 1722 when Tsarina, Catherine the Great first sent her armies to 
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probe Russia’s southern flank along the Ottoman Empire (Gammer, 2004; King and 
Menon, 2010:22-25).  By the mid-18th century Russian troops came to occupy much 
of the area and this presence sparked what would become the first of many Muslim 
insurgencies against Russian forces.  The first resistance was led by Sheikh Mansur, 
a Muslim cleric of dubious origins, who unified the numerous Chechen clans and 
declared holy war on the Tsarist army, delivering a shocking defeat to Russian 
forces in 1785 (Gammer, 2006:17-54). Mansur is viewed as a mystical figure and an 
inspiration to generations of Chechen separatists.  Today many displaced Chechens 
hang portraits of the more famous Imam Shamil, but among the more committed 
Chechen separatists one finds pictures of Mansur hanging prominently.  
In the aftermath of Mansur's victory, the Tsar dispatched additional troops to 
the North Caucasus with the politico-military objective of annexing the region. This 
decision had more to do with fears of Ottoman invasion than it did with the 
particulars of the Chechen lands (Blanch, 1960; Dunlop, 1998:35).  Nonetheless, it 
was during the course of this renewed escalation in violence that the second great 
military leader of Muslim resistance to the Russians emerged, an ethnic Avar from 
Dagestan named, Imam Shamil.  Shamil would lead a four decade resistance against 
the overwhelming power of the Russian state by using emerging guerilla techniques 
to the region, tactics like hit and run ambushes, attacks on supply lines, and targeted 
assassinations to thwart Russian efforts (Blanch, 1960; Dunlop, 1998:28; Gammer, 
2004; Gammer, 2006:45-59).   
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As the Muslim fighters continued to resist, Russian forces poured into the 
region and began to counter Caucasian guerrilla warfare with their own brand of 
warfare, total war.  Presaging the conduct of Russian forces some century and a half 
later, under the direction of General Yermolov, a hero of the Napoleonic Wars, the 
Russians engaged in a scorched earth policy, burning crops and villages, hacking 
down the thick birch forests that sheltered the guerillas, and establishing a series of 
forts, the largest of which he called “Terrible” to convey the appropriate levels of 
fear he deemed necessary to quell the rebellious mountaineers (Dunlop, 1998; 
Gammer, 2006; Toft, 2010:115).  The fort city still stands to today and still bears the 
same name, in Russian, Grozny.   These tactics, while incredibly harsh and brutal, 
eventually crushed the resistance.  Shamil was captured in 1859 and although the 
Chechens fought on after his arrest, they too surrendered a decade later (Blanch, 
1960; Dunlop, 1998:29;  Gammer, 2006:64-66).   
It was during this period that the greater Russian people were introduced to 
their formidable neighbors to the south.  A number of later literary greats, men such 
as Alexander Pushkin, Mikhail Lermontov, and Leo Tolstoy served with Tsarist 
troops in Chechnya and Dagestan.  After witnessing the destruction of one particular 
Chechen village and the brutal repression of its inhabitants, Tolstoy described the 
residents' reaction as, 
No one spoke of hatred for the Russians.  The feeling which all Chechens felt, 
both young and old, was stronger than hatred.  It was...such a revulsion, 
disgust and bewilderment at the senseless cruelty of these beings, that the 
desire to destroy them, like a desire to destroy rats, poisonous spiders and 
wolves, was as natural as the instinct for self-preservation. 
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FROM TSAR TO COMMISSAR  
Despite the long 18th Century War and the nature of its conduct, Chechnya 
remained fairly stable after it was granted a semi-autonomous status within Russia.  
This relative calm would last until the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 (Broxup, 1992).  
When the Bolsheviks seized power the Chechens again used the chaos within Russia 
to attempt to create an independent North Caucasian state, an Islamic Caucasus 
Emirate. I will discuss the significance of this political goal in greater detail in 
Chapter 4, however, for now I will briefly address the historical context of the 
Caucasus Emirate. 
Mansur and later Shamil articulated similar goals in their respective 
campaigns against Tsarist forces.  In the 20th Century, the peoples of the Caucasus 
tried to create such a political unit from 1918 to 1920 in the detritus of the collapse 
of the Tsarist regime.  After Tsar Nicholas II abdicated the throne, a Congress of the 
North Caucasus met in Vladikavkaz to establish a new overarching governing body 
for an independent state, the Independent Democratic Republic of Mountaineers of 
the North Caucasus, a political unit that is similar to today’s Caucasus Emirate 
(Avtorkhanov, 1992:152). The North Caucasus Emirate proposed in 1918 was even 
recognized by foreign powers; Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey all 
recognized the polity, the Turks going so far as to enter into a formal alliance with 
the North Caucasians on June 8, 1918 (Avtorkhanov, 1992:152). 
 Eager to enlist the support of the highlanders in the struggle against the pro-
Tsarist White Armies in the emerging Russian Civil War, on January 20, 1921, 
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Vladimir Lenin sent Josef Stalin, as Commissar of Nationalities, to meet with 
delegates from the North Caucasus Emirate at a Congress of Mountaineers in North 
Ossetia (Avtorkhanov, 1992:152).  Although he later reneged, Stalin offered the 
Caucasians, in exchange for highlander recognition of Soviet power, the possibility 
of a unique Soviet polity, autonomy in the form on an Autonomous Soviet Mountain 
Republic (Schafer, 2010:95-98).  As the Soviets took full control in Moscow, they 
exerted more power in the Caucasus, forcibly subduing the resistance in the early 
1930s. When the Russians again offered the Chechens a nominally autonomous 
republic in 1936 in a bid to end the violence, the Chechens joined with neighboring 
Ingushetia in 1934 to form a joint republic that was later named the Chechen-Ingush 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Dunlop, 1998:46).  
THE GREAT DEPORTATIONS OF 1944 
Less than a decade after the seeming normalization of relations between the 
center and periphery, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, on the heels of numerous purges 
of the communist party, the military and other ethnic groups, decided the Chechens 
could not be trusted in such a pivotal region, especially as Hitler’s Nazi Armies were 
pouring into the Soviet Union.  Accusing the Chechens of being pro-Nazi, Stalin 
deported nearly the entire population, more than 500,000 men, women and 
children, to the frozen steppes of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Stalin's deportation 
orders were carried out on February 23, 1944, a date that remains a touchstone in 
Chechen history (Dunlop, 1998:61-72; Gall and de Waal, 1998:56-75). 
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The Chechens stayed in Kazakhstan for more than ten years, isolated from 
the local Kazakhs and resentful of the Soviets. Following Stalin's death in 1953, the 
Soviets eased their restrictions on the Chechens and Ingush and almost all had 
begun to return to their homeland by 1957 (King and Menon, 2010:26).   Although 
reports vary widely, experts estimate some 200,000 Chechens died during the exile 
(Dunlop, 2008:70).  Khrushchev finally allowed the Chechens to return home en 
mass. Yet, ever mindful of the role of religion in fomenting resistance the Soviets 
continued to curtail their ability to practice Islam, and many of the region’s mosques 
were not rebuilt until well into the 1970s (Gammer, 2006:166-184). 
The region once again experienced an uneasy calm during the 1970s and 80s, 
but as the Soviet Union began to unravel, Chechnya once again made a move 
towards independence (Dunlop, 1998:80-84). Like prior attempts, the 
independence movement would soon devolve into a guerilla war between the 
Russian army and militant separatists aimed at ending more than 150 years of 
Russian rule. 
THE CHECHEN REVOLUTION AND THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE  
As early as November 1990, the Chechen people formed the Chechen 
National Congress as a platform to address national issues and as a mechanism to 
organize politically for what they assumed would be inevitable autonomy (Lieven, 
1998:159).  Indeed, the Chechens naturally assumed that if Tajiks and Uzbeks were 
being granted sovereignty, they too would soon be independent.  Newly elected 
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President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was even telling the republics to 
“swallow as much sovereignty as you can,” a declaration which resonated deeply 
with the Chechens (Trenin and Malashenko, 2004:57). 
Soon after its inception, the Chechen National Congress held a number of 
events to celebrate and glorify Chechen history and culture and to exert pressure on 
the local Communist authorities, still technically in charge, to initiate change.  
Among the guest speakers was a newly promoted Soviet Air Force General, 
Dzhokhar Dudayev (Gall and de Waal, 1998:76-86).  Dudayev was already a minor 
celebrity for his rare achievements. As discussed in Chapter 5, under Soviet rule 
there was a highly formalized hierarchy of ethnicity.  Ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, 
and Byelorussians were at the top, thus affording them access to the best education 
and the top positions in the Communist Party and Red Army.  At the bottom of this 
hierarchy were the Central Asians, the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen, and 
Caucasians, Azeris, Armenians, and Ingush.  Below them, at the very bottom, were 
the Chechens. Long distrusted, they were primarily relegated to the world of 
migrant labor and low-level factory work. Accordingly, a former fighter pilot and 
Soviet General, one in charge a nuclear bomber-wing in Estonia was afforded 
significant admiration (King and Menon, 2010:26).  
Dudayev took the stage and gave an unexpectedly resounding and inspiring 
speech calling for Chechen unity and independence.22  Within a month, Dudayev was 
                                                 
22 Dudayev’s outspoken nationalism may have been used to as a compensation for his weak Chechen 
roots. He was born in exile and spent most of his adult life in the military – stationed outside 
Chechnya – and had married an ethnic Russian whose father was a top-ranking Soviet officer. 
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elected Chairman of the National Congress, and within the year, parliamentary and 
presidential elections were held in which Dudayev received 85% of the popular vote 
(Gall and de Waal, 1998:75-77).  For the first time in 150 years, it appeared the 
Chechen people were finally free.   
At this point in Chechen domestic politics, the key factor in the initial political 
mobilization was not primarily nationalist or religious, but anti-Communist. 
Dudayev played upon the Chechen aversion of certain aspects of Communist 
ideology, such as the hyper-centralization and inefficiency of the political and 
economic systems, and sought to mobilize support against the only other prominent 
politician in Chechnya, the former first secretary of the Chechen Communist party, 
Doku Zavgayev (Evangelista, 2002:15-16).  These initial appeals to simple and 
emotional themes of freedom, fatherland and resistance would prove momentarily 
effective, but ultimately insufficient for the societal mobilization to come. Of course, 
it should be noted that though he professed secular ambitions, Dudayev was acutely 
aware of the traditional role of Islam in Chechen society and, as such, made several 
token gestures and overtures to the emerging class of Sufi clerics, including using 
the Quran to swear the oath of office and changing the official day of rest from 
Sunday to Friday.  More importantly, these gestures were motivated by Dudayev’s 
desire to attract foreign capital and support from his southern Muslim neighbors 
(German, 2003:65).  
Chechnya’s democratic experiment would prove short lived; once elected 
Dudayev issued a decree bestowing the executive office with emergency powers for 
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one month, although he would never relinquish these powers.  His second decree, 
on November 2, 1992, was an official declaration of Chechen independence from the 
Russian Federation (Handleman, 1995:240).   Dudayev publicly stated, “I’ve always 
had just one idea – to fight for the Chechen people’s right to independence.  That’s 
my life’s goal and I will not shy away from it. Not under any conditions or any 
pressure” (Smith, 1998:128). 
In accordance with these goals, Chechnya, along with Tatarstan, refused to 
sign the new Russian Federal Treaty. At the time, Kremlin officials were preoccupied 
with consolidating their own domestic power and were in no position to react.  They 
issued a desultory attempt to pressure Chechnya into signing the treaty, yet tacitly 
recognized Chechen independence in exchange for bilateral agreements codifying 
mutually close relations.  Yeltsin initially endorsed Dudayev in the mistaken belief 
that he could be a reliable partner, but the relationship soon soured (Dunlop, 1998: 
169-170; Shetsova, 1999:110).   
In Moscow, the Kremlin feared the broader geo-political implications of a 
sovereign Chechnya. In particular, the Kremlin feared a “domino effect” whereby 
independence in one Muslim republic would begin to spread to the rest of the North 
and West Caucasus and, eventually, up the Volga River to the resource-rich 
republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.  To avoid an all-out invasion, Yeltsin tried 
to create a more pragmatic and pro-Moscow government in Chechnya. He 
erroneously believed Dudayev’s own mistakes and administrative impotence would 
result in a popular revolt against the former general.  Yeltsin and his advisors 
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believed that by applying minimal economic pressure on Dudayev his rule would 
disintegrate from within.  But rather than weakening Dudayev, Yeltsin’s sanctions 
elevated him to folk hero status.  Indeed, Russian actions gave Dudayev the 
necessary exogenous ‘enemy’ against which to mobilize the Chechen people and 
keep the now burgeoning opposition parties in check (Bennett, 1999:329).  Dudayev 
continued his call for full independence and opposition to Moscow, despite the 
sanctions, and quickly moved to solidify his support with the militant Chechen 
highlanders (Gall and De Waal, 1998: 187).   
By the spring of 1994, Russia’s reentry into Chechnya was becoming obvious. 
The indigenous opposition to Dudayev, although diverging on parochial goals, 
collectively called for the reconciliation of Chechen political groups and issued an 
appeal for Dudayev to seek negotiations with Yeltsin as the relationship between 
the two was were becoming increasingly antagonistic. (German, 2003:95)  Still, even 
with public articulations of solidarity, the opposition groups were composed of 
political novices and no one rival was able to match the military prowess of 
Dudayev’s Chechen National Guard (Seely, 2001:115).  Nonetheless, making little 
progress politically, the groups decided to take Dudayev on directly and soon 
engaged in low-intensity military engagements.  The violence remained limited until 
June 1994, when former prisoner and warlord, Ruslan Labazanov’s forces protested 
in the Grozny town square, calling for the government’s resignation.  A fierce battle 
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ensued and Labazanov was forced to flee.23  Dudayev’s harsh treatment towards the 
opposition and desecration of human remains, posting the severed heads of 
slaughtered protesters, disgusted the Chechen people and rather than abolishing a 
dangerous but relatively small group, he had unwittingly provided it legitimacy and 
recruits (German, 2003:100).  
Once more Dudayev’s rule seemed destined to collapse, and faced with the 
emergence of new political competition, several assassination attempts, and 
increasing Russian military support to his rivals, he sought advice from his Vice 
President, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev who, based on his experience and contacts with 
Wahhabi clerics and militants, persuaded him to utilize more overt and radical 
Islamic appeals.  It was at this point that Dudayev decided to “turn Chechen Islam 
into an instrument for the manipulation of mass awareness” (Dunlop, 1998:148). 
Dudayev soon dissolved the Chechen Parliament and relied on the elevated public 
status of the traditional, religiously sanctioned Council of Elders to provide a façade 
of democracy and political legitimacy although he continued to rule exclusively by 
presidential decree (Gall and de Waal, 1998:101-102).24   
In the summer of 1994, Yeltsin decided to increase support to the opposition 
groups.  The Russians began to actively support armed revolt against Dudayev and 
by August 1994, open civil war had erupted in Chechnya.  Yeltsin provided the 
opposition with arms, helicopters, and tanks in order to topple the Dudayev regime 
                                                 
23 Dudayev executed and beheaded four of Labazanov’s cousins and put the severed heads on public 
display thus, igniting a traditional Chechen blood feud between the two men. 
24 Dudayev did maintain the actual body and the Constitutional Court, although neither had any 
power, thus making the republic a presidential dictatorship; See Dunlop, 1998. 
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(German, 2003:109).  The decision to abandon negotiations and embark on a 
military campaign was made primarily because Yeltsin misperceived the domestic 
situation in Chechnya and the dynamics of Chechen domestic politics.  In Chechnya’s 
incipient civil conflict, Dudayev had taken only limited military actions against his 
rivals.  Yeltsin perceived this as a dispositional weakness while in all likelihood 
Dudayev acted in this manner so as to not alienate potential supporters.  The 
Kremlin realistically hoped to exploit inter-Chechen divisions, and in exchange for 
the military assistance given to opposition forces, usher into power a pro-Moscow, 
puppet government.  In order to ensure success, “volunteers” from the Russian army 
were recruited by the FSB (the successor agency to the KGB) to join the opposition 
(Souleimonov, 2007:92-93).  
From November 25, 1994 through November 27, 1994, bitter fighting ensued 
between the two factions.  In the end, even with Russian military assistance, 
Dudayev’s regime was able to rout the opposition and in doing so captured some 
twenty-one Russian soldiers (Souleimonov, 2007:98-100).  Dudayev realized the 
political capital these troops represented and openly called on the Russian 
government to recognize the troops as prisoners of war; in the absence of such an 
admission they would be executed as mercenaries (Gall and de Waal, 1998:156).  
More importantly, the revelation of Russians fighting in and against Chechnya 
provided Dudayev with the ultimate mobilization tool – foreign invasion.  Although 
inter-clan fighting plagued Chechen society, whenever the clans were faced with an 
invading force they quickly abandoned their quarrels and join together to repel the 
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aggressors.  Yeltsin’s plan did not weaken Dudayev’s position, but rather 
strengthened it as the populace coalesced around their leader in the face of a foreign 
invasion from a historical enemy.   
Dudayev’s unexpected maneuver with the captured soldiers put Yeltsin in an 
embarrassing and difficult situation.  Yeltsin could not ignore Dudayev’s challenge.  
If Yeltsin chose to negotiate for the captives’ freedom, it would implicitly signal the 
recognition of Dudayev’s regime and Chechen sovereignty.  However, to ignore the 
crisis would surely draw the umbrage of domestic nationalists, the media and the 
populace as a whole – an unattractive proposition given the state of Russian 
domestic politics at the time.  This was an especially objectionable prospect given 
the relatively close proximity of the presidential and parliamentary elections the 
following year (Fowkes, 1998:107-110).   In a late-night meeting with heavy 
drinking all around, Defense Secretary Pavel Grachev finally convinced Yeltsin that a 
“small victorious war” would be good for domestic politics and, moreover, the entire 
endeavor could be accomplished in less than two hours by Russian paratroopers. 
With this idea in mind, the Russians were poised to once again become embroiled in 
a long, bloody, slog in the North Caucasus (Trenin and Malashenko, 2004:57). 
THE FIRST RUSSO-CHECHEN WAR (1994 TO 1996) 
On December 11, 1994, some 40,000 Russian troops accompanied by 
armored personnel carriers, tanks and helicopters began their assault on Chechnya.  
Despite the strategic absurdity of initiating a war during winter in the Caucasus 
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Mountains, the Russian military strategy was for three separate columns to 
converge on the capital city of Grozny.  This massive show of force was intended to 
intimidate and crush the separatists aligned with President Dudayev.  Yeltsin’s 
confidence that flexing Russian military muscle would force the separatists to flee 
the city was a crucial miscalculation, a tactical error leaving open the corridor to the 
south.  This decisive mistake about Chechen resolve and relative Russian military 
capability permitted the Chechen fighters an avenue for re-supply and became 
indicative of the many tactical errors Yeltsin would make in his prosecution of the 
military campaign (Gall and de Waal, 1998:173-177).  
The Chechen resistance was well prepared for the Russian onslaught and 
utilized the urban environment of Grozny to its full potential.  Through the sewers 
and in buildings, the Chechens had established sniper niches and rocket propelled 
grenade nests.  The Chechen guerrillas employed the age-old tactics and strategies 
their ancestors had utilized during the first Caucasian war in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, when resistance fighters to the tsar’s armies countered the overwhelming 
asymmetry in force by hit and run strikes through the rugged mountains and thick 
birch forests.  As the first column of armored personnel carriers lumbered down the 
main road into Grozny’s town square, the Chechens identified a crucial Russian 
error in not accompanying the vehicles with infantry support.  Exploiting this 
mistake, the Chechen guerrillas used shoulder-fired, rocket-propelled grenades to 
knock out the first and last carriers in the caravans, trapping the middle vehicles.  As 
the young soldiers panicked and fled the protection of the armored shells, they were 
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mowed down in the streets by machine gun fire.  This scene was repeated 
throughout the city, as the Chechens used mobile phones and an intimate 
knowledge of the city to maneuver small bands of guerrillas, unleashing a deadly 
barrage of fire on the Russians (Gall and de Waal, 1998:289-317; Souleimanov, 
2007:226-301:102-113).  The Chechen fighters, a high proportion of whom made 
the solemn vow to fight jihad based on Dudayev’s earlier encouragement, quickly 
adopted Islamic slogans and articulated that they the soldiers were “already dead to 
this world” (Shaz-Kazemi, 2000:45).   Within a couple of hours of the initial assault, 
the main Russian force was scattered, shocked and suffering from a near fifty 
percent casualty infliction.  Incredulous officers ordered a retreat to the city 
outskirts and tried to regroup while Russian artillery held back the guerrillas.  The 
first Chechen war had begun and within a month, Grozny would be destroyed.  It 
would be the first European city razed since the end of World War II (Menon and 
Fuller, 2000:48).  
At this point the war in Chechnya shifted to a new phase, where classic 
guerrilla tactics in the mountains and forests of the south replaced the horrors of 
urban conflict.   Throughout the spring the Russian army used indiscriminate force 
against rebels and civilians alike.  They would shell small cities and villages during 
the day then at night hunker down and await the counter attacks of Chechen 
guerillas.  Even in territory that was purported to be under Russian control, 
Chechen rebels were consistently able to attack checkpoints and bases as well as lay 
mines and booby traps.  This not only took a physical toll on Russian troops, but a 
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psychological one as well, further decreasing morale (Gall and de Waal, 1998:289-
317; Souleimanov, 2007:109-113).  
In spite of these events the Russian war machine continued its slow trudge 
south, eventually capturing most of the flat northern plains.  For the next two years, 
the Russians and Chechens slogged it out in cities like Bamut, Argun, Shatili, and 
Vedeno.  The Chechen resistance proved to be a superior fighting force, utilizing key 
terrain to inflict tremendous damage on the Russian forces, many of whom had little 
desire to fight. The resistance had one significant comparative weakness, however, 
supplies (Bennett, 1998; Smith, 1999).  Russian forces were poorly trained and 
poorly equipped, yet the Chechens eventually began to wear down, fighting more 
stalemates than victories as the war continued.  In April 1995, Dudayev was killed 
by an air to surface missile and it was at this point that the decision was made to 
exert a new kind of pressure on Russian.  The new tactic was to exploit the already 
high levels of popular dissatisfaction for the war among the Russian people and 
push them to pressure their elected leaders to acquiesce to the Chechens territorial 
and political demands (Gall and de Waal, 1998:257-275; Souleimanov, 2007:116).  
It is important to note that by May 1995, the Chechens seemed destined for 
defeat as ammunition supplies dwindled and combat fatigue intensified 
(Evangelista, 2002; Lieven, 1998:120-123).   In short, the realities of asymmetric 
warfare had seemingly caught up with the Chechens. However, a daring raid 
changed the course of the war and, some argue, established a dangerous precedent 
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in the Chechen struggle, namely the justification of terrorism (Bodansky, 2007;  
Murphy, 2006). 
On June 14, 1995, Shamil Basayev managed to smuggle over two hundred 
insurgents into the sleepy Russian town of Buddennovsk, some one hundred miles 
north of the Chechen border.  He succeeded in doing this through bribing border 
guards and police.  Once in Buddennovsk, the Chechen fighters seized over two 
thousand hostages and barricaded themselves in the local hospital (Gall and de 
Waal, 1998:257; Souleimanov, 2007:11-112).   
Yeltsin was attending the G-7 meeting in Halifax, Canada at the time.  In his 
absence, the decision was made to eschew negotiations and, instead, send in elite 
Russian troops to storm the hospital and rescue the hostages. This attempt 
tragically failed, and the indiscriminate use of firepower by the Russian troops killed 
hundreds of hostages, all of which was broadcast live on national television. As a 
result, Russian public disgust reached such a crescendo that then Prime Minister, 
Viktor Chernomyrdin was left with few options to maneuver out of the crisis.  In six 
months parliamentary elections were to be held and the presidential election was 
now only a year away.  Political self-preservation dictated that Chernomyrdin 
alleviate the situation as quickly as possible, and without further bloodshed.  
Accordingly, he initiated negotiations with Basayev and by June 19, 1995, the 
insurgents were given safe passage back into Chechnya, where they received a 
heroic welcome. Chernomyrdin further capitulated to a cease-fire and to begin 
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negotiations for an end to Russia’s involvement in the Chechen quagmire  (Lieven, 
1999:124-125; Gall and de Waal, 1998:263-275; Souleimanov, 2007:111-112).  
   The raid on Buddennovsk became the pivotal episode of the first Chechen 
campaign. In pure desperation, the guerrillas had launched a seemingly suicidal raid 
for both themselves and the cause of Chechen independence.  However, due to the 
pressure of public opinion they had managed to instigate peace talks and secure 
breathing space from the near constant warfare of the seven-month-old campaign.  
In the ensuing break from hostilities the Chechens shrewdly filtered back into the 
territories they had been driven from, all without firing a shot.  Seemingly out of 
nowhere, the first Chechen war had ended in a humiliating Russian defeat (Gammer, 
2006:209). 
On August 14, 1996, Yeltsin charged Security Council Chairman, Alexander 
Lebed with full powers to negotiate a settlement.  The accord stipulated the full 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and for the question of Chechen 
sovereignty to be addressed in five years’ time. In the interim the Chechen people 
would be allowed free elections and limited autonomy in conducting domestic 
affairs.  After eighteen months of war the Chechen separatists had won de-facto 
independence.   By late December, the last of the Russian combat troops withdrew 
from Chechnya ending a war whose human toll dwarfed that of the Afghan crusade.  
Conservative estimates announced by Lebed after signing the treaty put the total 
 
95 
human cost of the war between 70,000 and 90,000 people killed (Fowkes, 
1998:180-183; Gall and de Waal, 1998:358-361; Lieven, 1998:143-145).25 
What is most remarkable is that the Chechens were able to do what no one 
had anticipated. They beat the remnants of a formidable army and did so in a 
remarkable way.  But the celebrations of victory would be short-lived.   On the one 
hand, the Chechens had won independence after 200 years of struggle.  On the other 
hand, it came at a tremendous cost, and Chechen society was utterly destroyed.   
THE INTER-WAR YEARS (1997 TO 1999) 
It has oft been quipped that the Chechens won the war, but lost the peace.  In 
the aftermath of the surprising Chechen victory, Chechnya faced a number of serious 
challenges.  Most of the republic was destroyed.  Its economy was as ruined as its 
cities. Bands of armed men, some bent on exploiting the situation for their own 
financial gain, roamed the country killing and kidnapping.  The lawlessness in 
Chechnya and attacks on foreigners would keep even the most determined NGOs 
from entering the war-torn republic to help rebuild. Finally, a new element was 
spreading, namely a foreign version of Islam (Bodansky, 2007; Murphy, 2010; 
Wilhemsen, 2006).  In this context, the leaders of the Chechen resistance tried to 
stitch together a new state.  
The first Chechen war ended in a humiliating Russian defeat and an 
agreement to allow Chechnya de facto independence for a period of five years. Once 
                                                 
25 Casualties figures must be viewed with caution since there is no consensus on the true number of 
dead or wounded.  
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again, local Chechen elites attempted to maintain the cohesion of the endemically 
fractious Chechen society by institutionalizing central rule.  In this, three central 
figures emerged:  Maskhadov, leader of the armed forces, acting President, 
Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, and Basayev (Souleimanov, 2007:127-132).  Each man had 
different ideas about what type of political institutions should be implemented, but 
each ultimately wanted to preside over a centralized and hierarchical Chechen state.  
However, the traditional centrifugal pull of Chechen society would prove too great 
an impediment to centralized institution building (Hughes, 2007:96-99). In this 
environment, the predatory groups that had formed to fight the Russians now 
engaged one another in fierce competition for scarce material goods.  In the absence 
of any government, lucrative black markets emerged dealing drugs and weapons, 
and kidnapping became a cottage industry.  The kidnapping was often done by 
neighbors and acquaintances.  Many times ransoms were demanded for the dead 
bodies.  Foreign influence also grew.  The trickle of foreign dollars and recruits that 
began to filter in during the war became a flood as Arabs began to shower Chechen 
warlords with money for rebuilding and to influence the form of government. To 
attract these funds, the public violence became exactly that as death and violence 
was taped and televised as a perverse form of advertisement for foreign dollars 
(Wilhemsen, 2006).   
 In January 1997, the developing rift between competing visions of 
Chechnya’s future appeared set the stage for another violent civil war.  During the 
1997 presidential elections Maskhadov, rationalizing that were Chechnya to have a 
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chance for sustained independence it would need international support, which 
would likely frown upon yet another radical Islamic state, ran on a secular platform 
and received 60% of the vote.  Yandarbiyev and Basayev, espousing more Islamist 
and radical rhetoric and openly backed by the Wahhabis, received 20% and 10%, 
respectively (Evangelista, 2003).  The results revealed that although a majority 
favored a secular state, a third of the population favored some version of 
fundamentalism.  Hence, the election presaged the growing tensions within the 
postwar religious community whereby a serious confrontation between Wahhabis 
and Sufis emerged over the degree to which Islamization should influence state 
institutions and daily norms of behavior.  Maskhadov immediately sought to quell 
internal dissatisfaction and hope to coop the popularity of Basayev by appointing 
him prime minister.  But soon Basayev would chafe at his subordinate status and 
began to overtly court the foreign Islamic radicals he had grown close to during the 
war (Cornell, 2003).  
By any account Maskhadov had a daunting task.  Chechnya’s failure to 
develop robust political institutions stemmed from five over-arching challenges: 
“the absence of resources for post-war construction, profound confusion about the 
structure of the new state, weak political leadership… the proliferation of private 
armies, and a failure in Moscow to undertake constructive policies for building 
relations with Chechnya” (Lanskoy, 2003:27).  Maskhadov’s inability to impose 
centralized control and establish hierarchical institutions is explained by the 
parochial goals of individual warlords.  Like Afghanistan, tribal societies with no 
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historical antecedents of hierarchical governance face problems not so much 
because of ideational appeals to traditional social structures, but rather from 
material variables.  In the aftermath of conflict, individual warlords find themselves 
in possession of weapons, territory, prestige, and armed men who, in an 
economically devastated environment, have few avenues to pursue non-militarized 
occupations (Barfield, 2010).  Why would these warlords acquiesce to a centralized 
government which by definition would decrease their power and influence?   The 
continued existence of armed factions presented the most serious obstacle to state 
security and institution building and Maskhadov initially tried to offer either free 
university training or the opportunity to mobilize into a standing national army.  
Both of these endeavors failed because of a lack of funds and a lack of desire, 
especially from field commanders who had no incentive to lay down their arms and 
surrender power to Maskhadov.26  Fairbanks compared Maskhadov’s position to 
that of a medieval monarch who is at a disadvantage in his struggle with powerful 
lords and often had to resort to giving away part of the royal estate.   Similarly, 
Maskhadov made such concessions with private commanders to bring them into the 
government.27  This proved more detrimental than helpful, and his actions were 
commonly perceived as the acts of a weak man. Accordingly, this was a perception 
Basayev tried to propagate to simultaneously discredit Maskhadov’s reputation and 
increase his own esteem.  Ultimately, Basayev triumphed.   
                                                 
26 See Derluguian, 1999.  
27 For more discussion, see Fairbanks, 2002.  
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The violence committed by Chechens against foreigners has been by any 
measure horrific.  Foreign aid workers were murdered in their sleep; foreign 
technologists were captured and be-headed on TV.  Kidnapping again became a 
cottage industry and the poor souls who were kidnapped suffered immensely.  They 
were often forced into slave labor and when they were not working they were kept 
in dank rotted pits dug into the earth (Tishkov, 2004:107-126).  Those with rich 
families were ransomed, usually after a toe or finger was sent off to the grieving 
relative.  The rival warlords began to see the kidnapped as currency in their rivalry 
(there also emerged a relative value scale:  Russian officers and foreigners were of 
top value, while conscripts were of little worth.  Chechens of varying wealth fell 
between the two extremes), as markers of esteem and power, and actively sought to 
accrue as many as possible (Bodansky, 2007; Murphy, 2006).  In several interviews I 
conducted with Chechen refugees and former fighters I was told how some, 
especially the Barayev brothers, would joke and laugh about the number of hostages 
they had.  They would trade them to other warlords and often talk about how much 
they had received for one.   In some instances to show how powerful they were or to 
scare people into submission, the warlords would publicly murder their victims.  I 
was told that this too was often done with the cavalier attitude of a millionaire who 
burns money. 
The religious strife between the traditional clerics and the small but powerful 
Wahhabis was particularly acrimonious in the interwar years.  It is essential to note, 
however, that the conflict between the traditional Sufi clerics and the Wahhabis had 
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little to do with religious concerns and arguably more with parochial political and 
power issues as each side tried to exploit religion.28  
In time, Maskhadov’s tenuous hold on power grew increasingly weak.  He 
eventually commanded little more than Grozny and a few other cities, which were 
sparsely populated and devastated, and the clans associated with his family. The 
private armies continued to grow because they offered one of the few employment 
opportunities in Chechnya.  Maskhadov’s repeated attempts to reach out to both the 
international community and the Chechen people for support failed.  Soon 
Maskhadov became a president without a state and like Dudayev, proved unable to 
sustain hierarchical control over Chechen society (Fairbanks, 2002).  Ever the 
peacemaker, Maskhadov sought to quell internal dissatisfaction and tried to co-op 
the popularity of Basayev by appointing him prime minister.  Basayev openly chafed 
at his subordinate status and soon began to overtly court the foreign Islamic radicals 
he had grown close to during the war (Evangelista, 2003).  
The role of religion in the inter-war years merits further discussion, 
especially since, as we shall see in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 ideas on religious 
authority are correlated with certain views on the legitimacy of political violence. 
THE ROLE OF ISLAM 
The radicalization of Islam in Russian and the former Soviet republics has not 
been restricted to the North Caucasus (Cornell, 2003:178-179).  Indeed, the Islamic 
                                                 
28 For a more detailed discussion, see Lanskoy, 2002.  
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renaissance that had been underway throughout Russia since the late 1980s had 
inevitably politicized Islam, spawning both nation-wide and regional parties and 
creating a situation where Islam was fast becoming the prime motivating factor in 
North Caucasian ethnic forces (Howard, 2011: 171; Zelkina, 2000).   
Throughout Chechen history, Islam was held as something that served as a 
cultural marker between the Chechens and the ‘others’. This included not only the 
Russians, but also fellow Caucasian Muslims who, because of their willingness to 
subordinate themselves to Russian rule, were considered to be lesser Muslims 
(Lieven, 1998:354-356).  Chechen Islam is a peculiar case because although they 
adhered broadly to the mystical Sufism (more specifically, Chechen traditional Islam 
is tarekat – the path or method of instruction akin to a brotherhood, of which the 
Nakhshbandiya and Kadiriya schools are most influential), most combined Islamic 
tenets of faith with the pre-Islamic pagan rituals pervasive amongst the 
mountainous peoples of the Caucasus. Though they considered themselves as being 
more observant practitioners of Islam than their Caucasian brethren, it has been 
noted that the Chechen interpretation of Islam was viewed by other Russian and 
later Soviet Muslims as being so out of sync with Islamic teachings that the Chechen 
faith had little in common with the teachings of Muhammad.  Thus, it has been 
suggested that this lack of an “authentic” historic Islamic identity has contributed to 
the contemporary “hyper-Islamic” identity as a way of overcompensating for their 
embarrassing religious foundations (Zelkina, 2000).  Of course, during Soviet times 
the Kremlin had little desire or incentive to allow even limited expressions of 
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Muslim faith (with the exception being the partial degree of religious freedom 
afforded the Central Asian republics) and as such, mosques remained closed in the 
republic until 1978.  Soviet policy had done substantial damage to the faith and 
permanently erased many Islamic traditions (Gall and de Waal, 1998:33-38).  
In the buildup to the First Russo-Chechen War, Dudayev moved cautiously 
and incrementally in reintroducing a politicized Islam, attempting to create the 
common identity boundaries of a new Chechen that was both novel and authentic.  
He began by adopting a new Chechen flag, peppering his speeches with Islamic 
slogans and Quranic verses and organizing the widespread construction of mosques 
throughout the republic. This was consistent with an overall trend in Chechnya 
where it had become fashionable to read Arabic, express knowledge of the Quran, 
wear Islamic dress, and fast.  He even called on the Chechen Muslims to pray to 
Allah, but interestingly, only three times a day rather than the scripture-mandated 
five, thus illustrating his Islamic illiteracy (Wilhemsen, 2006).  The capital for these 
endeavors came from foreign sources, particularly Saudi Arabia, and provided 
Chechen leaders and individuals with another incentive to promote and construct 
an Islamic Chechnya, money.  However, with Saudi dollars came Saudi radicalism, 
and this would prove the critical juncture in the evolution of a politicized Islamic 
identity to a militarized one.  The Wahhabis opened religious centers and began to 
spread austere Islamic literature, organize mass prayers, and use the local media to 
propagate their ideas while simultaneously establishing indoctrination camps for 
young Muslims from the entire North Caucasus to learn the necessity of jihad and 
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the military skills necessary to wage holy war.  The Wahhabis regarded the Sufi faith 
as a delusion and deviation from pure Islam and their initial emergence in Chechen 
society was greeted with significant skepticism, particularly from the elders.29  
Again, it is important not to understate the economic situation the average Chechen 
faced at this time. Many had turned to organized crime and selling off family 
possessions to make ends meet, and it was in this contextual chaos that a foreign 
group, espousing a simple, utopian solution to these economic grievances, often 
offering financial incentives, were able to gain a foothold in the Chechen society.  
Soon, these militant elites were able to hijack the public discourse (with the 
complicity of indigenous Chechen elites eagerly pursuing their own parochial 
objectives) on the role of Islam in society (Cornell, 2003:178-179; King and Menon, 
2010:32-34). 
The economic hardships and astronomical rates of unemployment made 
Chechnya a fertile ground for new recruits to a movement and identity that offered 
hope and a positive message for anyone who believed (Souleimanov, 2007:290-
292).  The Wahhabis were particularly successful at attracting young Chechen males 
– especially during and after the first war – who became enamored with the “Muslim 
warrior culture” that came out of Afghanistan.  Indeed “to the extent that 
Wahhabism actually is finding a significant base of social support in the North 
Caucasus, it is likely to be among militant youths who have no employment 
opportunities, were members of militia units to which they remain loyal and that 
                                                 
29 See Akaev, 2002.  
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provided – and continue to provide – them with a security and a sense of belonging 
to a community… [It] appears attractive in the way that gang membership is for 
teenagers in the West” (Seely, 2001:305).  This has become especially true in the 
inter-war and second war environment where a new generation has come of age 
knowing little more than the atrocities of war and the abuse of Russian soldiers.  
As noted, Maskhadov struggled in his attempts to create a new Chechen state.  
In particular, he felt increasing pressure from the Islamic factions and, in attempting 
to bring them into his state-building project, amended the Chechen Constitution, 
proclaiming Islam both the official state religion and basis for codified law (Hughes, 
2007:100-105).  Counter to Maskhadov’s wishes, Basayev immediately exploited 
this endorsement of politicized Islam and utilized it as a way to criticize both 
Maskhadov and head Mufti of Chechnya, the former rebel leader and future Russian 
backed president Akhmed-Hadji Kadyrov.  Countering Basayev’s challenges and 
rhetoric presented Maskhadov and Kadyrov with their own difficult situation.  
Strategically, they increased their denunciations of radicalism and portrayed 
Wahhabism as an ideology of terror; however, they realized that alienating radical 
sympathizers would bolster Basayev’s already growing ranks and risk plunging the 
war torn republic into civil war once more (Sagramoso, 2007:693-699).  Ultimately, 
they decided to acquiesce to parliamentary demands and implemented sharia in 
February 1999 (Trenin and Malashenko, 2002: 32-34).  
According to some scholars, sharia had been an integral, albeit informal and 
un-codified part of Chechen society for 300 years (Bodansky, 2007; Hahn, 2011; 
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Murphy, 2006; 2010).  It was never formally institutionalized, although there were 
attempts.  In the Great Caucasus Wars Imam Shamil attempted to implement sharia 
but was met with much resistance, surprisingly from the Chechens who found 
sharia too austere and too far a deviation for traditional norms and mores 
(Akhmadov, 2010:122).  In the inter-war years, most sharia courts operated as 
something like military courts martial, giving lashes to drunkards.  
According to Akhmadov, sharia had always existed alongside secular legal 
institutions, although in some contexts it was not entirely clear which legal form 
was subordinate to which.  Yet the chaos and uncertainly of the First Russo-Chechen 
War played a significant factor in helping sharia, or at least the idea of sharia, seem 
further and further into public life and political discourse.  More importantly, as 
noted above, sharia became a political platform for would-be leaders, especially 
young males.  “How could one make a name for oneself?  Simple; join a sharia court 
or force women to wear headscarves, or segregate buses along gender lines.  The 
introduction of alien religious norms represented a sphere of activity where any 
young man who wanted to be noticed could show that he had initiative” (Akhmadov, 
2010:124).  He further explains that in a society known for giving respect and 
deference to elders and their opinions, on the issue of sharia the elders were 
curiously and conspicuously silent.  The debate about the proper role of sharia was 
left to the young, some of whom had indeed studied abroad at Islamic universities, 
but most did so without any credentials.  
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Despite Maskhadov’s overtures to the Islamic factions, hostility erupted in 
July 1998 in the city of Gudermes.  Gudermes was under the control of the 
Yamadayev brothers, one-time allies of the Kadyrov clan.  After a group of Wahhabis 
harassed a local man related to the Yamadayevs they organized a band of loyal 
fighters and confronted the Wahhabis in a standoff.  Soon, anyone who had a 
grievance against the Wahhabis was soon arriving in the city and violence soon 
erupted, leading to a six-day battle which left over one hundred dead (The 
Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, August, 1998)   
The battle of Gudermes illustrated the level of public antipathy towards the 
foreign religious zealots and revealed the relative military weakness of the 
Wahhabis.  Although Maskhadov would still feel pressure to acquiesce to certain 
Islamic demands, the Wahhabis would never be a serious political force again.  Yet, 
they were still important for some Chechen resistance leaders, like Basayev who 
viewed them as critical allies in the looming new war with Russia (Akhmadov, 
2010:131-132), once again underscoring Basayev’s ever-strategic pragmatism.  
Basayev was a charismatic and shrewd political calculator.  It remains 
unclear, however, whether Basayev was truly adhering to militant ideology or 
merely utilizing it for material gains, a debate further discussed in Chapter 4.  There 
has been much speculation about the authenticity of his embrace of Islam after the 
deaths of several friends and family members, and journalists have noted that he did 
pray five times a day.  Moreover, he adopted an Arabic name, Abdullah Shamil Abu 
Idris, and declared himself leader of the Gardens for the Righteous Islamic Brigade of 
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Martyrs.  In videos from the period, he was shown shouting “God is great” in Arabic 
and wearing Islamic dress.30  Nevertheless, he too reasoned that an open struggle 
against Maskhadov risked a civil war in which both sides could lose; worse still 
another internal war could present a tempting opening for another Russian 
invasion.  Therefore, he believed that he could maximize and consolidate his 
influence in Chechen politics by reinforcing the heroic image that had followed him 
since he fought for the Abkhazians in Georgia in the early 1990s and from his 
actions at Buddennovsk.  In a purported attempt to boost his popularity, Basayev 
launched a raid into neighboring Dagestan with Ibn Khattab in the hopes that a 
successful campaign would bring him home a hero once more, solidify a base of 
political support among radical and moderate Islamists alike and provide him the 
requisite political capital to challenge and dispose of Maskhadov.  Clearly, events 
have not transpired as he planned, and the consequences of his actions, along with a 
series of suspicious bombings of Russian apartments that killed over three hundred, 
were used as a justification for the renewed Russian invasion.  In this new war, a 
new strong, resolute political leader, Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, would ride a 
wave of popularity for his harsh prosecution of the Chechen war to the apex of the 
Russian political system.  
                                                 









THE SECOND RUSSO-CHECHEN WAR (1999 TO PRESENT)  
As Russian forces once again invaded the tiny yet intransigent Chechen 
republic in 1999, they were determined to exact revenge and to avoid the strategic, 
tactical, and political mistakes, which had plagued their previous endeavor (Cornell, 
2003:171).  This new campaign was framed as an anti-terrorist operation instead of 
a war.  Deliberate efforts were made to control the media, restricting access to 
military approved areas and forcing journalists to use an officially sanctioned 
rhetoric that attempted to sanitize the conflict.  The Kremlin wanted to avoid the 
political fallout and public outcry that characterized the first war. To avoid large 
scale popular opposition, the decision was made to control and manipulate the 
media.  Accordingly, the army was never fighting, but rather “working” and 
“cleaning” areas.  Strategically, Russia would take a new approach, abandoning the 
usual script of invading from the north, driving the resistance to the south, and then 
engaging in a slow, methodical, and bloody protracted guerrilla campaign.  The 
Kremlin was particularly concerned with avoiding the deadly consequences of 
fighting an urban campaign.  Fighting wars in the cities has long been shown to be 
one of the most deadly environments for modern warfare.  Indeed, famous historic 
battles from Stalingrad and Berlin to Hue and Fallujah, all illustrate the inherent 
difficulties of engaging in urban combat.  The Russians devised an ingenious, albeit 
deadly, solutions to avoiding the pitfalls of urban combat, namely, eliminate the 
urban.  In the Second Russo-Chechen War Russian forces relied almost exclusively 
on heavy air and artillery power.  Prior to any patrol or probing action against 
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Chechen forces, Russian forces first “softened up” zones, usual civilian areas, with 
heavy bombardments.  If, after extensive bombing, a patrol was fired upon, the 
decision was made for all units to withdraw while renewed fire was rained down. 
Moreover, the decision was made to wage a republic-wide campaign, attacking both 
major urban centers in the north and cities and villages throughout the south 
(Souleimanov, 2007:160-171).   
The Russians use of massive artillery and aerial bombardments to crush the 
separatist army limited Russian casualties, but also caused an unprecedented flow 
of refugees as hundreds of thousands fled to neighboring Ingushetia, Georgia, and 
Azerbaijan.  The Chechen resistance was initially un-prepared for another Russian 
onslaught.  Nonetheless, thousands were once again mobilized and the inter-
factional fighting was forgotten as all Chechens braced for war.  In doing so, Chechen 
forces massed in Grozny and waited for the invading Russians (Hughes, 2007:81-
87). 
The Chechen resistance grossly underestimated the Russian’s willingness to 
rely so exclusively on air and artillery power.  The strategic shift to attack all parts of 
Chechnya at once, instead of attacking from the north while slowly pushing south, 
forced the Chechens to spread their forces out to the villages. The Russians also 
finally learned to surround Grozny and in doing so trapped a number of Chechen 
fighters and top field commanders.  As the fighting wore on, the Chechens attempted 
to break out of Grozny and believed they had bribed a safe passage. The bribe was a 
trap, however, and the purportedly safe route was in fact a mine field covered by 
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Russian paratroopers. In the dash hundreds of Chechens were killed, blown-up, or 
mutilated.  Basayev lost a leg and nearly died alongside 75% of the field 
commanders.  The Second Russo-Chechen War had begun and it appeared it would 
be an even bloodier affair than the first war (Hughes, 2007:108; Tishkov, 2004:226). 
After major combat operations died down, Putin implemented 
“Chechenization”, a policy which delegated significant political and military power 
to pro-Moscow Chechens (Hughes, 2007:118-125; Souleimanov, 2007:200-216).  
The former Mufti of Chechnya, and former rebel, Akhmed Kadyrov was appointed 
President and he quickly used his powerful plains clan to exert control over Russian 
occupied territories.  Within a year, a national Referendum was conducted in which 
the Chechen people purportedly signaled their desire to remain a part of Russian.  
Chechenization allowed the Russians to control Chechnya in a way they could never 
do directly (King and Menon, 2010:30-31).  Of course, a significant part of the 
population distrusted the Kadyrovs and in June 2003 Akhmed was killed by a bomb 
planted in the Diamo Stadium in Grozny during a military parade.  In short order his 
son, current pro-Kremlin Chechen President, Ramzan Kadyrov came to power and 
has used this position to establish a regime of terror in Chechnya today.  Scores of 
people, particularly human rights advocates and opponents of the regime have been 
arrested, tortured, and, in many cases, summarily executed.   
The Russians and Kadyrovsky both have also used an innocuously sounding 
policy, “zachistkys” or cleaning operations, to instill fear in the Chechen people and 
hunt down possible insurgents (Gilligan, 2009; Cornell, 2003:172-174).  The 
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zachistkys have been pointed to be numerous human rights groups as being one of 
the vilest aspects of the new war.  In a usual operation, small villages are 
surrounded and swept for males aged 12 to 90.  In many cases all the men are 
rounded up and taken to filtration camps, usually deep pits dug into the earth, 
abandoned buildings, or old tankers, where they are subjected to systematic and 
prolonged torture and abuse.  Many are permanently maimed and significant 
numbers are killed or never seen again (Cornell, 2003:172-174). 
The Chechen resistance has faced its own challenges. The international 
support they enjoyed in the first war has all but disappeared.  The secular-
nationalist leadership has been decimated by Russian assassinations and a new-
generation of increasingly radicalized youth, many of whom adhere to non-
traditional forms of militant Islam, has filled the ranks.  The rebels have also 
changed tactics, attempting to spread the conflict beyond Chechnya to the rest of the 
North and West Caucasus through a system of jamaats, small cells of militants 
organized around Islamic militancy (Sagramoso, 2007:697-699; Souleimanov, 
2007:292-298).  .  
Most observers agree that although local concerns fuel the attractiveness of 
the jamaats, the Chechen resistance is the main beneficiary.  The formation of 
regional jamaats in Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachay-
Cherkessia keep Russia occupied elsewhere, drain its resources and ability to 
provide patronage to local satraps, and give the Chechens breathing space to rest 
and recover demographically (Sagramoso, 2007:697-699; Souleimanov, 2007:292-
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298).  Basayev, the mastermind behind the idea, tried to spark rebellion throughout 
the North Caucasus not a goal in and of itself, but rather “to establish Chechen 
statehood” (Akhmadov, 2010:232-233).  
These local factors, however, cannot be ignored. The issue of why individuals 
join insurgent movements is addressed in the recent literature and is beyond the 
scope of this study.  However, in the North Caucasus there are some concrete 
incentives and benefits to actively participating in the insurgency rather than 
remaining a passive observer.  These considerations give us insights into both the 
nature of the current campaign and its potential future trajectory.  Akhmadov 
contends that most, if not all, individuals who join the North Caucasus jamaats do so 
not out of religious fervor, but rather because of very specific local concerns and 
grievances, arguing that “injustice, arbitrary political violence, clan rivalries, and the 
absence of recourse through legal or political channels…” (Akhmadov, 2010:241-
242) drive scores of young men to, in the local euphemism for joining the 
insurgents, “go to the forest.”  This is a very different story than the one propagated 
by Russian and many Western analysts and politicians who view such behavior as 
evidence of the globalized Islamic radicalism found among adherents of 
Salafism/Wahhabism.  I contend that we see the same instrumental and strategic 
considerations as those driving many Chechen refugees to desire maximal political 
goals like the Caucasus Emirate, viewing Islam as an overarching identity force to 
unite the disparate nationalities of the region.  Akhmadov concurs, noting that 
today’s political climate has changed significantly from the early 1990s when 
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nationalism was the main rallying cry.  Today, the political atmosphere is markedly 
different and there is little to untie the North Caucasus peoples save religious 
identity.  Islam is seen as a protest to the endemic corruption and injustice and 
pervasive unemployment and other socio-economic woes.  The jamaats “offer 
people stability, social cohesion, and protection from a dysfunctional and predatory 
state” (Akhmadov, 2010:243). 
The Chechen militants have also increasingly relied on suicide bombings and 
mass-hostage takings against Russian civilians (Hahn, 2011; Murphy, 2006; Murphy, 
2010; Pape, 2005).  As discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, Chechen suicide 
bombers have detonated bombs at rock concerts, in metro stations, on busses, in 
cafes and trains, and even on two airplanes simultaneously.  Finally, they have 
engaged in the so-called “spectaculars”, major coordinated attacks against Russian 
targets.  Four such actions merit further discussion. 
FOUR ACTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
On October 23, 2002, Movsar Barayev commanded 36 militants, including a 
dozen of the so-called Black Widow female suicide bombers, to seize the affluent 
Dubrovka Theater in Moscow during a showing of the musical, Nord-Ost.  The 
militants seized approximately 900 people and demanded the immediate 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and a stop to the war.  The Russian 
authorities objected to any negotiations and instead pumped a secret weaponized 
anesthetic gas into the theater, rendering all occupants unconscious.  Under 
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sedation the militants were executed, while 130 hostages died from cerebral-
hypoxia and other complications from the gas (Hughes, 2007:150-157; 
Souleimanov, 2007:236-245).  
On September 1, 2004 in the North Ossetia town of Beslan, another group of 
militants stormed School #1 and seized approximately 1,200 hostages, most of them 
young school children.  The demands were the same – the immediate withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Chechnya and a stop to the war.  The Russians refused to 
negotiate and instead tried to storm the building, an act which caused the militants’ 
explosives to detonate prematurely and initiated a massive firefight.  In the end 
close to 400 people were killed, the majority of whom were young children (Hughes, 
2007:150-155; Souleimanov, 2007:246-261). 
In the summer of 2004 in Nazran, Ingushetia several hundred militants 
orchestrated a well-coordinated action against the Interior Ministry, FSB, and 
Military Headquarters, and the local police station.  According to witnesses, the 
militants attacked as revenge against those deemed responsible for the humiliation 
and violence committed against local Muslim youths.  The militants appear to have 
had more material interest and after a day of fighting they withdrew to the 
mountains and forests, managing to seize large quantities of weapons and 
ammunition.  Approximately 100 Russian authorities were killed (Hughes, 
2007:122; Souleimanov, 2007:289-291).  
The Nazran attack spurred a similar raid into the city of Nalchik, Kabardino-
Balkaria in 2005.  The attacking force was mostly comprised mostly of 
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inexperienced but hostile Muslim youths equally frustrated by the poor treatment 
and harassment inflicted by the Russian authorities.  Unlike the Nalchik raid, the 
authorities were alerted to the attack in advance and the militants suffered heavy 
losses.  Later, militant leaders declared the operation a failure (Hughes, 2007:122; 
205). 
Today, the war drags on.  It was spread to Dagestan to the east and 
Ingushetia in the west, leaving Chechnya as a relative island of calm between the 
two, and, as discussed above, spread farther to Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-
Cherkessia. In Dagestan and Ingushetia a low-level insurgency has taken thousands 
of lives from all sides and the violence is growing.  This assumption of relative peace 
in Chechnya is also misleading.  In the past year violence has begun to occur with 
more frequency.  More importantly, in June 2011, a number of former fighters who 
had accepted amnesty into the Kadyrovsky defected back to the resistance (The 
Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, May - June, 2011).  
The ethnic Russian population in the Caucasus has long fled and the 
population as a whole has become increasingly vocal in its opposition to the 
continued funding Moscow lavishes on the Caucasus, particularly Ramzan Kadyrov.  
This opposition is one of the few key contentious issues Putin is encountering in his 
all but assured Presidential re-election campaign.  Yet, the Kremlin does not appear 
to be ready to deviate from its usual playbook of supporting local corrupt satraps 
while using a heavy-hand with suspected militants, many of whom are young 
Muslim males frustrated and angry with their lack of opportunity and the 
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repression.  The history of the Caucasus has been one of violence and bloodshed.  It 
does not appear the future holds any deviation from this age old dynamic. 
In the next chapter, I explore the general attitudes displaced Chechens 
express when speaking about political violence.  Contrary to the prevailing 
assumptions, displaced Chechens are more likely to either support or reject the 
legitimacy of select politically violent acts due to strategic considerations instead of 
emotive factors like revenge or fear.  Next, I reveal how individual political goals 
choices and preferences for certain regime types influence attitudes supporting 
political violence among Chechen refugees.   Finally, I address the potential role that 
level of education and living location (urban versus rural) have on both attitudes 










Chapter 4:  Political Goals, Regime Type and Attitudes Supporting 
Political Violence 
The people always desire two things:  the first is to avenge themselves against those 
who were the cause of their being enslaved; the other is to regain their freedom…a 
small part desire to be free in order to command; but all others, the countless majority, 
desire liberty in order to live in security. 
Machiavelli, Discourses, Book I, Chapter 16 
 
The expectation in ethnic wars, or wars between two nations, is that violence 
and attitudes supporting violence will be driven primarily by emotive factors, like 
fear or revenge (Fearon, 1995; Petersen, 2002).  Strategic considerations are 
deemed less consequential.  Yet, as we are beginning to better understand, even 
ethnic wars, those conflicts presumed by their very nature to be thick with emotion, 
are more often than not driven and fueled by strategic, material and instrumental 
considerations (Mueller, 2000).  “Strategic considerations are fundamental in ethnic 
conflicts despite…the strong passions involved…and these considerations have been 
largely neglected” (Fearon, 1995:5).  This is the case with the Chechens and their 
support for political violence. 
There are also a number of assumptions about the relationship between 
select political goals, regime type preferences, and dissatisfaction and the increased 
likelihood of political violence (Shapiro and Fair, 2009). All of these suppositions 
suggest a natural relationship between certain objectives and pro-violent 
sentiments.   High levels of political dissatisfaction have long been proffered as an 
explanation of why certain individuals support political violence as acceptable form 
of social behavior (Lerner, 1958; Shafiq and Sinno, 2010). Individuals espousing 
 
118 
maximal political goals and the belief in using political violence to achieve these 
objectives are presumed to go hand in hand (Crenshaw, 2007; Jenkins, 1980; Kydd, 
2006; Pape, 2005; Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley, 1983).  The same is true of 
regime type preferences.  In recent years, it is expected that individuals or groups 
desiring religious authority as political authority are, as a general rule, more likely 
to favor politically violent solutions.  In particular, those desiring Islamic forms of 
authority, like sharia, are expected to be overwhelmingly pro-violent (Pipes, 2003; 
Lewis, 2004; Rapoport, 1998).  Indeed, as discussed previously, this view is now the 
basis for a number of Western aid packages and policies in the Islamic world (see 
Shapiro and Fair, 2009).  In all, these explanations support an instrumental and 
material or interest view of political violence.  Simply put, individuals and/or groups 
use political violence to achieve select objectives.  This is only part of the story.   
The study of political violence and certainly of the dynamics of protracted 
insurgency is not exclusive to perpetrators alone.  The social environment in which 
these individuals operate matters greatly to both the goals such individuals pursue 
and the means used to achieve such ends.  Understanding the social environment in 
protracted insurgent movements has both theoretical and policy implications. Such 
understandings certainly matter for constructing effective foreign policy solutions.  
As Mao famously quipped, the “people are the sea” and militants can only operate 
within the confines of popular acquiesces.  Accordingly, we must better understand 
what drives non-participant support for militant activity and political violence.  I 
argue that among displaced Chechens, attitudes supporting political violence are not 
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primarily influenced by emotive factors, like revenge, but rather by strategic, 
material considerations.  Conversely, the rejection of such behaviors is not driven by 
emotive or moral factors, but rather by strategic considerations as well.  
In this chapter, I explore the relationship between political goals and regime 
type preferences and the support for militant activity and political violence.  In the 
next two chapters, I will use an individual level of analysis to better understand the 
micro-level processes driven displaced Chechens to either support or reject militant 
activity back home against the Russian state and Russian people.  In doing so, this 
chapter first explores alternative explanations, such as level of education, age, and 
residence (urban versus rural).  Then, it looks the relationship between the support 
of maximal goals, like the establishment of an Islamic Caucasus Emirate, and the 
desire of religious authority as political authority (sharia) and the support of 
militant activity.   
Why do some Chechen refugees support political violence while others do 
not?  Prior to observation, the expectation of such a study would expect to find little 
variation among respondents.  Indeed, if any population was expected to hold pro-
violent attitudes it would be the Chechens, especially in regard to Russia and 
Russian targets (Hahn, 2011; Murphy, 2006; Tishkov, 2004; Zaurbekova and 
Yandarov, 2001).  According to this logic, the displaced Chechens scattered across 
the Caucasus and Europe purportedly support or tolerate insurgent activity carried 
out in their name, as part of the Chechen nation, against Russian targets due to one 
of four factors or logics:  first, historical animosities between the two peoples (Hahn, 
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2011; Murphy, 2006; Tishkov, 2004);  second, cultural norms of “blood-feud” 
privileging revenge against intruders (Tishkov, 2004);  third, the acute trauma of the 
war and forced migration (Spekhard and Akhmedova, 2005; Zaurbekova and 
Yandarov, 2001);  and fourth, abnormal psychology as a result of the war and 
carnage (Spekhard and Akhmedova, 2005; Zaurbekova and Yandarov, 2001).  In this 
chapter, I will illustrate that although these factors can play a role in influencing 
pro-violent attitudes, they are not as determinative as many suggest. Indeed, I argue 
that strategic and material considerations are the primary determining factors, not 
historical relations, emotive factors, or some variety of psychopathy.  Nonetheless, 
these factors do merit further discussion. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Chechens and Russians have a long and bloody 
history. Over the past three hundred years Russia has fought several protracted 
Muslim insurgencies in the region, all of which were extremely violent affairs 
(Gammer, 2006).  In the Twentieth Century, Soviet authorities had to deal with 
continual strife from the intransigent Chechen people, deciding in 1944 to deport 
the entire population to the frozen steppes of Central Asia rather than risk local 
collusion with the encroaching Nazi Armies (Gall and de Waal, 1998). The 
Deportation killed some third of the population and remains a source of contention 
to this day (Dunlop, 1998).  Finally, after the collapse of the Soviet Union two bloody 
wars for secession have taken place, furthering souring relations between the two 
seemingly perennial enemies (Evangelista, 2003; Hughes, 2007; Souleimanov, 
2007).  In these latter wars the Russians have been accused of committing gross 
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human rights violations and their tactics in the Second Russo-Chechen War, heavy 
bombardments, has sent hundreds of thousands into forced migration (Gilligan, 
2009). In short, we would expect displaced Chechens to express disproportionately 
high levels of support for militant activity against the Russians.  
This expectation is bolstered by extant cultural considerations.  Beyond the 
deep-psychological trauma from both the war and the violent displacement, 
alternate hypotheses suggest that Chechen culture, sometimes called a “Kalashnikov 
Culture”, instills in all Chechens a normative acceptance of violence, particularly 
revenge (Lieven, 1998; Trenin and Malashenko, 2004; Tishkov, 2004). As noted 
previously, the Chechens do have a formalized institutional system, adat, which 
utilizes a “blood feud” logic of reciprocal violence to control and punish deviant 
social behaviors (Jaimoukha, 2005) .  According to this understanding, pro-violent 
attitudes are primarily driven by personal loss (of property, family, or both) (Lieven, 
1999; Tishkov, 2004).  
As a related factor, the abhorrent nature and horrendous loss of life and 
property during the two Russo-Chechen Wars have scarred scores of people.  The 
capital city, Grozny, as well as much of the rest of the republic, was completely razed 
in the Second War and the fighting was brutal.  There are countless stories about the 
true horrors of modern total war (Dunlop, 1998; Gall and de Waal, 1998; King and 
Menon, 2010; Lieven, 1999; Politskovskaya, 2001; Politskovskaya, 2003; 
Souleimanov, 2007).  As a result, many find it quite reasonable that Chechens would 
desire revenge for their losses and, as part of a protracted insurgency, continue to 
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support any action against the Russian state or its quisling allies, Ramzan Kadyrov 
and his militias (Bodansky, 2007; Tishkov, 2004).   
Finally, behavioral scientists have long studied the psychological effects of 
war on both combatants and non-participants (Grossmen and Christensen, 2008).  
Few, if any, would seriously claim that protracted warfare has little to no 
psychological effect on people (Grossman, 2010; Hunt, 2010).  The relationship 
between humans and combat and the inherent toll of organized conflict is arguably 
older than written civilization.  In Homer’s classic tales we see signs of post-
traumatic stress syndrome and the psychological struggle to reintegrate into society 
and return to normalcy (Shay, 1995; 2003).  Some observers have noted that a 
significant percent of the Chechen population now suffer from collective 
psychological trauma and as such, their attitudes and views, particularly on 
violence, are irrational (Fields, 1978; Tishkov, 2001; Zaurbekova and Yandarov, 
2001).  This is a sentiment articulated by some Chechen respondents in this study.  
In short, the argument is that the Chechens have been so badly damaged by the 
trauma of war and loss that they know little more than war, an argument frequently 
applied to the youth, and are warped into thinking all violence is legitimate or 
socially acceptable (see Fields, 1978; Spekhard and Akhmedova, 2005; Tishkov, 
2001; Zaurbekova and Yandarov, 2001).  This certainly plays a role for some 
displaced Chechens, but again, as we observe below, this accounts for an extremely 
small percent of respondents.  
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The discussion above underscores the belief that if we should ever expect to 
find a unified, pro-violent populace, then certainly the Chechen refugee community 
would be a prime suspect.  Yet, this is not what we find.  We do find significant 
variation and I contend this variance is due to material interests and instrumental 
considerations, namely disparate political goals, dissimilar regime type preferences 
and gender.  This does not mean that revenge or culture or trauma play no role in 
generating attitudes supporting political violence.  Instead, culture, experiences and 
emotive variables simply do not tell the whole story. There is certainly a role for 
each of these in understanding both the genesis of and conditions under which 
Chechen refugees find political violence an acceptable form of behavior. However, 
these things are near-universal experiences among Chechen refugees.  We should 
expect uniform views on the legitimacy of certain politically violent acts if these 
factors were determinative.  Yet, the Chechens display marked variation in their 
attitudes towards militant activity and political violence.  What explains this 
variation?  In this chapter, I will explore the role of political goals and regime type 
preferences in influencing the support or tolerance of militant activity. 
CHECHEN REFUGEES AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
Research conducted in circumstances where conflict and violence are 
endemic must be done with careful deliberation and the utmost care (Grima, 2004; 
Nordstrom, 1997).  My goal was to better understand specific attitudes, namely 
those pertaining to the use and limits of political violence.  In doing so, ensuring the 
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safety and security of all parties was paramount.  Many Chechens rightfully fear for 
the safety of their families and I have taken significant precautions to ensure the 
anonymity of all respondents.  
My structured interviews used both open and closed ended questions and 
were broken down into three sections. Each respondent was asked the same 
questions in the same order. In the first section, I asked basic demographic and 
personal information:  date of birth; previous residency; previous occupation; levels 
of education; personal loss, status as a fighter or veteran, history of torture or 
personal injury, etc.  In the second part of the interview I asked a series of questions 
about life as a Chechen refugee and about the challenges of maintaining Chechen 
culture during displacement, especially into presumably alien host countries and 
cultures. I asked about their most pressing problems, about expectations and 
relative deprivation, about whether they were harassed by either the locals or local 
authorities, and about their general views and attitudes about life and family, 
religion and politics.  In the final section, I asked questions specifically pertaining to 
politics and political life. In order to gauge and measure individual perceptions of 
political efficacy, I asked about voting patterns and, for example, whether they voted 
in the 1997 Chechen Presidential election and if so, for whom; I asked about Doku 
Umarov, constitutional successor to Aslan Maskhadov and Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev 
(both assassinated by Russian special services) and current leader of the Chechen 
separatist movement, and about which course of action he and his followers should 
pursue (e.g. should they continue to fight or lay down their arms); I asked about 
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what should Chechnya be politically: a part of Russia;  a part of Russia, but 
Autonomous, like the republic of Tatarstan; Independent; or part of a Caucasus 
Emirate.  This latter political entity would be an Islamic state composed of 
Ingushetia, Dagestan, parts of northern Georgia and Azerbaijan with Chechnya at the 
political and administrative apex. I asked which form of governing institution was 
best for Chechnya. Finally, the last four questions asked about the legitimacy of four 
concrete acts of political violence, two directed at civilians and two directed at 
representatives of the state:  the 2002 hostage taking at the Dubrovka Theater in 
Moscow, the 2004 Beslan school tragedy, and the attacks on military and police 
personnel in Nazran in 2004 and Nalchik in 2005. Each of these events occurred 
after the respondent had settled into a refugee community. 
How many Chechen refugees are there?  In general, it has been noted that it 
is difficult if not impossible, to accurately count the number of refugees in any 
conflict (see Blakewell, 1999; Crisp, 1999).  Regrettably, it is impossible to ascertain 
accurate figures for the total size of the Chechen refugee population, mainly because 
each side has an incentive to misrepresent the real numbers.  The Russians have 
traditionally underestimated the actual number of refugees while the Chechens have 
tended to overestimate the number. In many cases, this is done out of practical 
necessity to survive. The Chechen refugees, many of whom rely exclusively on 
subsistence from either host governments or some combination of NGO/IGO aid, 
often inflate the size of their family members so that they will receive more goods. 
The surplus can then be stored away or sold on the black-market for other 
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commodities.  This fact, coupled with the UN mandate protecting refugees, means 
that UNHCR representatives are equally wary of discussing population numbers, 
especially with outsiders. Consequently, we can only estimate the total size of the 
Chechen refugee population. In Georgia, there are anywhere from 500 to 2,000 
Chechen refugees (this is down from a high of 10,000 in 1999).  In Azerbaijan, they 
range from 1,000 to 3,000.  In Poland, there are between 1,000 and 3,000.   In 
Belgium there are approximately 1,500 Chechen refugees.  
I interviewed a total of 301 Chechen refugees.31 Disaggregated by country, I 
conducted 71 interviews in Georgia, 71 in Azerbaijan, 100 in Poland, and 59 in 
Belgium.  75% (226) were males and 25% (75) were females.  61% (184) came 
from rural areas, while 38.8 % (117) came from the urban centers and cities.  Most 
had only secondary education 89.3% (269) with just 10.6% (32) reporting to have 
completed university or technical school.  15 were tortured, 6 were amputees.  
77.7% (234) were self-declared civilians and 21.9% (66) self-declared former-
fighters or veterans. 4.3% (13) were verified political or economic elites. 
It is important to note the social desirability bias inherent in this work. 
Questions regarding views on political violence are often susceptible to social 
desirability bias, a condition in which participants may be wary of expressing their 
true views in front of the researcher or may give answers they think the researcher 
wants to hear.  To avoid social desirability bias, I framed questions about political 
                                                 
31 In all instances, the structured interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis.  This includes 
interviews with displaced Chechen females.  In some interviews with women, Chechen male relatives 
demanded to remain in visual proximity of the interview but out of earshot, thus increasing the likelihood 
of more accurate responses from female respondents. 
 
127 
violence as such, “Certain members of the Chechen resistance claim that acts such as 
Nord-Ost, Beslan, Nalchik, and Nazran were both legitimate and necessary.  Do you 
think they are correct?” 
It is important to stress that this study does not, in any way, purport to 
explain the attitudes of all Chechens, nor of all Chechen refugees.  These findings are 
a qualitative assessment of observations made during systematic fieldwork in 
various displaced Chechen communities.  These findings are impressionistic; as 
such, they are meant to be viewed as part of the broader exercise in developing 
theory.  In particular, in accordance with the inherent caveats of the micro-
comparative turn in the study of political violence, these findings are meant to 
generate arguments regarding the patterns of attitudes towards political violence 
and the potential factors contributing to such attitudinal patterns.  As noted 
previously, this study pushes the limits of what can be done and serves to generate 
hypotheses more than test them.  It is clearly difficult to conduct any research 
involving refugees, especially Chechen refugees who live in appalling circumstances 
and who, even in exile, face significant security threats from Russia and the Russian-
backed, pro-Moscow Chechen government under Ramzan Kadyrov.  This is a 
vulnerable population, and most observers would expect a monolithic, rebellious, 
pro-violence population (Bodansky, 2007; Murphy, 2006; Zaurbekova and 
Yandarov, 2001).  My work challenges this assumption.  The Chechen refugee 
population exhibits a highly sophisticated view toward political violence, thus 
bolstering claims for an instrumental theory of political violence. 
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In the following tables, Chechen refugee respondents who believed that each 
of the four concrete acts (the 2002 attack on Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater during a 
performance of, Nord-Ost; the 2004 attack on School #1 in Beslan, North Ossetia; the 
2004 attack on military and police personnel in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria; and 
the attack on military and police personnel in Nazran, Ingushetia) legitimate are 
grouped under, Supports All Acts of Political Violence.  Respondents who rejected all 
four acts are grouped under, Rejects All Acts of Political Violence.  Respondents who 
fell in-between the two extremes, Supports Some Acts of Political Violence, answered 
one of three ways:  1) Supports All Acts of Political Violence Not Targeting Civilians 
(Nalchik and Nazran); 2) Supports All Acts of Political Violence Except Beslan; or 3) 
Rejects All Acts of Political Violence Except Nord-Ost. 












51.6% 25.0% 12.5% 4.7% 3.1% 3.1% 









It Does Not 
Work 
It Gives Chechens 
a Bad Image 
It is Wrong to Kill 
Innocents 
Fear of Reciprocal 
Attacks 
37.5% 31.3% 18.8% 12.5% 
Table 4.2: Negative Support for All Acts of Political Violence 
   Before discussing the relationship between political goals, regime type 
preferences and political violence, it is first necessary to explore what displaced 
Chechens say in general when discussing political violence.  In doing so, there are 
basic trends and sentiments expressed.  These are portrayed in Table 4.1 and Table 
4.2 above, respectively.  In exploring the structured-interview narratives, the 
general view towards the acceptance or rejection of political violence is revealed 
above. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 clearly demonstrate that displaced Chechens 
overwhelmingly support or reject political violence due to strategic or instrumental 
considerations.  Slightly over half of the respondents (51.6%) claim that such 
militant actions and political violence are necessary to ensure the survival of the 
Chechen people.  3.1% claim such acts are simply “demonstrative” and conducted to 
draw global attention to the suffering of the Chechen people. Emotive factors play a 
lesser role with only 25.0% of respondents claiming Revenge as their primary 
reason for supporting political violence.  Conversely, among individuals who reject 
political violence, 37.5% do so because they believe such actions do not work, 
31.3% claim such actions cast Chechens in an unfavorable light and therefore should 
not be conducted, and 12.5% reject such actions out of fear of reciprocal attacks; all 
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three reasons suggest strategic viewpoints.  In contrast, moral considerations are 
less important with only 18.8% of respondents claiming that the four attacks were 
immoral and that civilians are not to be considered a legitimate target.  A form of 
moral logic is also expressed by 12.5% of respondents who claim violence is 
legitimate because all methods are acceptable in war, while 4.7% feel violence is 
justified because of Russian actions.  
Some Chechens who support political violence as necessary also claimed to 
do so out of desperation.  Several refugees used the metaphor of a wounded animal 
backed into a corner.  Others articulated an analogy of a mouse caught by a cat that, 
even though smaller and sure to die, nonetheless, bit its attacker.  Comparable 
analogies were of dogs, chained and repeatedly beaten by an owner.  After such 
abuse, what behavior would one expect from the animal?  In these instances, the 
Chechen refugee was trying to make the case that repression and brutality breed 
additional violence. 
A small number, some 3.1% of Chechens, claimed that the psychological 
trauma of the war and of the horrendous things they had personally witnessed and 
endured had changed them.  They professed that what was now normal for them 
was indeed abnormal for others.  So, one young man who witnessed cats and dogs 
eating corpses in the streets of Grozny felt a degree of indifference for the suffering 
of others, irrespective of presumed innocence or purported guilt.  Individuals such 
as this recognized their cognitive distance from common humanity but were 
strikingly candid about their feelings. 
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Individuals like the latter, as well as those who did not confess to any trauma 
induced cognitive changes, frequently cited the need for vengeance. It has been well 
noted that in the Chechen culture the system of adat, or blood feud is still practiced. 
Indeed, in many of my interviews Chechen refugees, especially young males, claim 
that they were driven in past instances to commit violence against Russian soldiers 
because of personal loss.  The idea of reciprocal violence is deeply embedded in 
many cultures.  A cursory reading of contemporary events demonstrates that the 
Israelis and Palestinians often, even today, seem to engage in a seemingly endless 
spiral of tit-for-tat violence. Among the Chechen refugees, significant support for 
extended reciprocity (violence directed not against the actual perpetrator of some 
grievance against you or your family specifically, but rather against the 
perpetrator’s in-group, either civilian or solider in arms) does exist.  In rare 
instances, this even holds true for the perpetrating in-group’s children.  Among 
some Chechen refugees, support for political violence is driven by considerations for 
past losses.  Some Chechens claim that the current violence must continue because 
so many had already given their lives in the name of the struggle. For these 
respondents, to stop now would be to forfeit those lives as wasted in vain.  
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize the relative influence of strategic over 
emotive factors in generating attitudes towards political violence. 
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GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION AND SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE  
Before exploring the various political goal choices and regime type 
preferences, it is first necessary to rule out other potential sources of pro-militant 
attitudes.  In particular, literature suggests certain socio-economic factors,32 such as 
level of education, age, and/or location of occupancy (rural dwellers versus 
urbanites) play a significant factor in determining support for political violence 
(Berebbi, 2003; Johnson and Monkkonen, 1996; Kreuger and Maleckova, 2003; 
Lochner, 2007; Miguel, 2007).  Kruger (2010) further notes the prevalence of this 
purported relationship among prominent political elites.  Indeed, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, the King of Jordan, and former America Presidents, Bill Clinton and 
George W. Bush have all publically proclaimed that policies directed at ameliorating 
both poverty and poor education will reduce future acts of poitical violence.  
A common thought is that rural dwellers are more comfortable with violence 
than urbanites (Cohen and Nisbett, 1996).  As applied to Chechnya, there is a myth 
that the rural highlanders, or mountain men, were more rugged and more militant 
than their plain-dwelling or urbanite brethren (Lieven, 1998; Tishkov, 2004).  What 
is the effect of living location on attitudes towards political violence, political goals, 
and regime type preferences? 
                                                 














Some Acts of 
Political 
Violence No Response 
Urban 23.9% 17.4% 42.9% 15.8% 
Rural 20.5% 24.8% 48.7% 6.0% 
Table 4.3: Living Locale and Attitudes towards Political Violence 
Table 4.3 reveals that there is no significant difference in attitudes towards 
political violence or regime type preferences between rural inhabitants and 
urbanites.  The only noticeable difference is that urbanites were more likely than 












Some Acts of 
Political 
Violence No Response 
University 28.1% 31.3% 40.6% 0.0% 
High School 21.9% 19.0% 45.7% 13.4% 
Table 4.4: Level of Education and Attitudes towards Political Violence  
There is a debate about the role of education and the support of political 
violence (Berebbi, 2003; Kreuger and Maleckova, 2003; Lochner, 2008).  Some claim 
that education can help moderate political violence, while others suggest higher 
education removes the ignorance about certain socio-economic problems, highlights 
these issues, and breeds greater political dissatisfaction, a purported cause of 
political violence (Lerner, 1958; Shafiq and Sinno, 2010).  
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According to Tables 4.3 and 4.4, among displaced Chechens there is no 
significant difference in the support or rejection of political violence between those 
with a university education and those with only a high school education or less.  One 
noticeable difference is that no university educated respondent declined to answer 
questions about political violence, meaning that all Non-Responses came from high 
school educated respondents.  This is interesting since all but one Non-Response 
took place in Georgia, thus telling us more about the composition of the Chechen 
refugee community closest to the current insurgency. 
POLITICAL GOALS, REGIME TYPE PREFERENCES, AND SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE  
 Political Goals 
Supports 










Violence No Response 
Total: 301  
Autonomy 0.0% 46.7% 51.1% 2.2% 
Independence 17.5% 20.2% 44.3% 18.0% 
Caucasus Emirate 55.8% 1.6% 42.6% 0.0% 
Table 4.5: Political Goals and Attitudes towards Political Violence  
In Table 4.5, we observe the relationship between political goals and 
attitudes supporting political violence. The conventional wisdom is that the more 
maximal the respondents’ political goals, the more likely they will be to support all 
or some forms of political violence.  Table 4.5 demonstrates that Chechen refugees 
who desire maximal goals, like the establishment of an Islamic Caucasus Emirate, 
are more likely to accept all forms of political violence, while more moderate goals 
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drive more pacific views towards violence.  This suggests that among Chechen 
refugees, political violence is not driven primarily by culture or trauma (either from 
the war and forced displacement or from personal loss), but is rather viewed 
instrumentally, as a means to achieve some desired objective.  Indeed, refugees who 
desire more moderate political goals, like Autonomy within the Russian Federation 
are overwhelmingly against (46.7%) all acts of political violence.  The reason there 
is a correlation between moderate political goals and the rejection of political 
violence is that there is no need to employ violence to achieve such a political 
objective.  On the other end of the spectrum, 55.8% of refugees who desire a 
Caucasus Emirate favor all politically violent acts.  Only 1.6% rejects all acts. In this 
instance, political is perceived to be necessary to achieve the desired goal.  Again, 
these findings bolster an instrumental theory of violence. 
Refugees who desire Independence, a maximal political goal for some are 
closely divided between those in favor of all violent acts (17.5%) and those who 
reject all (20.2%).  The division in support for political violence among those 
desiring Independence as a political goal is explained further in Chapter 5.  The 
comparatively high levels of Rejects All Acts of Political Violence can be explained by 
the inordinate number of displaced Chechen women, the group most likely to reject 














Some Acts of 
Political 
Violence No Response 
Total: 301  
Democracy 8.4% 30.5% 44.2% 16.9% 
Sharia 39.5% 10.2% 46.9% 6.4% 
Table 4.6: Regime Type and Attitudes towards Political Violence  
Table 4.6 elucidates the relationship between preferred regime type and 
attitudes supporting political violence.  It is important to note that I asked 
respondents to state their preference for the form of government they thought was 
best for Chechnya.  This was an open-ended question and responses were either 
democracy or sharia.  The findings reveal that Chechen refugees who prefer sharia 
over democratic institutions are more likely to accept all forms of political violence.  
39.5% of refugees desiring sharia favor all acts of political violence, while only 
10.2% reject all acts.  In contrast, only 8.4% of refugees preferring democracy as a 
regime type accept all acts of political violence, while 30.5% reject all acts.  These 
findings closely mirror one other in reverse.  There is only modest statistical 
difference between Chechen refugees who desire sharia and those who prefer 
democracy and the support some acts of political violence.  These responses are 
identical to the ones discussed previously regarding Beslan and Nord-Ost.  
Undoubtedly, the finding of a relationship between sharia and the support of 
political violence is a controversial one.  It is not clear that such support has 
anything to do with piety or, for that matter, it is not clear that respondents had an 
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accurate understanding of what sharia truly entails.  For some of these individuals, 
sharia might be chosen as a rejection of all other forms of regime type. Some may 
feel that because they are Muslim, and the ideal regime according to the Quran is 
sharia, that there is no other choice.  However, in keeping with the other findings 
which suggest instrumentalist views on violence, I contend that the correlation 
between refugees who embrace religious authority as political authority and 
political violence is due to the current situation.  In order to implement sharia in 
Chechnya it would take tremendous efforts and violent means. 
Finally, why do maximal political goals drive attitudes which support 
political violence?  Despite the instinctually negative connotations towards 
employing violence to achieve some desired goal, most societies, in fact, permit 
some form of institutionalized violence and possess the ancillary norms for 
regulating such behavior. I argue that such means are necessary given 
contemporary circumstances.  The Russians have established considerable control 
over the once-rebellious republic.  Today an organized resistance operates in the 
southern mountains and western forests and foothills with a fair amount of 
operational freedom, but they do not hold any concrete territory and they no longer 
possess the conventional capabilities necessary to achieve a military stalemate, 
much less a decisive victory, which would implement independence or establish the 
first step in an eventual Caucasus Emirate (Souleimanov, 2007:226-301).  This 
explains the adoption of more unconventional military tactics and suicide bombings.  
In short, achieving either Independence or an Islamic Caucasus Emirate is an 
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extreme objective and as such, equally extreme measures are necessary.  Finally, I 
posit that many Chechen refugees, males and females alike, still feel as if they are a 
people at war.  Consequently, politically violent actions, even those which might be 
viewed as abhorrent in times of peace, are legitimate.   
ISLAMIC CAUCASUS EMIRATE  
As noted, although for some Chechen refugees attitudes towards political 
violence are driven in part by revenge, this doesn't take away from the dominant 
strategic nature of such views.  This study has shown that attitudes supporting 
political violence are more frequently driven by strategic considerations.   I contend 
that where emotive factors do gain traction is in channeling sentiments like fear and 
survival into concrete political choices and desires.  A significant number of 
displaced Chechens truly fear outright extermination by the Russians, a more than 
plausible fear given the mutually antagonistic history between the two peoples.   As 
a solution, some displaced Chechen perceive Independence as a salvation, while 
others claim Chechnya is too small and too isolated to ever effectively counter 
Russian aggression in the region.   A common sentiment expressed by displaced 
Chechens was their observation that, every fifty years the Russians attempted to 
exterminate the Chechen people.   Accordingly, a significant number of displaced 
Chechens perceive their best chance of national survival coming from the 
establishment of a Caucasus-wide Islamic state.   When they imagine and talk about 
an Islamic Caucasus Emirate, I do not find among the vast majority, over 90% of 
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respondents, the same religious, fundamentalist language of global jihadist rhetoric 
espoused by people like Osama bin Laden, but rather views of a surprisingly secular, 
nationalist form of political organization.  A small minority does articulate the global 
jihadist lingo, yet the overwhelmingly majority of Chechen refugees who support an 
Islamic Caucasus Emirate envision a large, independent, self-sufficient state with 
numerous resources and warm water ports to access the outer world, thus securing 
the ability to procure resources.  When coupled with the natural barriers of the 
Caucasus Mountains, such a political unit seems to ostensibly provide full protection 
against foreign invasion and war.   This idea of a state is not new.  
In describing a Caucasus Emirate in security terms, many see sharia not in 
purely religious terms, but rather as a kind of unifying, overarching ideology and 
identity.  Sharia acts as a mechanism to unite the myriad disparate nationalities of 
the Caucasus.  Sharia is a way to unite a Chechen with an Avar, an Ingush, a 
Cherkessk, and a Balkar.  The Caucasus-wide Islamic Emirate would be the ultimate 
shield against any Russian aggression and the ultimate guarantor of Chechen 
survival. The finding that support for political violence, especially violence with 
ostensibly religious overtones, is in fact driven by more parochial concerns and 
insecurities suggests very different policy prescriptions and is something policy-
makers and academics alike need to better understand and appreciate. In short, the 
support for an Islamic Caucasus Emirate and sharia in the Caucasus appears to have 






Table 4.7: Reasons for Supporting the Caucasus Emirate  
25 year old Male student from Urus-Martan (Poland) 
I want to see an Islamic Caliphate.  There we would have Muslims and sharia 
law. We would have to do nothing more than to serve Allah.  We would be 
strong.  Who could ever defeat such a place?  That is what happened in 
Afghanistan with the Communists, and it will happen to the Americans there 
too.  If Chechnya becomes part of an Islamic Caliphate no one will ever be 
able to kill so many of us ever again. 
 
47 year old Male collective farmer from Grozny (Belgium) 
I am not a religious man, but a Muslim Emirate is best.  We are a small people 
but if we all stick together, we will have access to the sea.  No one will ever be 
able to defeat us. 
 
57 year old Male doctor from Urus-Martan (Azerbaijan) 
We must have an Islamic Emirate. Chechnya will be prosperous and will give 
help to its neighbors.  And we will have a seaport.  We will build a port city 
that will reach to the Mediterranean Sea.  And we will re-open the Silk Road, 
which we controlled for 200 years….Sharia unites all the different Muslim 
nations in the Caucasus.  Together we will be united under one law and our 
old differences will be forgotten. With sharia we are once again brothers. 
 
Many observers claim the Chechen resistance’s 2007 adoption of the Islamic 
Caucasus Emirate as their new political goal marks a new chapter in an increasingly 
radicalized movement.  Originally nationalist and secular, the current resistance is 
purportedly comprised of more radicalized members, many of whom are younger 
than their predecessors.  These new recruits lack prior connections to their Russian 
adversaries (during Soviet times many Chechens served in the Red Army, they 
worked together, and lived as neighbors) and have known little more than war and 
violence in their lives, thus making them ostensibly more violent. Certainly, there 
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are such individuals in the movement and this has led some analysts categorize the 
recent and highly public clash among the separatists over leadership between 
Umarov and Khassan Vertkaev as a generational clash more so than an ideological 
one (see below).  Certainly, there might be truth to that as well.  Yet, I contend that 
Umarov cloaked himself in jihadist garb and adopted jihadist jargon not out of 
personal beliefs or piety, but rather as the result of strategic considerations and as a 
way to create a force-multiplier.   It is important to make this case since it bolsters 
my argument about the strategic rather than emotive character of Chechen support 
for political violence. 
The Chechens realized during their first war with Russia that external 
support from the western world was nonexistent.  Russia was too powerful a 
geopolitical player for western states to challenge over tiny Chechnya.   As a result, 
Chechnya was forced to fend for herself and this was no small task.  Chechnya is a 
rugged and mountainous place located almost entirely within Russia proper.  Their 
one external border is with Georgia along the infamous Pankisi Gorge, itself difficult 
to access.  Topography prohibits large influxes of recruits and volunteers and to 
survive Chechnya needed not men or arms, which they managed to procure from 
the Russians themselves, but funding.  Money was easily smuggled into Chechnya 
and it was instrumental in keeping the Chechen war-machine alive.  Money paid for 
everything from weapons to bribes.  Money, not recruits, became the lifeblood of the 
movement and espousing global jihadist rhetoric became the chief instrument to 
draw vital funds.  
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Yet the Chechen Diaspora is relatively small and external donations from 
sympathizers were never more than a pittance, especially in the early years when 
many displaced Chechens struggled to even survive.  The Chechens needed to 
attract money and the best way to do so was to play up their Islamic identity, 
particularly to a Middle Eastern audience.  Clearly, the greater Islamic community 
was aware of Chechnya and her struggles against Russia.  The Chechens made a 
deliberate effort to accentuate their identity to attract funds.  The result was video-
taped battles, which served essentially as commercial advertisements for foreign 
investors to engage in their own form of “checkbook diplomacy”.  It was only 
natural, and a matter of time, before Umarov, one of the old guard secular 
nationalists, adopted the title of Emir and declared the establishment of an Islamic 
Caucasus Emirate as the ultimate goal.  In doing so, he tried, strategically, to 
simultaneously unite the various Muslim nationalities of the Northern Caucasus and 
attract foreign investment, the latter of which became increasingly important as 
actual fighters decreased in number.  
Appeals to pan-Islamic political goals are not new to the region.   As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the legendary resistance leader, Imam Shamil first 
articulated similar goals in the 19th Century during his near half-century campaign 
against Tsarist forces.  In the 20th Century, the peoples of the Caucasus tried to 
create such a political unit from 1918 to 1920 in the detritus of the collapse of the 
Tsarist regime.   After Tsar Nicholas II abdicated the throne, a Congress of the North 
Caucasus met in Vladikavkaz to establish a new overarching governing body for an 
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independent state, the Independent Democratic Republic of Mountaineers of the 
North Caucasus, a political unit that is similar to today’s Caucasus Emirate.  The 
North Caucasus Emirate proposed in 1918 was actually recognized by several 
foreign powers:  Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey all recognized the polity, 
the Turks going so far as to enter into a formal alliance with the North Caucasians on 
June 8, 1918 (Avtorkhanov, 1992:152). 
 During the Russian Civil War, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were eager to enlist 
the support of the highlanders in the struggle against the pro-Tsarist White Armies.  
On January 20, 1921, Lenin sent Stalin, as Commissar of Nationalities, to meet with 
delegates from the North Caucasus Emirate at a Congress of Mountaineers in North 
Ossetia.  Stalin offered the Caucasians, in exchange for highlander recognition of 
Soviet power, the possibility of a unique Soviet political unit, autonomy in the form 
on an Autonomous Soviet Mountain Republic.  “Thus was created a completely 
unnatural Soviet Republic with a Soviet emblem on its banner and a sharia 
constitution…” (Avtorkhanov, 1992:154).  The highlanders were even encouraged to 
replace the portraits of Lenin with ones of Imam Shamil and his naib warriors. 
When the highlanders went to sign the agreement with Lenin in Moscow they were 
tricked and diverted to Rostov where they were executed.  The Bolsheviks 
eventually defeated the White Armies, but a low-level insurgency persisted 
throughout the 1930s in the North Caucasus (Schafer: 2010:95-98).  
In the early 1990s as the Soviet Union began to disintegrate, newly elected 
Chechen President, Dzhokhar Dudayev initially advocated a unified pan-Caucasus, 
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but never took any serious action to promote the agenda (Hughes, 2007:102).  
Indeed, according to members of his inner circle, after the war between Abkhazia 
and Georgia erupted Dudayev seemed almost fearful of the possibility of a Caucasus-
wide Islamic state.33  After the surprising Chechen victory over Russian forces in 
1996, some elements began to clamor for religious authority as political authority. 
Movladi Udugov, chief propagandist for the resistance movement and Deputy Prime 
Mister under President Aslan Maskhadov became leader of the Islamic Order and 
the Islamic Nation, groups comprised of members of various ethnic groups from the 
North Caucasus.  The groups’ objectives were to re-establish the “Imamate” of 18th 
Century guerrilla leader, Imam Shamil.  Despite the lofty sounding religious goals, 
many believed the movement was essentially cover for a Chechen land grab 
(Hughes, 2007:103).  In the spring of 1998, Basayev established the Congress of 
Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan, an organization seeking to create an 
independent state.  This became the banner for Basayev and Khattab’s 1999 
invasion of Dagestan, the event which helped instigate the Second Russo-Chechen 
War (Hughes, 2007:105). 
In the Second Russo-Chechen War, the Chechen resistance fought under the 
banner of national independence from Russia for seven years.  In October 2007, 
                                                 
33 Authors interviews, Baku, Azerbaijan, 2007. Dudayev did, however, have less concern about the 
idea floated by some members of his administration to push for a union with Dagestan.  Supporters 
of this new political unit claimed that the two polities should join for three main reasons.  First, there 
was a long history and close geographical proximity between the two republics.  Second, a 
substantial Chechen minority population resided along the border, itself the site of disputed land 
claims over the years. And finally, the topography of the regions would make any would-be invaders 
wary of conquest, as the high and rugged mountains were a natural fortress, tailor made for a 
protracted guerrilla war; See Hughes, 2007. 
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Chechen President, Doku Umarov announced the surprising new political aims of 
the Chechen resistance.  The Chechen leader called for all Muslim brethren in the 
North and West Caucasus to join together and drive out the Russians, creating a new 
political unit, the Islamic Caucasus Emirate.  The borders of the Caucasus Emirate 
have yet to be well defined.  Some maps posted on the Chechen pro-resistance 
website Kavkaz Center show a political unit which spans from the Caspian Sea to the 
Mediterranean, with a small “island” in the middle, apparently pro-Christian 
Georgia.  Others show the North Caucasus as part of the Middle and Far East, 
spanning from North Africa to Central Asia. 
Why did Umarov decide to change the goals of the decade’s long Chechen 
resistance movement from national sovereignty to a transnational Islamic state?  
Observers posit three possibilities.  First, it is said that in the aftermath of 
Maskhadov’s assassination the resistance was close to collapse and did not knowing 
which way to maneuver. Declaring a Caucasus Emirate is thus viewed as essentially 
a panic move.  Second, because they had little support from the West, observers 
claim that Umarov had no choice but to reach out to the Islamic world for assistance.  
Finally, Umarov might have recognized the futility of negotiating with the Russians 
and thus decided to push the resistance as far, politically, from Russia as possible.  
Certainly after Beslan it was clear that Putin’s government would never agree to any 
concessions and as such, war was the only realistic alternative to achieve any degree 
of Chechen autonomy (Akhmadov, 2010:243-244).  In separate analyses, the likes of 
which dominate contemporary American policy towards the region, the claim is that 
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Umarov and the Chechen resistance has morphed into a radical jihadist movement 
in full alliance with transnational Islamic terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda (see 
Murphy, 2010; Hahn, 2011).  
 I contend that the shift in political goals has a material rather than religious 
basis.  This shift denotes a shift in strategy, not goals.  The turn to the East, to the 
greater Muslim world, was made less out of religious piety or even religious 
extremism of the kind associated with transnational jihadists, but instead was a 
purposeful, strategic attempt to marshal support from the Islamic world and, 
simultaneously, exploit the growing frustration among Muslims, particularly the 
youth, in the greater Caucasus region, channeling populist anger into military force.  
It is an old truism that all politics are local and I contend this is as true as it is 
in American politics as it is in the North Caucasus.  The Caucasian Islamic Emirate is 
a fundamentally local political solution to fundamentally local grievances dressed in 
Islamic rhetoric.  The use of Islamic appeals to secure non-religious political or 
material goods in Chechnya predates Umarov.  Wilhelmsen argues that most of the 
prominent Chechen elites in the 1990s who espoused radical Islam to one degree or 
another did so primarily out of strategic and personal reasons rather than theocratic 
piety.34  Dressing themselves in Islamic garb to conceal more parochial political and 
                                                 
34 On that note, Wilhelmsen (2005:35) argues that radical Islam, itself an alien concept in Chechnya, 
was brought about principally by three potential mechanisms.  First, the First Russo-Chechen War 
led to a radicalization of key leaders.  Second, foreign groups were able to co-opt the Chechen cause 
as part of the broader Muslim struggle against the West.  Third, Russian polices influenced the 
balance of power between Chechen moderates and the radicals in such a way as to undermine the 
former while emboldening the latter. The adoption and articulation of radical Islam for Basayev 
became a gateway to international funds, contracts, skills and training, and recruits.  It is important 
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even financial objectives was surprisingly common among the first generation of 
Chechen resistance leaders, men who had lived their entire lives under the Soviet 
system and who had little understanding of the religious tenets of their faith.  These 
were men who smoked and drank and lived anything but pious lives.  Yet, they 
claimed religiousness when it suited them.   Still, as discussed below, there appears 
to be a fundamental shift among these one-time secularists in terms of politic-
religious goals.  
 Many contemporary resistance groups mobilized around tribal and/or 
Islamic appeals are thought to give rhetorical lip-service to global jihadist groups, 
like Al Qaeda, above all because it is a useful tactic for raising funds and recruits in 
their quest to achieve local political objectives.  Such espousals can bestow these 
groups with a certain international prestige and publicity.  For their part, 
transnational terrorist organizations use these local conflicts to pursue their own 
objectives, wedding indigenous grievances to broader political goals.  In doing so, 
David Kilcullen, a contemporary counter-insurgency theorist, claims this deadly 
bargain creates “accidental guerrillas”, whereby indigenous fighters become caught 
up in transitional struggles despite their exclusively local concerns.  This is 
especially problematic when outside forces, like the United States or NATO, invade 
such traditional spaces in search of transnational terrorists, thus forcing local agents 
                                                                                                                                                 
to note that not all of the Chechen resistance leaders are so disingenuous about their faith and their 
religious goals.  This is certainly true among a number of displaced Chechen refugees, particularly 
those in Baku and Belgium, who articulate and adhere to a set of belief closer to Salafism than their 




to fight what they perceive to be a hostile Western presence.  This is purportedly the 
dynamic underlying a number of contemporary conflicts from Afghanistan and 
Pakistan to the Philippians and Somalia.  Scholars and policy-makers alike must not 
allow themselves to be tricked into thinking these disparate groups are part of some 
greater homogenous terrorist threat.  In regard to the North Caucasus, I believe 
these groups are far more concerned with local considerations and grievances (see 
also Topf and Zhukov, 2010).  They continue their struggle not because of 
emotional, ideational, religious, or transnational religious objectives, but rather 
because of concrete local political goals.  Support for political violence and militant 
activity among displaced Chechen is driven by the same material and strategic 
considerations.   
Public statements by the resistance provide additional evidence of a strategic 
rationale.  A close reading of Umarov’s Islamic appeals and rhetoric, as well as those 
of other purportedly Islamic extremists in the Chechen resistance, demonstrates 
such sentiments to be driven more by nationalist political concerns than either 
transnational or religious objectives.  Even the violence and suicide bombings are 
driven by strategic considerations rather than emotions, like revenge.  These claims 
are bolstered by the popular sentiments articulated by displaced Chechens 
regarding the Caucasus Emirate.  I contend that Chechen militants are, in fact, driven 
more by local concerns, namely establishing Chechen independence.  The 
instrumental use of Islamic rhetoric is driven towards attracting funds to wage a 
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secular fight.  I contend this has been the case as well for most of the Chechen 
resistance, including the infamous Shamil Basayev.35   
Basayev was above all a strategic pragmatist who dressed himself in 
whatever garb he deemed necessary to achieve his singular goal, the establishment 
of Chechen independence.36  Time and again Basayev’s motives were repeatedly 
revealed to be more national and secular than religious.  After the success of the 
First Russo-Chechen War, Basayev recognized the utility and value of employing 
Islamic rhetoric to the appropriate audience. In an infamous 2005 interview with 
Babitsky, which aired on ABC, Basayev displayed political acumen by abandoning 
his usual jihadist rhetoric, knowing that such lingo would be highly inflammatory to 
Western audiences still seething about September 11th.  Instead, Basayev framed the 
Chechen struggle as a colonial one against a historic oppressor.  This war, he 
claimed, was a fight for independence and national sovereignty.  The implications of 
this act of political theater are clear; Basayev, like many of his purportedly “jihadist” 
compatriots adopt whichever rhetoric and/or goals suit the circumstances.  When 
                                                 
35 Prior to his death in 2006, Basayev was the face of Chechen Islamic terrorism. In May 2003 
Basayev initiated Operation Boomerang, a plan, as the target name suggests, of visiting back upon the 
Russians the very same tactics they had employed against the Chechen civilians (Hughes, 2007:157).  
Basayev had come to the conclusion that the conflict with the Russians had become a total war and 
he would bring that war to the Russian homeland.  To do anything else, he reasoned, was to prolong 
the genocide of the Chechen people.  In this endeavor he would have to be especially brutal.  In a 
February and July interview with Western media Basayev promised a series of “Beslans”, claiming 
that all Russian citizens were now legitimate targets, a sentiment he had first expressed in 1995 
during the siege of Buddennovsk.  
 
36 According to journalist Antol Lieven, who spent considerable time with Basayev during the First 
Russo-Chechen War, throughout the early campaign Basayev appeared outwardly to typify the 
stereotypical Islamic holy warrior.  He even took an Islamic name, Abdallah Shamil Abu-Idris and 
published a lengthy Islamic manifesto.  Yet, Basayev seemed curiously disinterested in Islamic 
jurisprudence or an Islamic state (Hughes, 2007:101), thus bolstering the assertion that he is indeed 
pursuing more secular goals.   
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they need finances from abroad, the message becomes more religious and fanatical. 
When they need to bolster their image with the West, especially when the latter 
were closer to Russia in fighting a common foe, their language is more subtle and 
accepted. Conversely, for the Russian media, he frequently cast himself as the 
“Islamic bogeyman” they eventually perceived him to be.   
 Former Chechen Foreign Minister, Ilyas Akhmadov, recounts that in a 
discussion about the merits and plausibility of achieving Chechen sovereignty with 
Basayev in 1998, Basayev claimed, “The Russians will never permit us to establish a 
normal state…we need to create a Caliphate…” (Akhmadov, 2010:138).   Even during 
the so-called spectacular terrorist attacks, actions which purposefully took on 
Islamic dress, themes, symbols, and rhetoric, the actual goals were exclusively 
national in character. In a closely guarded note of demands given to the Russians 
during the siege of Beslan, Basayev wrote, “The Chechen people are conducting a 
national liberation struggle for our Freedom and Independence, for our self-
preservation, and not to destroy Russia or humiliate it.  Being free, we would be a 
strong neighbor.  We offer you peace, but the choice is yours.”   If true, this casts 
both the Beslan siege and Basayev in a new light, one quite different than the image 
perpetrated by governments and media.  It appears that Basayev was indeed above 
all a nationalist. 37  
                                                 
37 Akhmadov also believes that both Nord-Ost and Beslan were operations meant to repeat 
the success of Buddennovsk, namely military attacks meant to draw Russian once again to 




Observers like Pape (2010) concur with this overall conclusion.  Specifically, 
he notes that although Umarov’s rhetoric is frequently of the kind found among 
global jihadists, in fact, this is all a cover.  Pape contends that despite the Islamic 
dressings, Umarov is, at heart, a national secularist and that the struggle he wages is 
still primarily focused on achieving one goal.  That goal is not the establishment of 
an Islamic Caucasus Emirate, but rather Chechen independence.   In an apparent nod 
to this assertion, in the aftermath of the March 2010 airport bombing, Umarov 
momentarily deviated from the fiery jihadist rhetoric and confessed, “…this is the 
land of our brothers and it is our sacred duty to liberate these lands.”  It is all 
political theater, a thought echoed by prominent scholars like Hughes who caution 
that “we should remain cautious about the fundamentalist motivations of leaders 
such as Basayev.  When pushed to define his philosophy of struggle in June of 2005, 
Basayev emphasized the predominance of the statist content of his ideology over 
the religious, imparting the sense that taking power in the state was his political and 
military objective” (2007:101).  I contend this is exactly what current resistance 
leader Doku Umarov is doing when he articulates the push for an Islamic Caucasus 
Emirate.  It is merely a cover for other goals, namely Chechen independence.    
For most Chechens today, both at home and abroad, the idea of a Caucasus 
Emirate has little practical meaning.  The vast majority are much more concerned 
with security and basic needs like education, food, medicine, etc. (Jamestown 
Terrorism Monitor, January 20, 2010, Vol. IX, Issue 3).  Those who do support the 
Caucasus Emirate have particular political calculations.  The vast majority support it 
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as a way to ultimately stop the violence and bloodshed.  This has both short-term 
and long-term aspects.  In the short-term, enlisting the support of fellow Caucasus 
Muslims acts a force-multiplier, adding fresh new recruits to the struggle.  It also 
spreads the theater of operations, forcing the Russians to expand and stretch their 
own troops.  In doing so, if history is any guide, Russian behavior towards locals in 
areas plagued by insurgents has been especially brutal, a factor driving support to 
the insurgents.  As troops spread, the pressure is lifted off Chechnya, thus 
decreasing short-term violence. Moreover, as the structured-interviews reveal, a 
unified political unit from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, rich with resources and 
formidable natural defenses would indeed be a major player in regional geo-politics.  
It would certainly be an area able to withstand Russian military pressure.  
Umarov’s decision to abandon the goal of Chechen independence in favor of 
establishing a Caucasus Emirate caused a serious split in the Chechen resistance.  
However, this cleavage has not been without some unintended benefits, particularly 
in regard to the international community.  Thus far, most financial support for the 
resistance has come from either the now sizable Chechen Diaspora spread across 
the Caucasus, Middle East, and Europe, or from foreign donors in the Islamic world.  
The recent split, however, has allowed each ideological side the chance to see what 
it wants in one of the two resistance movements.  For the west, they can still support 
the national secularists, now represented by moderates like Zakayev in London and 




GENERATIONAL CLEAVAGES  
Age Groups Russia Autonomy Independence 
Caucasus 
Emirate 
18 to 24 0.0% 12.1% 72.7% 15.2% 
25 to 34 0.0% 4.1% 67.0% 28.9% 
35 to 55 1.2% 8.1% 69.0% 21.8% 
56 to 66 0.0% 11.1% 33.3% 55.6% 
Table 4.8: Age and Political Goals 
Table 4.9: Age and Regime Type 
It is important to note the generational aspect in the support of maximal 
political goals.  The conventional wisdom is that in protracted insurgencies and civil 
conflicts younger generations of militants will purportedly be more radical and 
extreme than their elder counterparts in both desired political goals and the 
accepted means to achieve such goals.  Empirically, this has been true in places like 
Afghanistan.  However, this does not seem to be the case among the Chechens.  
Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 reveal that although the older generation of Chechen 
separatists once supported national independence and democracy, they are now 
more likely to desire more maximal goals, like the establishment of an Islamic 
Emirate in the Caucasus, and support religious authority (sharia) as political 
authority.  This is especially puzzlingly since this generation experienced the secular 
Age Groups Democracy Sharia 
18 to 24 61.5% 38.5% 
25 to 34 40.0% 60.0% 
35 to 55 60.2% 39.8% 
56 to 66 31.3% 68.7% 
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world of the Soviet Union.  They spent significant time with ethnic Russians, serving 
together in the military or Communist Party, working in factories, competing in 
athletic endeavors, and sharing neighborhoods.  This was the generation foreign 
fighters from the Middle East repeatedly condemned as “infidels” for drinking 
alcohol and smoking.  
Unlike other regions, the younger generation of Chechens is ostensibly less 
interested in global jihad or any pan-Islamic, pan-Caucasian political unit. Indeed, 
the high-profile defection of young Chechen field-commanders last summer from 
current leader, Doku Umarov, himself a former “old guard” national secularist 
turned global jihadist, suggests the younger generation is interested in the 
comparatively moderate and exclusive goal of Chechen national sovereignty.  It is 
not clear if the younger generation is also moderating their views on political 
violence, but as of this writing there have been fewer terrorist attacks on Russian 
civilians in recent months.  Although much work needs to be done, I suspect the 
generational shift in political goals among non-participant Chechens is related to 
two factors, desperation and time.  The older generation has endured inconceivable 
trauma; many have lost members of their families, their homes, their honor and 
reputation, their livelihood, and any conceivable hope of a normal future. 
Supporting an Islamic Caucasus Emirate may be viewed as the best option to regain 
some material or ideational good. Second, each passing days brings the recognition 
that time is not on their side, and perceivably the quickest way to achieve the goal of 
a Chechnya free from Russian rule may be to untie together the disparate ethno-
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national groups of the North Caucasus.  Chapter 5 explores another aspect to these 
generational findings.  When disaggregated along gender lines, an interesting new 
pattern emerges.    
In general, this puzzle does merit further inquiry.  Foreign policy decision-
makers engaged in protracted insurgencies or civil wars often lament the paradox 
that although it is necessity to eliminate top militant leaders (many of whom may 
represent an older generation) doing so may stymie any subsequent attempts at 
negotiating peace since younger militants will be purportedly less willing to 
compromise.  Understanding the conditions under which generational political 
shifts occur in insurgency can plausibly help better inform foreign policy decision-
makers and help us better understand the micro-level dynamics of non-participant 
support for militant activity.   
CONCLUSION 
The data reveals a remarkable level of sophistication among Chechen 
refugees and how they view certain acts of political violence.  On the one hand, 
Chechens see political violence as a strategic tool, which helps achieve certain goals.  
On the other hand, there are equally powerful constraints on violence, especially in 
regard to whom it targets.  Children, it appears, are for the most part off-limits.  
Representatives of the Russian state, like military and police personnel, are fair 
game, and Russian citizens fall somewhere in-between.  More importantly, these 
findings significantly challenge both the conventional wisdom regarding refugees 
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and violence and cultural arguments, which have overwhelmingly categorized 
Chechens as a congenitally war-prone people. 
The expectation, as stated above, is of a uniformly, pro-violent community.  
There is considerable variation, however.  In addition to the differences discussed 
here in Chapter 4, there is also significant variation between displaced Chechen men 
and women in both their attitudes towards violence and in their political views.  In 
the next chapter, I explore the role of gender in influencing attitudes towards 
political violence and in generating political goals choices and regime type 
preferences.  Women are less likely to support political violence and they are less 
likely to desire either an Islamic Caucasus Emirate or sharia as a regime type.  As I 
reveal in Chapter 5, women make these decisions based on the perception that they 
have no material interest in an Islamic world.   This chapter will further explore how 
gender roles have evolved during the war and in exile, empowering women and 
challenging traditional Chechen patriarchal norms, and discusses the role of women 









Chapter 5:  The Interactive Effect – The Role of Gender  
It is a kind of revolution, the start of a matriarchy, which is threatening to destroy the 
nucleus of Chechen society – the family – and it could ultimately be even more 
destructive than Stalin’s Deportations.  The Deportations killed us demographically, 
people died of cold and hunger.  But this war is actually doing more damage by 
destroying Chechen traditional society and values. 
Abdul Sultygov, Chechen sociologist 
 
A common misperception of the Chechens is that they are a congenitally war-
like people (Bodansky, 2007; Hahn, 2011; Murphy, 2006; Murphy, 2010; 
Zaurbekova and Yandarov, 2001).  This is a view propagated in the classic Russian 
works of literature by Pushkin, Lermontov, and Tolstoy, and, in recent years, 
popular films like “Prisoner of the Mountains” and various media accounts.  In this 
view, Chechen males were sometimes noble savages, but more often, bandits, 
murders, and blood-thirsty terrorists.  In the past, Chechen women were mostly 
absent from these narratives.  However, in recent years there has emerged a new, 
predominant stereotype of Chechen women as being particularly, and near-
universally prone to violence as well (Murphy, 2010).  Indeed, various media 
accounts, especially Russian, have perpetuated the view of ubiquitous, bomb-laden 
Black Widows lurking in Moscow’s every shadow; even in the West, The New York 
Times published an Op-Ed titled, “Why are Chechen Women So Dangerous?”, 
seemingly lumping all Chechen females into one pro-violent community.  Are 
Chechen women really so dangerous?  
Undoubtedly, Chechen women have been as much a part of the post-Soviet 
wars against Russia as have their male counterparts.  Some observers might argue 
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Chechen women have been more involved than their men.  Chechen women have 
taken up arms as militants and insurgents; they have participated in the so-called 
“spectacular” terrorist attacks in Moscow during the showing of the play, Nord-Ost 
and at School #1 in Beslan, North Ossetia; they have committed a number of suicide 
bombings against Russian civilians; and they have provide material support to the 
rebel fighters in the southern forests and mountains.  It is hard to argue that the 
protracted insurgency in Chechnya could persist were it not for the integral role 
Chechen women have played.  
In taking up arms, a significant number of women have been killed, but a 
greater number still have lost their lives to indiscriminant bombardments from 
Russian artillery, planes, or helicopters, or from the innumerable land mines that 
pepper the republic as they tried to peddle their wares in the market, gather 
firewood or food in the forests, or attempted to secure the release of family 
members, both dead and alive.38  They have been the target of direct persecution.  In 
the so-called “zachistky” or “cleansing” operations, they have been arrested, 
detained, and brought to filtration camps where many are raped, tortured and 
executed; for many such women, their only crime is to be the wife, sister or cousin of 
a purported militant.   A number of women brought to the filtration camps are never 
seen again (Gilligan, 2009).  
                                                 
38 The Russian armed forces have capitalized on the Chechen traditions of burying their dead in 
ancestral homelands by frequently ransoming remains as well as live captives; See Politskovskaya, 
2001; 2003.  
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Russians are not the only threat to Chechen women.  Their own ethnic 
brethren have been accused and often documented perpetrating violence. The pro-
Kremlin government of Ramzan Kadyrov acts much like Russian forces in targeting 
women because of purported family ties to suspected separatists or for other acts of 
alleged collusion. Kadyrov has further introduced draconian measures to control 
Chechen female behavior and dress, institutionalizing abuse for women who fail to 
adhere to the regime’s strict new interpretations.39  On the other side, it has been 
claimed that members of the Chechen resistance kidnap Chechen women to turn 
them into suicide bombers by coercion, drugging and/or brainwashing or by 
impugning her honor by rape.   In Chechen culture the worst fate for a woman is not 
to be killed, but rather raped, an action that brings dishonor upon the family.   In this 
scenario, Chechen women who are raped are told they have but one way to remove 
the stain and tarnish from their family’s honor, namely by becoming a suicide 
bomber (see Hahn, 2011; Murphy, 2010).   
Whatever the cause, it is clear that Chechen women are an especially 
vulnerable group and, in some cases, a source for violent actions.  They have indeed 
been both victim and perpetrator of violence.  Displaced Chechen women are 
arguably even more vulnerable, isolated from their traditional support networks 
and forced to endure countless hardships from displacement.  There is no evidence 
to suggest that any displaced Chechen female has become a Black Widow, but the 
                                                 
39 See Human Rights Watch, “You Dress According to Our Rules: Enforcement of an Islamic Dress 
Code for Women in Chechnya,” March 2011.  
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question remains, are Chechen refugee women potential recruits and future Black 
Widows?  Becoming a Black Widow is a behavioral outcome, yet it is also important 
to understand the relationship between gender and attitudes towards political 
violence.  In particular, how do Chechen refugee women feel about political violence 
and militant activity?  Do displaced Chechen men and women desire the same 
political outcomes? 
Conventional wisdom seemingly suggests that the community of displaced 
Chechens presents an ideal population from which to recruit individuals to commit 
acts of political violence, particularly against Russian targets (Bodansky, 2007; 
Hahn, 2011; Murphy, 2006; Murphy, 2010).  As discussed previously, the historical 
animosities between the two groups as well as the conduct of the Russians during 
the two post-Soviet wars provide ample grievances and potential cause for pro-
violent sentiments.  Still, it is important to better understand whether or not gender 
plays a role in influencing attitudes supporting politically violent means to achieve 
select objectives.  Moreover, it is important to understand the relationship between 
gender and choice of political goals and regime type preferences.  
Despite the shared common experiences of culture, war, and displacement 
there is significant variation among displaced Chechen females and males regarding 
their attitudes on the legitimacy of political violence.  I argue that in general 
Chechen refugee women are more likely than Chechen refugee males to reject all 
acts of political violence.  Chechen refugee women display a remarkably 
sophisticated view of political violence, especially as it pertains to the legitimacy of 
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target.  They also display significant variation from the Chechen refugee males in 
choice of political goals and regime type preferences, a finding which challenges 
contemporary views about Chechen gender relations and patrimonial dominance 
and suggests a material or interest-based argument for the support of political 
violence and militant activity. 
Conversely, the prevalent and constant view of Chechen males is that they 
are a hyper-violent group (Bodansky, 2007; Hahn, 2011; Murphy, 2005; Murphy, 
2010).  Chechen males do indeed have a culture which privileges violence and 
individual bravery and a significant number of male Chechen refugees are former 
fighters.  Among the refugee communities there are large numbers of young males,40 
a group usually associated as being particularly prone to violence,41 and all Chechen 
refugee males have endured the acute trauma of both war and displacement.   
Moreover, although Chechen refugee males escaped the every-day violence of war 
and insurgency that still rages in the North Caucasus, they are not immune to 
violence.  Feelings of insecurity and vulnerability are endemic throughout the 
European and especially Caucasian refugee communities.  In addition to the episodic 
violence that takes place between Chechen refugee males and locals or other forced 
migrants, many have been deliberately targeted for liquidation by the Russian and 
Kadyrov special security services. As a result, Chechen males have been 
assassinated in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Austria, Georgia, and Azerbaijan 
                                                 
40 The common view of refugee communities is that they are predominately composed of women and 
children. In the Chechen refugee communities in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Poland, and Belgium, males 
make up a plurality of the total population.  This is discussed further in Chapter 6.  
41 See Lischer, 2006. 
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and a considerable number of Chechen refugee men fear that they too will be 
executed.  
Given the circumstances, it is perceived that Chechen males, particularly 
young males, are a uniformly pro-violent group.  Indeed, according to a number of 
scholars and policy-makers, if we should expect to find pro-violent attitudes 
anywhere it should be among the males in the Chechen refugee communities.  Under 
what conditions do Chechen refugee males find political violence an acceptable form 
of social behavior?  I argue that Chechen refugee males will be more likely to 
support all acts of political violence than Chechen refugee females.  Yet, Chechen 
refugee males too display marked variation in their views towards violence.  What 
explains this variation?  As discussed in Chapter 4, I argue that for both Chechen 
males and females, attitudes supporting political violence are driven primarily by 
the desire for select political goals and regime type preferences.  In this chapter, I 
will discuss this interactive affect whereby gender determines support for political 
violence and, in turn, also determines choice of certain political goals and regime 
type preferences.  I will also discuss the surprising generational cleavage that has 
emerged among displaced Chechen men. 
Chapter 5 proceeds as follows:  After a discussion of the literature on gender 
and violence, a literature which spans from the cultural to the biological, I discuss 
the history of traditional Chechen views on gender and how these have changed 
over time, exploring how structural changes, in particular the differing socio-
economic experiences under communist and post-communist rule, has impacted 
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and influenced contemporary attitudes towards political goals and regime type 
preferences.  Then, I briefly discuss how displacement and the wars have challenged 
traditional Chechen norms on gender.  I also examine in detail the Black Widows, 
revealing competing debates on their underlying motivations and exploring 
whether the refugee communities are breeding grounds for future recruits.  Finally, 
I discuss gender’s discernible influence on generating attitudes towards political 
violence and political goals and regime type preferences. In doing so, I also reveal 
how gender influences the support or rejection of certain concrete acts of political 
violence, in particular the attacks on Nord-Ost and Beslan, respectively.  
PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 
Prior to discussing attitudes towards political violence it is important to 
understand the broader historical and cultural environment of Chechen gender 
relations and illustrate how these relationships have been influenced by recent 
social disruptions, like the wars and displacement.  Chechen society is based on 
patriarchal-patrimonial clan and familial structures and the patron-based 
organization is characterized primarily by solidarity to the tribe.  Nevertheless, 
there are relics of ancient matriarchy manifest in the fact that women enjoy a 
number of privileges, including a measure of financial independence (Jaimouka, 
2005:83).  Classical Chechen society went through two phases of gender 
domination, as did most other indigenous North Caucasian societies, with society 
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being “initially matriarchal, later transforming to patriarchy when the physically 
more powerful males took control” (Jaimoukha, 2005:84).  
Historically, women acted as the “guardians of traditions and culture”.  They 
were treated with respect and deference and, in some instances, were bestowed 
with the power to adjudicate physical disputes.  Yet, in many respects women were 
subordinate in Chechen society and their behaviors were significantly proscribed, 
especially in decision-making processes (Jaimoukha, 2005:92).   
GENDER RELATIONS IN EXILE 
Gender relations between Chechen men and women have been in flux since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.  In the heady days of the so-called Chechen 
Revolution, Dudayev, like many other new, ethno-nationalist leaders, engaged in 
widespread nationalist mythmaking, articulating an idealized past of brave Chechen 
warriors and strong Chechen female mothers and homebuilders.  This was a shock 
for many Chechen women, especially those in the cities and large towns who had 
enjoyed a period of relative “Soviet feminism”.  When the First Russo-Chechen War 
broke out in 1994, significant numbers of Chechen males left for battle, leaving 
Chechen women behind to essentially fend for themselves and their families.  These 
women sold goods at the markets and risked their lives daily in the search for food 
and provisions.  For the women whose husbands did not go off to fight, there was 
still a disproportionate shift in responsibilities because of the security threat to 
males.  Although the situation would become far worse after the Second Russo-
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Chechen War broke out in 1999, Chechen men were not safe to walk about for fear 
of kidnapping or execution by Russian soldiers.  Men who ventured outside could be 
arrested and accused of any crime, usually confessing after torture.  As such, a 
number of Chechen women actually confessed to preferring to see their men at 
home instead of outside working because at least at home the women knew they 
were safe.42  
During the inter-war years Chechen women were subjected to new, alien 
ideas about their role and their image in society.  The influence of foreign Islamic 
thought introduced a new austerity for Chechen women, one that ironically has 
continued today under the Russian-approved leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, who has 
mandated a strict dress code for women and institutionalized harsh penalties for 
violators (see Human Rights Watch, March 2010).   
The staggeringly high loss of Chechen males from the total population has 
created new challenges for Chechen women.  It has always been socially acceptable, 
although relatively rare in urban areas, for Chechen men to take more than one wife.  
Recently, Kadyrov has stated that this should in fact be a goal for all Chechen men 
and women so as to replenish their lost ranks.  Polygamy is thus seen as a necessary 
prescription, especially given the Chechen cultural taboo of marrying foreigners, 
particularly foreign men.  The loss of so many men has also impacted the lives of 
women in the home.  Chechen females are now more tolerant of abusive and lazy 
                                                 




behavior from their husbands because they are simply not enough men to go 
around.  The loss of men is not just problematic for finding potential husbands.  
Brothers, key enforcers of women’s rights after marriage, are also gone, thus 
removing a last defense against abuse for many Chechen women.  For many women, 
a bad husband is better than none.  “Thus women’s position becomes precarious.  
On the one hand they have to struggle to provide for their families; on the other 
hand, they have to tolerate any kind of behavior, even though men are no longer 
then main breadwinners and protectors of the household because marriage still 
represents a ‘compulsory’ institution without which women can easily lose their 
‘honor’ and ‘respect’ in the community” (Szczepanikova, 2006:289). 
Forced migration of any kind has been shown to be extremely disruptive to 
family and kin structures.  As a result, there frequently emerge new familial 
arrangements, many of which are contested in violent ways behind closed doors 
(Szczepanikova, 2005:281).  Once the refugees arrive in a camp or community they 
are no longer threatened by the once daily horrors of war.  They are, however, 
confronted by new challenges and new restrictions, especially on mobility, and are 
confronted by new economic realities which challenge traditional views on gender.  
In many instances, this outcome is an unintended consequence of foreign aid 
organizations.   
Turner (2004) reveals that the institutional basis of altered gender norms.  
Organizations like UNHCR and other NGOs, especially in Africa, have deliberately 
engaged in policies, which empower females.  The dominant groups in the camps 
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meet these attempts with derision and hostility.  Why do organizations do this?  
According to Szczpanikova, it is primarily due to the predominant view of women as 
victims.  Women are seen as particularly vulnerable, yet ironically, the very policies 
established to ameliorate this vulnerability actually exacerbates it along with other 
gender tensions, often leading to a more dire environment for female refugees 
(Szczepanikova, 2005:284).  Refugee camp authorities too both tacitly and explicitly 
alter gender relations.  In many refugee communities, the organizers offer 
employment opportunities exclusively to women.  In many places, refugees are not 
permitted to work anywhere except for within the confines of the refugee camp 
itself.  The camp organizers do this because they consider refugee women to be 
“more reliable and docile than men, who are perceived to be troublemakers” 
(Szczepanikova, 2005:286).  These polices affect and influence gender relations by 
making females the sole breadwinners, a problem for Chechens because of a culture 
which views women as homemakers and men as the primary care-takers.  As a 
result, in many Chechen refugee families the men have become depressed, engaged 
in illegal drug use, and committed record levels of domestic abuse.  Although I never 
personally witnessed any domestic abuse, I did occasionally see the signs of physical 
abuse and in some instances, in Poland, for example, I was told confidentially that a 
woman was beat by her husband.  I also never observed any drug abuse, but was 
informed in the same way that it did occur.  
During my fieldwork I observed a range of patriarchal relations.  I will 
chronicle daily life in more detail in Chapter 6, but for now will provide a brief 
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discussion.  In many families, regardless of country location, the females always did 
the majority of the housework like cleaning, cooking, and tending to the children.  In 
some homes the women acted like invisible servants.  In these settings I was never 
introduced to wives, sister, or daughters even though they served me food directly 
or cleaned the mud from my boots while we ate.  The women and children would eat 
only after the men were done with their food and tea.  I witnessed this dynamic in a 
range of families in a range of locales – abandoned office buildings turned living 
quarters in Pankisi Gorge, in crowded and dilapidated old buildings in Baku, 
dormitory refugee centers in Poland, and comparatively nice flats in Belgium.   Yet, 
in these very same places, in some instances right next door, although the women 
did the chores, they sat and ate with the men, joining the conversation.   
Szczepanikova argues that although traditional male and female gender 
norms among Chechen refugees have been radically altered by war and 
displacement, the “idealized notions” remain.  In general, forced migration of any 
kind has been shown to be extremely disruptive to family and kin structures.  As a 
result, there frequently emerge new arrangements (Szczepanikova, 2005:281).  
Once the Chechen refugees arrive in a camp or community they are no longer 
threatened by the once daily horrors of war.   They are, however, confronted by new 
challenges and new restrictions, especially on mobility.  
In addition to being the victims of war and violence, Chechen women have 
found themselves on a new front-line, the battle over traditional gender roles.   
Chechen women today are more likely than not to be the main, if not sole, 
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breadwinner for many families and this has caused no dearth of consternation 
among Chechen males.  According to Chechen men, females, regardless of level of 
education or occupation or increased responsibility, must never forget that their 
primary function is as mother and housewife (Murphy, 2010:5).   To be a true 
Chechen woman, females are expected to fulfill four vital social functions: birth, 
marriage, bear children, and die (Murphy, 2010:10).   
Chechen women must fulfill the role of both mother and father.  They are 
expected to maintain all domestic duties involving the home and the children, and 
provide the necessary funds from external employment (Murphy, 2010:11-15).  Yet, 
Szczpanikova argues that despite the stark realities of the new gender relations, 
Chechen men and women alike both maintain idea-type views of gender and notions 
of femininity.  For Chechen refugees, females are still associated with housework 
and children, while Chechen males are associated with honor, honesty, and 
protection of the family (Szczepanikova, 2006:290).  
Chechen men and women spend their time differently in most refugee 
communities.  As shown in other studies of refugees and forced migrants, Chechen 
female refugees have been better able to adapt to their new circumstances.  They 
appear markedly more resilient, a fact due, perhaps, to the maintenance of daily 
habits and chores from before the displacement.  For most refugee women, they are 
still, regardless of environment or circumstance, expected to fulfill their domestic 
duties and this very pattern of routine might provide a sense of structure and 
normalcy, which eases the psychological trauma of displacement.  These behaviors 
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are also seems to provide self-confidence and a better mental state (Buijs, 1993; 
Franz, 2003).  The same cannot be said for refugee males.  Most male refugees, 
including Chechens, are used to outside employment prior to displacement.  The 
inability to work and provide for their family takes away a key component of what it 
means to be a man for most Chechens.  This in turn creates a sense of impotence and 
powerlessness.  Chechen male refugees adapt to this new reality differently.  Some 
have been documented as taking on traditional “women’s work” and have later 
reported to being happy to spend time dotting on their children, a cultural taboo 
back home.  Others, however, grow increasingly depressed or despondent.  Many 
have resorted to drug use and physically violence against their wives and/or 
children.  Rates of domestic abuse are notoriously difficult to ascertain, but studies 
(Szczepanikova, 2006:292), and my own observations (discussed in Chapter 6) 
suggest that it is quite prevalent.  Again, this is not unique to Chechen refugee 
families.  Most major studies of forced migration “explain the rise of domestic 
violence…by the loss of male status in the family and consequential frustration, 
which is vented by violent behavior towards women and children….” 
(Szczepanikova, 2006:293).  Similar to the gender relationships, domestic violence 
in many cases predates displacement and may be related to the near-total loss of 
social support networks of family and friends.  Most Chechen refugees in Europe 
arrived as nuclear families and are separated from friends and relatives who might 
have stopped such abusive behavior (Szczepanikova, 2006:294). 
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In sum, gender relations between displaced Chechen males and females have 
been in a state of constant flux essentially since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  As 
we will observe below, these changing dynamics arguably help explain the wide 
discrepancy between the political goals, regime type preferences, and views on 
violence expressed by displaced men and women, respectively.  Chechen women, for 
the most part, had access to high status occupations and higher education under the 
Soviets; conversely, Chechen males were predominately relegated to menial labor 
positions.  Upon collapse, Chechen began to reassert age-old patriarchal norms, but 
the two violent wars shifted autonomy back to women.  The forced migration into 
refugee communities across the Caucasus and Europe has exacerbated these roles 
and tensions.  Meanwhile, back in Chechnya a new campaign against women’s 
freedoms is being prosecuted in earnest.  It remains to be seen how gender roles 
will be constructed in the future.    
THE BLACK WIDOWS 
Any discussion of Chechens, gender and political violence would be remiss to 
not explore the so-called Black Widow phenomenon.  Indeed, it is precisely the 
existence of these female suicide bombers which has lent credence to the perception 
of a predominately pro-violent female community and thus, a homogenously pro-
violent people.  In this section, I explore three questions:  1) What drives insurgent 
movements and/or terrorist organizations to deploy female suicide bombers in the 
first place?  2) For that matter, what drives women to strap high-explosives to 
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themselves and then detonate them among crowds of civilians? Conventional 
wisdom posits abnormal psychology, desperation, brainwashing, or coercion. Is 
there a common driving factor?  3) Finally, what is the role of the community in 
supporting or tolerating the use of female suicide bombers?   
The term Black Widow originated in Russian media sources.  These 
journalists initially claimed the Black Widows were Chechen women driven by grief 
and the personal loss of male relatives to simultaneously commit mass murder and 
suicide.  Later claims suggested that such women had been drugged or brainwashed 
into detonating their bombs in crowds, at cafes, and on metros and airplanes.  The 
first Chechen female suicide bombers were Khava Bareyeva, sister to infamous 
criminal leader and warlord, Arbi Baryev, and Luisa Magomadova.  On January 7, 
2000, Barayeva drove a truck loaded with explosives into an OMON (Russian 
Interior Ministry Troops) checkpoint in the village of Alkhan-Yurt.   The attack 
reportedly killed both women as well as two others and wounded five (Murphy, 
2010; Spekhard and Akhmedova, 2005).  This first use of female suicide bombers 
exclusively targeted a military objective; future deployments of Black Widows 
would turn their attention to a number of Russian civilian targets.  Two such attacks, 
the mass hostage-taking at the Moscow Dubrovka Theater during the play, Nord-Ost, 
and at School #1 in Beslan would bring international attention to the deadly 
Chechen women.  Additional attacks at rock concerts, in metros, and aboard 
airplanes would kill scores of Russian civilians.  
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In the modern era, female suicide bombers have been around for nearly 
thirty years.43  Over the years, the tactic has spread from the Middle East (Lebanon, 
Iraq, Israel, Turkey) to South East Asia (Sri Lanka) and Central Asia (Afghanistan) 
(Bloom, 2010:23).  In 2007, the Chechens became the fourth modern group to 
deploy female suicide bombers, after terrorists in Lebanon, the Tamil Tigers, and 
the Turkish PKK.  In the ensuing years the overwhelming majority of all Chechen 
suicide bombers were women, a curious fact given Chechnya’s strong patriarchal 
norms.   What explains the emergence and seeming acceptance of female suicide 
bombers in Chechnya?  What caused the Chechen resistance to decide to use female 
suicide bombers?   More importantly, what is the reaction of the Chechen 
community to such developments? 
It is important to note that the onset of suicide terrorism tells us something 
about the present conflict in Chechnya.  Religious fundamentalism and Russian 
cleansing operations are relatively recent developments in the Chechen conflict, yet 
both have a role in explaining suicide terrorism.  Second, Chechen suicide terrorism 
is a strategic tactic.  The Chechen resistance is engaged in a protracted insurgency, 
using any means available to achieve their political goals.  Chechen militants have 
used suicide terrorism as a way to attract support and as a means to force Russian 
troops out of Chechnya.  Third, an examination of the psychology, motives, and 
demographics of individual suicide bombers provides helpful insights into 
                                                 
43 The first documented case was when a seventeen year old Lebanese girl, Sana’a Mehaydali, blew 
up an Israeli convoy in April 1985.  By the end of the 1980s there would be another twelve suicide 
bombers in that conflict.   
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Chechnya’s war-torn society.  In particular, the war in Chechnya has profoundly 
changed the role of women in Chechnya.  Fourth, understanding the motives and 
circumstances of Chechen suicide terrorism leads to certain conclusions about 
Russia’s presence in the region.  Russia’s brutal prosecution of the war in Chechnya, 
combined with its unwillingness to negotiate with moderate forces in the Chechen 
resistance, has spawned and exacerbated suicide terrorism in Chechnya.  
A primary underlying cause for the rise of suicide terrorism in Chechnya are 
the Russian cleansing operations.  These so-called “zachistky” operations have 
resulted in the abduction and extrajudicial killing of thousands of Chechens 
constitute.  The frequency of Chechen suicide terrorist attacks has been directly 
proportional to cycles of violence against civilians in Chechnya.  Indeed, Pape argues 
that the main driving force for individuals to become suicide terrorists is their direct 
interaction and experiences with Russian soldiers (see Reuter, 2004). 
Between 2000 and 2010, there were forty-two separate incidents of suicide 
terrorism committed in the name of the Chechen cause.  According to Pape, et all, 
few of these suicide terrorist attacks were religiously motivated, most were 
committed by males (60%), and by individuals from the region (thirty-eight of the 
forty-two), and, most importantly, were not primarily driven by a global jihadist 
ideology.  Instead, Pape argues, the attacks in Chechnya, much like those committed 
in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka are strategic actions taken as 
a last resort in a fight against the foreign military occupation of an occupied 
territorial homeland.  In most cases, functional democratic polities commit the 
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occupations and these governments must be attentive to popular pressures from 
their respective constituencies. In short, there are electoral consequences for 
governments which ignore the suffering of its people in favor of occupation.  
For the terrorist groups, Pape’s argument is one of efficacy.  He argues that 
suicide terrorism is a tactic that groups are reluctant to engage in.  Indeed, he points 
out that most groups do so only after all other means have been tried and 
exhausted.  Accordingly, he sees this assertion bolstered by events in Chechnya 
when suicide bombings were nonexistent during the First Russo-Chechen Wars.  
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS  
What drives insurgent movements and/or terrorist organizations to deploy 
female suicide bombers?  There is a robust literature on suicide terrorism that is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.44  Here, I wish to focus predominately on the 
Black Widows.  In the Russo-Chechen Wars, the Chechen resistance did not deploy 
female suicide bombers until well into the second iteration of combat.  There are a 
number of debates regarding suicide bombers and terrorism.  Many scholars now 
agree that such actions are usually not driven by religion, a common sentiment 
some years ago given the perceived nature of Islam and Islamic terrorism, but 
rather by some combination of territorial grievances and foreign occupation (Pape, 
2005), organizational out-bidding for recruits, funds, and/or influence (Bloom), or a 
prevailing normative acceptance of such tactics, sometimes called the “cult of 
                                                 
44 See Pedahzur, 2005 for an authoritative analysis of suicide terrorism.  
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martyrdom” (Moghadam, 2008).  In examining Chechen suicide terrorism, the main 
themes have posited religious extremism and/or despair.  
Whatever the driving force, suicide bombings appear to play a greater role in 
ethnic disputes, where perpetrators and victims belong to different groups.  In such 
conflicts targeting the other side is easier when its members are of a different race, 
ethnicity, religion, or nationality, especially when such contentious issues revolve 
around the control if territory.  Certainly, it is much easier to demonize and 
dehumanize the “other” in these instances and thus help ease the limits on who can 
be legitimately targeted.  Moreover, “if the perpetrating group has a dominant 
culture that is hospitable to violence and has a significant animosity towards the 
target group, we will also witness a lower threshold for who can be legitimately 
targeted” (Bloom, 2006:30-31), a claim which perhaps helps explain why the vast 
majority of suicide bombing attacks target civilians rather than representatives of 
the state.    
Clearly, not all insurgent movements or terrorist organizations use suicide 
bombers.  Some groups may use suicide bombers as a way to claim a moral high 
ground, or to morally shame the target government.  Suicide bombing is a form of 
political theater and audience reaction matters.  “Violence signals that they are 
proactive and engaged in the struggle…in order to survive, succeed, and achieve 
political power” (Bloom, 2006:26).  Some organizations, like the Chechen militants, 
only do so after a protracted struggle.   
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Despite some assertions of a religious element, particularly Islam, O’Rourke 
(2009) finds that secular groups are more likely to employ female suicide bombers, 
although traditional societies that predominately view females as subordinate to 
men and as nurturers and caregivers may be particularly reluctant to employ a 
“female destroyer” (Bloom, 2010:34).  Religiously-inspired groups as well as groups 
from traditional or patriarchal societies, including ones which may have already 
used political violence, are reluctant to use female suicide bombers mainly due to 
the belief that females are somehow physically or psychologically weaker than 
males.  Moreover, they may view the public world as one not suited for women, who 
belong to the private world behind closed doors.  In many such societies women are 
not only subordinate to males; they are subservient, used principally to support the 
men.  Finally, such groups may be wary of using female suicide bombers because of 
a fear of alienating male support.  This may be why groups such as Al Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia have been particularly reluctant to use female suicide bombers (just 
three percent).  Yet although religious groups may be reluctant at first to use female 
suicide bombers because of scriptural interpretations regarding women, many 
might eventually adopt the tactic after witnessing the success rates (O’Rourke, 
2009:692).  
In a number of conflicts it has been shown that women are often as willing as 
men to engage in armed struggle, but why do terrorist groups deploy female suicide 
bombers?  Simply put, because they work.  Female suicide bombers are more likely 
to succeed in their mission than men principally because they are better able to 
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avoid detection (O’Rourke, 2009:689-692).  Female suicide bombers, unlike their 
male counter-parts are less likely to arouse the suspicion of the authorities and pass 
easily through checkpoints.  These women tend to more readily blend in with their 
social surroundings, frequently dressing like the target populace and can employ a 
number of other distracting disguises.  Female suicide bombers have feigned 
pregnancy, a ruse, which ironically makes the attacker more deadly since the 
prosthetic, is filled with more explosives.  In many traditional societies, the 
prohibitive norms against touching women mean females can avoid serious 
searches and pat-downs (Bloom, 2010:21-22).  More importantly, for organizations, 
in addition to high kill rates, female suicide bombers generate significantly more 
media attention; something terrorist groups clearly enjoy (Bloom, 2010:23). 
As previously noted, despite the nature of the first iteration of combat 
between the Chechens and Russians (1994 to 1996), the Chechens only began to use 
suicide bombers in the Second Russo-Chechen War which began in 1999.  Initially, 
the Chechen use of suicide bombers closely resembled the tactics of groups like 
Hezbollah, driving heavy trucks loaded with explosives into Russian checkpoints or 
barracks (Pedahzur, 2005:111-113).  However, shortly after these initial attacks the 
infamous Chechen warlord, Shamil Basayev, created a so-called "suicide battalion", 
the Riyad Us-Saliheyn.45  The objective of this organization was to recruit, train, and 
deploy suicide bombers, both male and female, against Russian civilian targets.  
According to an ABC News interview with Basayev, the Russian people were 
                                                 
45 The Riyad Us-Saliheyn was revived by Doku Umarov in 2009.  
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legitimate targets since they voted for the politicians waging the campaign in 
Chechnya.  For him, like many Chechens, the Russian people were complicit in the 
genocide of the Chechen people.  Moreover, the very methods and tactics used by 
the Russians, indiscriminately attacking Chechen civilian and fighter alike, created 
an additional justification for targeting civilians.  “They kill our women and children, 
why should we not do the same?”46 
Terrorist organizations use a range of recruitment tactics for would-be 
female suicide bombers.  They may appeal to gender equality or offer the mission as 
a way to achieve redemption for some real or perceived violation of the social 
norms regarding gender behavior.  This may seem counter-intuitive, especially in 
traditional/patriarchal societies where the very act of a female becoming a suicide 
bomber challenges and violates extant norms.  However, in many such places the 
males have maintained their domination over women by controlling their dress and 
even chaperoning the women to the target.  Interestingly, there is even a 
discrepancy in financial restitutions to the families of successful suicide bombers 
whereby families of female bombers received less than the families of male suicide 
bombers.  Finally, in many cases, groups appeal to nationalism or religion 
(O’Rourke, 2009:701) or revenge (Pedahzur, 2005:142-151).  
                                                 
46 Author interview, Male, 40 years old, Baku, 2007. 
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MOTIVATING WOMEN:  WHY BECOME A SUICIDE BOMBER? 
The common perception of female suicide bombers is that they are driven by 
“despair, mental illness, religiously mandated subordination to men, and a host of 
other factors specific to their gender” (O’Rourke, 2009:682).  Yet O’Rourke claims 
that female suicide bombers are not motivated by gender-specific motivations, but 
by the very same things which motivate male suicide bombers, namely a deep 
commitment to a common cause (O’Rourke, 2009:682).  In short, it is in-group 
loyalty. 
The prevalence of female suicide attackers in Chechnya can be attributed to 
several factors.  The first factor is tactical.  As stated previously, women have an 
easier time reaching targets in Chechnya and Russia, since they apparently do not 
arouse as much suspicion as men.  Another factor that probably contributes to the 
large numbers of female suicide bombers is strategic.  Female suicide bombers 
affect a greater psychological impact on the target audience, and thus attract more 
publicity and attention.  Chechen militants observed and learned from the small, 
though much publicized upsurge in female suicide bombings that occurred in Iraq, 
Palestine, and Sri Lanka.  They recognized that female suicide bombers could 
generate significant media attention.   
The final reason why women represent such a high proportion of Chechen 
suicide bombers is tied to the main undercurrent of the broader suicide terrorism 
phenomenon in Chechnya.  As we have seen, desperation and hopelessness are 
major underlying precipitates of suicide terror, since these states naturally 
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precipitate feelings of helpless anger that is easily exploited by recruiters.  Not 
surprisingly, Chechen women are more prone to experience these intense feelings of 
anguish and despair.  Having lost husbands, sons, brothers, and fathers in the course 
of two wars, Chechen women have clearly been grievously afflicted by the 
devastation and brutality of the Russo-Chechen wars.   
 Most organizations are willing to use a number of tactics to achieve their 
stated goals.  Why do individuals, women in particular, agree to become suicide 
bombers?  There is no dearth of confusion and misinformation about the motivating 
factors for female suicide bombers.  The literature on female suicide bombers is 
problematic.  According to O’Rourke, many scholars mistakenly assign personal 
motives for female suicide bombers and, in doing so tend to over-generalize their 
findings (2009:701).  Some claim that men drive these women to action or that they 
are motivated by anger, sorrow, revenge, nationalism, or religion (see Murphy, 
2010).  Of course, terrorist groups have long been joined and supported by females.  
In 19th Century Russia, anti-Tsarist groups were full of radical women willing to die 
for their cause.  In the 1960s women joined with a number of the anti-colonial 
struggles taking place throughout the world and by the late 1960s women appeared 
in a number of Marxist-inspired terrorist organizations like the Italian Red Brigades, 
the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, the American Black Panthers and The 
Weathermen, and in the Japanese Red Army (Bloom, 2010:32).  Yet, scholars agree 
that there is a fundamental difference between engaging in armed struggle and 
becoming a suicide bomber.  
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Scholars like Barbara Victoria have claimed that female suicide bombers are 
motivated by a desire to amend social or culturally imposed gender inequalities.  By 
becoming a suicide bomber, it is claimed that such women simultaneously make 
themselves an integral part of the struggle while raising the profile of female agency 
and efficacy.  According to Victoria, the Palestinian women were said to behave in 
this manner, but in the Chechen case, the opposite appears true.  As discussed 
previously, Chechen women, were overall “much more emancipated than their Arab 
sisters” (Spekhard and Akhmedova, 2005).  Indeed, it was not unusual for Chechen 
women to pursue higher education and outside employment in the Communist era 
when Chechen women “enjoyed a Soviet type of feminism in terms of equality is 
seeking education and worked in many professions as equals to men – thus to 
volunteer from the first as bombers alongside the men is in keeping with their 
egalitarian occupational traditions” (Spekhard and Akhmedova, 2005).  In more 
peaceful times, many non-traditional occupations were open to Chechen women and 
even during the wars, a number of Chechen female suicide bombers were either 
currently university students and/or had once planned to pursue professional jobs 
like lawyers and doctors (Spekhard and Akhmedova, 2005).  When these women 
decided to become female suicide bombers, they arguably became “more repressed” 
taking on restrictive alien clothing, and, during the attacks on the Moscow Theater 
and Beslan, put their lives in the hands of their male counterparts who controlled 
the detonating mechanisms. 
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Another difference is that in the Palestinian case, female suicide bombers 
were a tactic of last resort, utilized only when it became increasingly difficult, and 
often impossible, for male suicide bombers to penetrate Israeli security checkpoints.  
However, in the Chechen case it has been noted that the resistance began to employ 
female suicide bombers almost from the start of the Second Russo-Chechen War.  
What explains the difference?  Spekhard and Akhmedova argue that it is most likely 
because of the “willingness, availability, [and] high motivational status” of Chechen 
women.  Over time, the Chechen resistance certainly recognized the relative 
freedoms of movement Chechen women were afforded.  It would become 
increasingly difficult for Chechen men to travel and more difficult to blend in; 
conversely, Chechen women could blend in with relative ease in cafés, or on trains, 
planes, buses, or on the metro.  By the early 2000s, for the Russian people the 
danger and threat appeared to be anywhere and everywhere, a highly successful 
outcome for the Chechen resistance.  The costs of a continuing Russian war in 
Chechnya meant a pervasive and ubiquitous danger for Russians in their own 
hometowns.  Another, arguably more determinative factor was the shift in Russian 
tactics, particularly the decision to directly target civilians.  
What kind of woman is more likely to become a suicide bomber?  Some 
scholars have claimed that females may desire to become suicide bombers because 
of fertility issues (Ness, 2007).  However, there is very little evidence to bolster the 
claim.  First, it is extremely difficult to know this and our evidence suggests it is not 
common. Only one Palestinian female suicide bomber and two Chechen women are 
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documented as having been infertile.  The claims about divorce are equally unclear, 
although female suicide bombers are more likely to be divorced than married. 
Most female suicide bombers have been in their late-20s, statistically older 
than the average for all known male suicide bombers.  They also tend to be 
unmarried (O’Rourke, 2009:707).  Female suicide bombers are more likely than 
male bombers to have experienced some type of personal loss.  O’Rourke finds that 
one-third of all female suicide bombers experience such loss compared to less than 
three percent for males.  However, O’Rourke cautions that this does not necessarily 
mean that it is loss, which is driving women to blow themselves up.  Rather, she 
claims that this fact presents an attractive recruiting tool for terrorist organizational 
leaders (O’Rourke, 2009:710). 
The majority of Chechen female suicide bombers were under 30 years of age 
and had indeed lost male relatives; most also suffered personal humiliation or 
assault during Russian sweeps operations.  All of this helped to create a “new 
culture…in which the norms of Chechen society and expectations of what women 
could contribute changed irrevocably.  Many girls are convinced that a martyrdom 
operation is there best option” (Bloom, 2010:66).  
Organizations that seek to deploy female suicide terrorist usually do so by 
first targeting vulnerable women for recruitment.  In Chechnya, it is claimed such 
women are those who have lost male relatives.  Once recruited, organizers are 
thought to indoctrinate the women by instilling an even greater hatred for the 
Russians, blaming them for the killing of so many innocent civilians.  Moreover, 
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recruiters are thought to use a psychological trick employed by many Special Forces 
groups, like the USMC training in boot-camp.  The goal is to simultaneously “break 
down” recruits while building them up.  In the case of Chechen female suicide 
bombers, this means demeaning the women and forcing them to do menial tasks 
like laundry and cleaning while also telling them how great and special they are (see 
Nivet, 2001). 
It is believed that in this process religion plays only a marginal role.  “While 
one sees an ideology in accordance with the global Salafi jihad in Chechnya, there it 
is focused mainly on motivating action in behalf of a nationalist cause, and in belief 
of achieving independence from what is seen as a brutal, repressive 
regime…achieving worldwide Muslim domination is not and never has been the 
separatist aim…” (Spekhard and Akhmedova, 2005).  Indeed, among Chechen female 
suicide bombers it has been noted that most were not very religious at all.  Most 
came from urban centers and grew up listening to western music and wearing 
western style dress.  Yet recruiters adroitly manipulate traditional views of family 
and culture and in addition promise to provide financial rewards for the families left 
behind. 
In the Chechen case, rape has also been posited as being a primary 
motivation for females becoming suicide bombers.  Many Chechen women were 
reportedly raped and or sexually assaulted.  Rape is a serious taboo in Chechen 
society and women, who are raped, especially by outsiders, are considered to have 
dishonored the family, often a crime that merits death by honor killing at the hand 
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of a male relative.47  As such, rapes usually go unreported.  However, a report by 
Doctors Without Borders estimates that 85% of Chechen women in occupied 
territory were raped by Russian soldiers or police.48  In some instances, Russian 
soldiers solicited bribes from fathers, brothers, or husbands to not rape Chechen 
females.  For the Russians, such behavior falls under the Russian policy of bespredel, 
or “without limits” (Bloom, 2010:58-63).  As a result, Politkovskaya claimed that in 
her experiences with Chechen women a significant number were “zombified” by 
sorrow and grief.  There are also claims that the Chechen resistance leaders too have 
engaged in rape deliberately to shame a woman into becoming a suicide bomber.  
Any woman who fails will find a videotape of the act sent to their families.  O’Rourke 
(2009) acknowledges that rape among the known Chechen female suicide bombers 
is a factor, yet argues that it is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately ascertain the 
                                                 
47 In an interview conducted in Poland, M. a Chechen woman from Bamut, an infamous stronghold of 
Chechen resistance and home to the Melkhi clan, one of Chechens oldest and most austere teips, 
retold the story of how profound the fear of rape was. As Russian troops began to surround the town 
M. and her extended family all huddled together in her father’s house.  The men, all armed, went out 
to join the local resistance at the edge of town, leaving behind her 14 year-old male cousin with an 
assault rifle.  In the coming days the initial fear of the assault was replaced by a strange familiarity of 
the bombs and shooting.  M. noted that although they were all obviously frightened, they began to 
joke a little, perhaps, she admits, as a way to cope with such stress. Yet, throughout the siege they 
young cousin never relaxed, looking sullen and morose.  It was only then that an aunt recognized 
what was happening.  The young cousin was not there to fight off an approaching Russians soldiers, 
but rather he was there to execute all the family women so that they would not fall victim to rape.  As 
these realities set in some women were horrified and afraid, but one aunt took to teasing the young 
boy about how, as a youngster, she used to bathe him, imploring his, “how can you kill me?’  This 
young man was saved from having to deal with this dilemma when his relatives and fellow townsmen 
managed to turn the city into “Fortress Bamut,” holding off the Russians indefinitely. 
 
48 In the summer of 2002 the Russian Duma approved Operation 12/309 “Operation Fatima,” which 
mandated that all women wearing headscarves while passing through Russian security checkpoints 
be detained and strip-searched.  As a result, many women were tortured, raped, and/or sexually 




exact role that rape plays.  I agree given that rape does appear to be widespread 
while the incidence of females becoming suicide bomber is much less.   
Much has been made of the purported role of both revenge and past trauma.  
I find the argument that Chechen women are driven to blow themselves up because 
of the loss of a male relative to be an incomplete explanation.  Indeed, because the 
Chechen population is relatively small and has such strong kinship ties, it is hard, if 
not impossible to find a single Chechen woman who has not lost a close relative.  
Moreover, seeking revenge for such losses is a cultural attribute shared by all 
Chechens.  However, this has historically been a feature assigned to the males.   As 
such, there must be something else at work.  Some scholars believe that missing 
factor is some version of psychological trauma (Spekhard and Akhmedova, 2005).  
There is no evidence that any of the known female suicide bombers had a 
history of serious mental illness.   None were thought to be seriously depressed or 
suicidal before their attacks (O’Rourke, 2009:704).  In a unique “psychological post-
mortem” of Chechen female suicide bombers and interviews with their family 
members, Spekhard and Akhmedova provide insights into the socio-economic and 
psychological profiles of Chechen female suicide bombers.  Spekhard and 
Akhmedova found that the Black Widows ranged in age from fifteen to thirty-eight.  
Three were married at the time of their death, while thirteen were single, four were 
divorced, five were widows, and one was currently in her second marriage.  Among 
them were mothers and one woman known to be infertile.  Sixty-five percent had 
completed the equivalent of a high-school education while eleven percent was 
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enrolled in university at the time of their attacks.  Nineteen percent had completed 
their university degree. 
Among the women, none were shown prior to their deaths to have exhibited 
any behavior known to be symptomatic of any serious underlying personality 
disorder, although they all had experienced deep personal trauma and, according to 
Spekhard and Akhmedova, most likely suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD).  It is not clear how many, if any, suffered from dissociative 
phenomenon.  The women had all lost close family members in “air-raids, bombings, 
landmines, so-called cleansing operations carried out by Russian forces, and in 
battle” (Spekhard and Akhmedova, 2005).  Many had personally witnessed killings 
and beatings of family members, neighbors and strangers by Russian forces. 
According to interviews with surviving family members, after witnessing or 
suffering such abuses, ninety-two percent of the Chechen women began to exhibit 
social alienation and isolation; twenty-three percent exhibited aggression with 
thirty-four percent repeatedly claiming to desire revenge.  Fifty-four percent 
spontaneously told their family of their desire for revenge and, regardless of timing; 
all women at some point had revenge as a motivating factor, a fact consistent with 
Chechen cultural norms on the social acceptability of revenge.    
As noted, as part of the discussion of the correlation between Islam and 
suicide bombings, it has been well documented and that Muslim males, who die as a 
shaheed, or martyr, are promised a paradise with seventy-two virgins.  There is 
much theocratic dispute over this claim, but nevertheless, this is the common belief 
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among many in the Islamic world.  As such, what do Muslim women perceive as 
their heavenly rewards for ostensibly becoming a shaheed?  According to Sheik 
Yassin from Hamas, female suicide bombers will go to paradise and become even 
more beautiful than the seventy-two virgins.  If they die while single they will 
receive in heaven a pure husband and will be allowed to bring with them seventy-
two relatives into paradise.  Others claim that female suicide bombers will be in 
charge, like managers, of the harems of the seventy-two virgins (O’Rourke, 
2009:709).  Among my interviews with Chechen women, I heard a number express a 
similar sentiment in that the more they suffer here on earth the better they perceive 
their lives will be in the afterlife. 
Finally, Spekhard and Akhmedova also challenge the claim that Chechen 
female suicide bombers received months of training, observing that any training 
must be minimal given the time that the women were reported missing from their 
homes and the date of a give attack, usually no more than two weeks.  This arguably 
casts doubt on the claims of intensive indoctrination and brainwashing as well.  
Spekhard and Akhmedova found no evidence of coercion.  They found no evidence 
of brainwashing, drugs, or coercive rape by the Chechen resistance.49  Bloom 
(2010:66) agrees that it is highly unlikely that any of the Chechen female suicide 
bombers were coerced.  “A coerced bomber is considered to be vocationally 
                                                 
49 The idea of coercion, like the purported role of an organizing “Black Fatima” came from failed 
Chechen female suicide bomber Zarema Matskevaya, who later confessed to lying. 
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unsuitable and would blow-up at any moment.  In the end, the girls go to their 
deaths voluntarily.” 
In the end, we have yet to fully understand why some Chechen women decide 
to become female suicide bombers.  We do know that the Chechen resistance is 
more than happy to continue deploying female suicide bombers, especially since the 
tactic, despite new attention to women from the Caucasus, seems to consistently be 
successful.  Moreover, it appears that the tactic may be bearing political fruit in the 
ways Pape suggests.  Indeed, a recent Russian public opinion poll notes that for the 
first time the vast majority of the Russian people have little desire to maintain their 
hold on the predominately Muslim territory of the North Caucasus. As more and 
more ethnic Russians continue their exodus out of the region, as indigenous Muslim 
birthrates remain high, and as socio-economic problems plague the impoverished 
region, tensions will increase and frustration, from both sides, grow exponentially.  
The future does not portend a peaceful the North Caucasus, especially if Chechen 
militants believe the continued use of suicide bombers can help achieve their 
political objectives.  Of course, as events in Beslan reveal, the militants must remain 
attentive to public sentiments if they are to continue waging a protracted insurgent 
campaign. 
PUBLIC SUPPORT AND SUICIDE TERRORISM 
Most societies and cultures have norms against committing suicide.  What 
explains the popular support for such tactics?  We now know that societies that have 
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endured air or artillery attacks are more likely to engage in suicide bombings, a fact 
clearly applicable to the Chechen case.  In general, militant success on depends on 
whether the broader community approves the use of violence.  If popular support is 
lacking or if the militants kill too many civilians, or as the Beslan examples shows, 
kill the wrong people, militant organizers will be forced to change tactics (See 
Bloom, 2010:25; Moghadam, 2008:53; and Pedahzur, 2005:80-84, 88-91, 96).  As 
shown previously, this is exactly what the Chechen resistance did in the aftermath of 
the overwhelming rejection of the Beslan attack.  
Insurgent groups and terrorist organizations should recognize the rise and 
fall of public support for a given strategy or tactic by nature of their close contact 
with the community.50  If groups employ highly controversial tactics, like suicide 
bombings, and the greater community does not subsequently endorse them, the 
group will abandon the tactic for other, less controversial means (Bloom, 2006:28).  
The IRA and ETA were forced to abandon certain practices in the face of popular 
opposition and, as discussed in Chapter 4, so too did Chechen militants abandon 
attacks targeting certain civilians, such as children after Beslan.  Non-participant 
support was so low after the latter attack that Chechen militants self-imposed a 
three-year moratorium on the use of any suicide bomber. 
Conversely, although non-participants can demand restraint, they can also be 
the driving force behind increasing violence against the state and its constituents.  
                                                 
50 An internal criticism of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia was that because the group was primarily 
composed of foreign fighters, they did not adequately heed local concerns or, for that matter, have 
access to such grievances.  It was this division which American counter-insurgency military leaders 
sought to exploit during the 2006 “surge” in Iraq.  
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Indeed, not all civilians will reject civilian casualties on the other side.  If during the 
course of the fighting the opposing government demonstrates its sheer disregard for 
the other side and sacrifices civilian lives in the pursuit of terrorism, the propaganda 
by militant leaders begins to resonate with the population upon whose support the 
insurgent group relies.  The use of indiscriminate air, drone or artillery 
bombardments on civilian centers often makes that government’s civilian 
constituents a legitimate target in the eyes of many from the targeted populace.  
This insight has clears implications for governments engaged in counter-terrorist or 
counter-insurgency operations and has not been lost on current American military 
planners in Iraq and Afghanistan.  To paraphrase newly appointed Head of the CIA 
and former General, David Petraeus, in every conflict the population is the prize.  
Winning over any population is the best way to separate it from the terrorists 
embedded in its midst.  
This is insight has both theoretical and foreign policy implications.  If non-
participant support erodes in the aftermath of a specific event or in light of a change 
in tactics or target, we directly observe the power of the community to potentially 
dampen political violence.  Militants are often, like elected politicians, captives to 
their respective constituents.  It is not clear what kinds of foreign policies might 
exploit such divisions, but much political discourse in Washington, DC invokes the 
image of “swamps” and breeding grounds of discontent.  The first step in “draining 
the swamp” might be to find ways to further alienate the “mosquitoes” from the 
swamp; being attentive to shifts in non-participant support for certain actions will 
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arguably help inform such policies.  That said, engaging in such a course of action 
may be easier said than done because of the intrinsically extensive ties between the 
two.  
Non-participant support can also reach a critical mass in which a “cult of 
martyrdom” emerges (Moghadam, 2008).  The cult of martyrdom refers to a society 
in which suicide operations and the suicide bombers themselves are glorified in 
popular songs, videos, posters, and discourse.  The act of committing a suicide 
bombing is viewed by the public as being a positive development, one which 
generates little to no negative social consequences.  In fact, such actions often lead 
to not only positive support from the community at large but also financial 
restitution for the surviving family members.  
What about the greater Chechen community?  How do they view suicide 
terrorism specifically?  Although one must view such figures cautiously given that 
they come from interviews conducted in Chechnya where individuals might be 
reluctant to express true feelings, Spekhard and Akhmedova (2005) found 
surprisingly little public support for the tactic.  Popular songs about Khava Barayeva 
were written, but overall the Chechen people do not yet seem ready to adopt the 
“cult of martyrdom” seen in other places like the Middle East.  Among those 
Chechens interviewed, twenty-one percent expressed pity for the female suicide 
bombers, while twenty-three percent said they understood why these women 
behaved as they did.  Forty-four percent thought the operations were planned by 
the FSB or that the women had been “used” by terrorist groups.  Twelve percent 
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criticized the tactic negatively.  Overall, fifty-nine percent spontaneously expressed 
pity for the hostages and other victims of any suicide bombing.  Yet, we must also be 
cautious in our optimism that, even if such figures are true representations of the 
lack of Chechen public support for suicide bombings that these trends will continue 
over time.  It is important to recognize that although a “cult of the martyr” does exist 
among the Palestinians today, it was not the dominant sentiment during the First 
Intifada (Spekhard and Akhmedova, 2005).  
CHECHEN WOMEN AND “THE SPECTACULARS”  
The world came to know the Black Widows most famously after the so-called 
“spectacular” terrorist action in the Moscow Theater and in School #1 in Beslan.  
These events were discussed in Chapter 3, and in this chapter, I focus exclusively on 
the role of the Black Widows and the gendered division of labor during the attacks.  
I argued that one reason for the disproportionate support for Nord-Ost 
among displaced Chechens was, in part, the mission objective.  Barayev and several 
other attackers claimed that they did not come to Moscow to kill anyone.  In a 
challenge to those claiming an international Islamic influence on the Chechen 
resistance, in fact the Nord-Ost planners chose the Dubrovka Theater because they 
believed it would have fewer foreigners in attendance (Murphy, 2010).  According 
to witness reports, the Chechen attackers claimed to have seen enough killing and 
war in Chechnya and that they came to Moscow exclusively to try and stop the war.  
Indeed, several hostages claimed that the attackers went to great lengths to actually 
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protect the hostages from their own government, which exhibited little regard for 
the hostages’ safety.   This echoes similar reports from the attack at the hospital in 
Buddennovsk in 1995.  
At Nord-Ost the attackers demanded that Putin declare an end to the war in 
Chechnya and that Russian forces begin an immediate withdrawal from the 
territory.  All air and artillery bombardments were to stop as were the zachistky 
cleaning operation sweeps.  Finally, they demanded that an anti-war rally take place 
in Moscow’s Red Square.  In the end, all the attackers would be killed and their 
families back home would suffer Russian retribution.  The family members and 
relatives of the known attackers at Nord-Ost would be imprisoned and tortured, 
executed, and have their homes bulldozed or blown-up.  
At Nord-Ost, the male attackers secured the perimeter while the female 
attackers were assigned to control the hostages, ensuring above all that the hostages 
not panic, an outcome, which would make the demands of the attackers impossible.  
The Black Widows distributed water and blankets and chewing gum to the hostages.  
They also shared their own food, dried dates, and later some candies found in a 
vending machine.  The hostages noted that the Black Widows were especially 
attentive to the needs of the children and appeared to one hostage as “more nurse 
than terrorist” (Murphy, 2010).  Indeed, this behavior was noted by the Chechen 
women back home who, according to Russian investigative journalist, Anna 
Politkovskaya (2006), believed the Black Widows of Nord-Ost were “real heroines”. 
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Why were there Black Widows at Nord-Ost at all?   Some claim that these 
women were there as a result of male coercion or perhaps that they had been 
drugged or brainwashed (Bodansky, 2007; Murphy, 2010).   Others claim that they 
were there to avenge the loss of male relatives or to exact revenge for their own 
humiliation and suffering during the “zachistky” raids (Reuter, 2004:2-5).  For their 
part, the Russian authorities and media have claimed that the Black Widows were 
drugged and brainwashed, but many observers point out that this is a convenient 
excuse because to “blame societal dynamics in Chechnya is easier than facing up to 
the role played by Russian soldiers in radicalizing Chechen women.  The authorities 
do not want people to conclude that the situation in Chechnya is so desperate and 
the living conditions so awful that women are driven to suicide and murder” 
(Bloom, 2010:64).  It is not clear what motivated these women, although it is 
obvious again that Russian behavior in Chechnya during the two wars created a 
climate of a “generalized revenge directed at all Russians” and that all Russians were 
somehow complicit in Russian abuses.  
Similar to insurgent or guerrilla actions, many believe organizations employ 
suicide bombers to simultaneously reveal the target government’s inability to 
protect its own constituents and provoke the government’s harsh response, an act 
which further reveals the brutality of the regime (Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 20, 
2011).  This is not the dynamic we observe in Chechnya, however.  The Chechen 
resistance uses suicide bombers as both a weapon to inflict physical and 
psychological damage on Russian and Kadyrovsky military and police forces, as a 
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psychological weapon against the Russian populace in order to drive Russian 
citizens to push elected leaders to acquiesce to territorial demands, namely Chechen 
independence.  Further, I contend it is used as a form of political theater and 
advertisement.  Any military force requires certain material goods necessary to 
wage a successful campaign.   
Chechen militants have been aided in their protracted struggle by favorable 
terrain and topography and a population willing to support their actions.  They 
amassed large stockpiles of weapons systems during the chaotic collapse of the 
Soviet Union and in exchanges with Russian troops during the wars.  Their main 
needs are recruits and ammunition.  Ironically, the very topography which allows 
them to wage a successful guerrilla campaign precludes large numbers of foreign 
fighters from joining the battle.  Foreigners have fought alongside the Chechen 
resistance, some quite prominently.  These fighters, however, never exceeded more 
than a couple of hundred at most, regardless of Russian and later Western 
pronouncements.  As such, the resistance realized that it could use, and receive, an 
equally valuable community, foreign money.  In doing so, the Chechen resistance 
began to appeal to the international Islamic community for help, especially after 
Western support failed to materialize.  The Chechens in the Second Russo-Chechen 
War now frequently videotape their ambushes and battles, broadcasting them on a 
number of jihadist websites and on-line chat rooms.  These actions, much like the 
more high profile “spectaculars” in Moscow and Beslan are essentially commercials 
or advertisements to raise the necessary funds to continue their campaign.  In the 
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end, I contend the use of female suicide bombers, like the use of jihadist slogans and 
even political goals, like the establishment of an Islamic Caucasus Emirate as 
discussed in Chapter 4, are driven more by strategic and instrumental calculations.   
What does the use of suicide bombers tell us about the state of the current 
conflict? Pape highlights a certain pattern of Chechen suicide terrorism, which 
underscores the influence popular attitudes have on the behavior of perpetrating 
organizations. From the first instance of Chechen suicide terrorism in June 2000 to 
November 2004 there were twenty-seven attacks.  From then until October of 2007, 
there were none, and from October 2007 to the time of his The New York Times Op-
Ed in March 2010 there were eighteen attacks.  What explains the three-year hiatus 
in Chechen suicide bombings?  Pape argues that the pause was created by two 
separate factors.  First, the Russian military abandoned its scorched earth policies in 
favor of a campaign to win “hearts and minds.”  In doing so, the number of civilian 
casualties attributed to the Russians dropped significantly. Pape does not clarify the 
causal mechanism, but I believe he means to suggest that the softening of Russian 
behavior towards civilians coupled with a widely popular amnesty for former 
fighters, lead many Chechens to mollify their views on attacking Russians.  The 
second factor was the loss of public support following the attacks on Beslan.  I 
believe this is critical.  The attack on Beslan and resulting loss of so many children 
was a devastating humiliation for the Chechen resistance.  It conferred upon all 
Chechens the label and stigma of congenital monsters, a perception expressed by a 
number of respondents in my structured-interviews.  Chechen resistance leaders 
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understood that the widespread rejection of Beslan curtailed the usually high levels 
of public support they had enjoyed and knew they needed to step back and 
reevaluate their tactics and strategy.  In both cases the factors, which lead to the 
pause in Chechen suicide terrorism, was the community.  As was discussed earlier, 
this has clear theoretical and policy implications, which I will discuss in greater 
detail below. For now, it is important to note that public attitudes do matter. 
Of course, the pause did eventually end and there now appears to be a steady 
rise in the rates of suicide terrorism.  What explains this?  Pape’s logic suggests that 
Kadyrov’s heavy-handed tactics in Chechnya has caused a new surge in suicide 
bombers.  By the autumn of 2007 Kadyrov had reverted back to a ruthless policy of 
exterminating the resistance.  In doing so, he relied heavily on pressuring suspected 
family members, engaging in a widespread policy of torture against his fellow 
Chechens.  In fact, Kadyrov has behaved so abhorrently that many Chechens now 
feel the Russians may be the lesser of two evils, acting as a moderating force on 
Kadyrov’s excesses.  Still, this does not fully explain the return to suicide bombings. I 
contend that the return has more to do with strategy and strategic goals. More 
importantly, it has to do with perceptions of success.  Since the renewal of suicide 
attacks there has been a gradual erosion of Russian support for continued action 
against the Caucasus.  In a shocking admission, a recent Russian public opinion poll 
revealed that the vast majority of Russian respondents actually desired that the 
Caucasus be “let go” rather than remain a part of Russian.  Suicide terrorism is 
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purposefully driven and goal-oriented and, in the case of the Chechen resistance, a 
successful tactic.  
GENDER AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
The goal of this empirical and inductive study is to explain the roots of 
political violence within a susceptible subset of a population that has adopted 
attitudes supportive of political violence.  Methodologically, this inductive study 
employed a mixed-methods approach, utilizing qualitative and ethnographic 
methods, such as direct participant-observer, to conduct 301 structured-interviews 
(in the Chechen or Russian language) with a range of Chechen refugees:  political 
elites, average civilians, former fighters, and Chechens still active in the separatist 
movement.  
This analysis is based on nearly three years of fieldwork conducted between 
2006 and 2009 in Chechen refugee communities in The Republic of Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Poland, and Belgium.  The dissimilarities among these cases provided a 
unique opportunity to explore whether and how displacement into diverse 
environments has affected the propensity to actively support political violence or 
find it an acceptable means of behavior.  More importantly, this work continues the 
recent trend in the study of social violence, which utilizes thick ethnographic 
research at the micro-level and seeks to generate and inform theory building rather 
than testing hypotheses.51  
                                                 
51 See Kalyvas (2006), Lyall (2009), and Wood (2006).  
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It is important to note the social desirability bias inherent in this work. 
Questions regarding views on political violence are often susceptible to social 
desirability bias, a condition in which participants may be wary of expressing their 
true views in front of the researcher or may give answers they think the researcher 
wants to hear.  To avoid social desirability bias, I framed questions about political 
violence as such, “Certain members of the Chechen resistance claim that acts such as 
Nord-Ost, Beslan, Nalchik, and Nazran were both legitimate and necessary.  Do you 
think they are correct?” 
It is important to stress that this study does not, in any way, purport to 
explain the attitudes of all Chechens, nor of all Chechen refugees.  These findings are 
a qualitative assessment of observations made during systematic fieldwork in 
various displaced Chechen communities.  These findings are impressionistic; as 
such, they are meant to be viewed as part of the broader exercise in developing 
theory.  In particular, in accordance with the inherent caveats of the micro-
comparative turn in the study of political violence, these findings are meant to 
generate arguments regarding the patterns of attitudes towards political violence 
and the potential factors contributing to such attitudinal patterns.  As noted 
previously, this study pushes the limits of what can be done and serves to generate 
hypotheses more than test them.  It is clearly difficult to conduct any research 
involving refugees, especially Chechen refugees who live in appalling circumstances 
and who, even in exile, face significant security threats from Russia and the Russian-
backed, pro-Moscow Chechen government under Ramzan Kadyrov.  This is a 
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vulnerable population, and most observers would expect a monolithic, rebellious, 
pro-violence population (Bodansky, 2007; Murphy, 2006; Zaurbekova and 
Yandarov, 2001).  My work challenges this assumption.  The Chechen refugee 
population exhibits a highly sophisticated view toward political violence, thus 
bolstering claims for an instrumental theory of political violence. 
For independent variables I asked every respondent the same battery of 
questions related to demographic profiles, grievances, political goals and 
preferences and preferences for regime type.  The dependent variable, attitudes 
towards political violence, was gleaned from structured-interviews which called on 
subjects to offer general assessments of their position on the acceptability of 
political violence as well as express their views on the legitimacy of four concrete 
events related to the conflict in Chechnya:  the 2002 attack on Moscow’s Dubrovka 
Theater during a performance of, Nord-Ost; the 2004 attack on School #1 in Beslan, 
North Ossetia; the 2004 attack on military and police personnel in Nazran, 
Ingushetia; and the attack on military and police personnel in Nalchik, Kabardino-
Balkaria.  latter two attacks primarily targeted representatives of the state, while 
Nord-Ost and Beslan exclusively targeted civilians.52  
                                                 
52 As discussed on Chapter 2, questions regarding views on political violence are often susceptible to 
social desirability bias, a condition in which participants may be wary of expressing their true views 
in front of the researcher or may give answers they think the researcher wants to hear.  To avoid 
social desirability bias I framed questions about political violence as such, “Certain members of the 
Chechen resistance claim that acts such as Nord-Ost, Beslan, Nalchik, and Nazran were both 




In this chapter, make three principle arguments:  1) Male Chechen refugees 
will be more likely to support political violence than female refugees; 2) Male 
Chechen refugees are more likely to desire maximal political goals, like the 
establishment of a Caucasus-wide Emirate than female refugees; 3) Male Chechen 
refugees are more likely to prefer religious authority as political authority (sharia) 
than female refugees.  
In the following tables, Chechen refugee respondents who believed that each 
of the four concrete acts (the 2002 attack on Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater during a 
performance of, Nord-Ost; the 2004 attack on School #1 in Beslan, North Ossetia; the 
2004 attack on military and police personnel in Nazran, Ingushetia; and the attack 
on military and police personnel in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria) was legitimate are 
grouped under, Supports All Acts of Political Violence.  Respondents who rejected all 
four acts are grouped under, Rejects All Acts of Political Violence.  Respondents who 
fell in-between the two extremes, Supports Some Acts of Political Violence, answered 
one of three ways:  1) Supports All Acts of Political Violence Not Targeting Civilians 
(Nalchik and Nazran); 2) Supports All Acts of Political Violence Except Beslan; or 3) 









Supports All Acts 
of Political 
Violence 
Rejects All Acts of 
Political Violence 
Supports Some 
Acts of Political 
Violence 
Total: 265  
Male (204) 32.4% 13.2% 54.4% 
Female (61) 3.3% 55.7% 41.0% 
Table 5.1: Gender and Attitudes Towards Political Violence 
Table 5.1 illustrates the attitudinal differences between Chechen refugee 
males and females regarding political violence.  32.4% of males and only 3.3% of 
females deem all four acts of political violence (Nord-Ost, Beslan, Nalchik, Nazran), 
regardless of target, legitimate.  In contrast, only 13.2% of males reject these violent 
acts, while the vast majority of females, 55.7% reject all.  Both genders support 
some acts of political violence.  These respondents typically supported all acts of 
political violence except for Beslan (20.3%) or expressed exclusive support for 
Nord-Ost (22.2%).  I discuss this finding in more detail below, but in short, Table 5.1 
reveals that among Chechen refugees, males are more likely to support political 
violence than females. 
There is much debate about the biological underpinnings of behavior. 
Commonly, despite numerous counter-examples, these debates center on the 
premise that males are inherently prone to conflict and competition, while women 
are predisposed to consensus building and cooperation. Most males are not 
inherently murderous, but scholars agree that male violence is an “evolutionary 
hangover” of certain select impulses, which once gave willing males reproductive 
advantages for violent risk-taking behavior (Potts and Hayden, 2009:2-14).  Early in 
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our human history young males banded together in small groups and set out to prey 
upon neighboring groups in search of resources.  Accordingly, man’s propensity to 
kill other members of our own species is an evolved behavior and those who did it 
successfully were more successful in passing on their genes than those who did not. 
Certainly, women have used violence to protect their family and kin and indeed, 
there have even been a number of female terrorists and murderers.  Yet, there is no 
evidence that women in our early history engaged in the same behavior as men in 
joining small bands to target outsiders and as such, scholars claim the same 
evolutionary baggage does not saddle women.  For women, the dominant strategy 
for reproductive success was to align with violent male mates. In the case of 
Chechen refugees, it is clear that men are more likely to support all acts of political 
violence, while women express entirely different sentiments, yet it is not clear these 
dissimilarities are driven exclusively by biology.  Biology may play a role, as may 
culture, especially in the Chechen case.  However, these are common to all Chechen 
refugees and as such, I argue that these findings have less to do with either biology 
or culture than they do with material interests and expectations for the future 
derived from recent experiences.  
When Chechen refugee males speak about violence, they usually do so in 
reference to the necessity of violence to stop the genocide of their people.  Others 
claim that they support violence as a last resort given that all other methods have 
failed.  Some claim that they are merely supporting actions and tactics which the 
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Russians have used against them and as such, anything is legitimate.  Finally, a 
common theme was one of desperation and survival. 
 39 year old Male former Rebel Commander from Grozny (Belgium)  
These actions are legitimate.  When you commit genocide against a whole 
people, what do you expect? 
 
 47 year old Male businessman from Shalinsky (Azerbaijan)  
When people will not leave you alone, you must do something. We tried to 
negotiate, but it did not work and so now we have no choice but to fight. This 
is war and in war all things are acceptable. 
 
 29 year old Male athlete from Grozny (Azerbaijan)  
Russia ignores the rules of war.  Why should we pay any attention to them 
then?  Why do we do these things?  Because we are small and Russia is big. 
How can we fight against Russia?  We have no planes, no tanks, nothing. 
What else can we do? 
 
 26 year old Male student from Grozny (Belgium)  
Beslan was terrible, but the other three?  We had to do them.  What choice 
did we have?  This is about survival.  We will do whatever it takes to win and 
survive.  I support 1,000 Nalchiks and Nazrans and Moscows.  I do not care 
how many Russians die.  They have killed too many of us already.  
 
Conversely, Chechen refugee females express markedly different sensibilities 
about the efficacy and legitimacy of political violence.  Chechen refugee women 
express concerns over the loss of innocent lives and express concern with how 
contemporary actions affect future threats against the Chechen people.  Finally, 
many worried about how the world would view Chechens because of these attacks.  
 38 year old Female physician from Grozny (Poland)  
No one can say that it is legitimate when innocent people die. 
 
 37 year old Female pharmacist from Bamut (Belgium)  
If I kill some peaceful people I will only make them angry against me.  They 
will do something to me and my family will do something back to them.  It 




 42 year old Female housewife from Grozny (Poland)  
You can do something in a war, but only if it is an equal fight.  We do not have 
this [ability], so we need to achieve results through peace and diplomacy. 
Chechens have become synonymous with “terrorist”.  These acts have given 
us a dirty reputation.  
 
For Chechen refugees who favored some acts of political violence, the vast 
majority of responses were either “Supports all acts of political violence, except 
Beslan” or “Rejects all acts of political violence, except Nord-Ost”.  Among all 
respondents, the attacks on Nalchik and Nazran were linked nearly identically and 
were exclusively supported by only 6.8% of the population.53  The rejection of 
Beslan is almost certainly due to universal norms prohibiting the harm of children.  
Indeed, the interview narratives make clear that it was the very act of targeting 
children, which made this so unpopular.  Chechen refugee women in particular 
overwhelmingly rejected Beslan with over 96.0% rejecting the legitimacy of the 
attack.   It is worth noting that few of the respondents who believed Beslan was 
legitimate advocated the wholesale slaughter of children.  Frequently, individuals 
who supported Beslan did so by blaming the Russians (either for driving the 
perpetrators to such an act, or for being the ones who actually started shooting 
during the stand-off and thus bearing ultimate responsibility) or out of revenge for 
personal losses, especially of their own children.  In one case, a 40-year-old male 
Chechen refugee in Azerbaijan confessed, “The Russians have killed my whole 
                                                 
53 Only 6.8% of respondents chose this option, thus illustrating that there is scant support for 
political violence exclusively targeting state representatives and/or attacks which are viewed as 
peripheral to the main conflict.  
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family.  What do I care for their children?  They did not care for mine.  This is war 
and war is an ugly business for everyone….”54 
While Beslan is the negative outlier, at the other end of the spectrum is the 
overwhelming support for Nord-Ost.  The preponderance of responses, 72.5% 
across the cases, regardless of gender, political goals, or regime type, supported the 
Nord-Ost attack.  I argue that it has to do with four factors:  select cultural 
antecedents, political learning, and target selection, and mission objective.  First, 
there is an underlying cultural acceptance in the Caucasus of certain forms of social 
violence.  Even among their people, symbolically or not, kidnapping, bride snatching 
and hostage taking are socially acceptable and as such, this behavior is deemed 
appropriate for adversaries. Second, many Chechens view the Moscow attack as 
being similar to the 1995 raid on a hospital in the southern Russian town of 
Buddennovsk, an act which helped bring the first Russo-Chechen War to an end in 
1995. Chechens who made the connection between these two events are more likely 
to view the actions in Moscow as being ultimately directed towards achieving peace, 
especially since the main demand of the hostage-takers was to end to the war in 
Chechnya. This latter point also underscores the instrumental rather than emotive 
nature of political violence in this community.  Fourth, target selection plays a role 
in that this event was the only one of the four that actually struck Moscow, the heart 
of the Chechens enemy.  Finally, mission objective plays a critical role in 
                                                 
54 Author’s interviews, Baku, 2007. 
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understanding disproportionate support for Nord-Ost. A significant number of 
Chechen refugees, males and females alike, claim that Nord-Ost was legitimate 
because it was meant as a demonstrative action, a way to draw attention to the 
atrocities occurring in Chechnya.  Respondents who support Nord-Ost claim that the 
perpetrators meant only to serve as a voice of the people, and did not intend to 
harm anyone.  Indeed, this perspective is frequently cited for support.                                                                     
GENDER, POLITICAL GOALS, AND REGIME TYPE PREFERENCES  
Gender Russia Autonomy Independence 
Caucasus 
Emirate  
Total: 301 0.3% 15.0% 64.5% 20.2% 
Male (226) 0.4% 7.1% 67.3% 25.2% 
Female (75) 0.0% 38.7% 56.0% 5.3% 
Table 5.2: Gender and Political Goals 
Gender Democracy Sharia 
Total: 301 51.2% 48.8% 
Male (226) 44.2% 55.8% 
Female (75) 72.0% 28.0% 
Table 5.3: Gender and Regime Type 
In Chapter 4, this dissertation showed that among Chechen refugees, political 
goals and regime type influence attitudes towards political violence. Those that 
desire maximal political goals, like the establishment of an Islamic Caucasus Emirate 
were more likely to accept all acts of political violence.  Moreover, those who 
desired religious authority as political authority (sharia) were also more likely to 
accept all acts of political violence.  I argued that these sentiments were driven 
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primarily by security concerns and not religious ideology. These individuals felt that 
Chechnya was too small and too isolated to ever be able to effectively challenge 
Russia and as such, the Chechen resistance needed to join together with other 
Caucasian nations, an idea with historical precedent in previous 20th Century 
attempts to establish a similar political unit after the Bolshevik Revolution.  Indeed, 
the structured-interviews revealed that when Chechen refugees spoke about a 
Caucasus Emirate, exceedingly few employed the global jihadist rhetoric of Osama 
bin Laden.  In fact, the overwhelming majority frequently spoke in nationalist and 
secular terms; in this, sharia became an overarching identity to unite the disparate 
ethno-nationalist groups of the North and West Caucasus.   
In all of this, gender matters. Clearly, there are discernable gender patterns in 
the support for political violence.  Chechen refugee males are more likely than their 
female counterparts to support all of some acts of political violence. But gender 
plays another role.  Gender influences both the preference for certain political goals 
and for regime type.  Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 reveal that Chechen refugee women 
are more likely to prefer more moderate political goals, like Autonomy (38.7%) and 
reject maximal goals like a Caucasus Emirate (5.3%).  They are also more likely to 
prefer democracy (72.0%) to sharia (28.0%).  Conversely, Chechen refugee males 
are more likely to accept more maximal goals (67.3% for Independence and 25.2% 
for a Caucasus Emirate, respectively), while rejecting more moderate goals (only 
7.1% for Autonomy). Chechen refugee males are also more likely to prefer sharia 
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(55.8%) to democracy (44.2%).55  These latter figures are most likely close due to 
the nature of the Chechen resistance.  The majority of the original resistances were 
secular, national separatists while the current generation is more religious. This 
includes both younger participants in the armed struggle as well as older 
individuals who, for a number of reasons, have become increasingly religious.  
However, there remain a number of Chechen refugees who feel that democracy 
most closely resembles the traditional Chechen political institutions and that 
democracy holds true to the ideals of the Chechen independence movements of the 
early 1990s.  These individuals may feel that, like Churchill, democracy is the worst 
form of government besides any other, in this case communism or sharia.  
In regard to the gendered differences towards political goals and regime type 
revealed above, what explains the variation between Chechen refugee males and 
females?  Where do political goals and preferences come from?  In general, early 
socialization can lead to certain political ontologies and consequent preferences. In 
early adulthood, society and social groups influence preferences by one of two 
mechanisms:  first, individuals are attracted to like-minded people and their 
respective in-groups, or, conversely, people get together and then become like-
minded; regardless, the effects are the same. Culture can play a significant role in 
                                                 
55 It is important to note that my structured-interview question about regime type preference was 
open-ended. I did not offer regime type choices, nor channel responses. Respondents themselves 
answered their choice for either democracy or sharia. Moreover, I did not probe what respondents 
meant by either regime type preference. Nonetheless, whatever these regime types symbolize for 
respondents, it is clear that these choices align with certain viewpoints about the legitimacy of 
political violence.   
 
212 
driving political ideas.  Finally, religion has been shown to influence individual and 
community views on political matters. 
However, I argue that among Chechen refugees, political preferences are 
driven first and foremost by personal experiences and the consequent perceptions 
about the future that these experiences generate.  Refugees who perceive select 
social advantage from certain political systems and outcomes, like independence or 
the establishment of a Caucasus Emirate, will desire such outcomes and the 
empirical evidence reveals that these individuals will be more likely to accept 
political violence as a legitimate form of social behavior. In the Chechen refugee 
community, these individuals are predominantly male. Chechen refugees who 
perceive an expected loss of select social advantages under these political systems 
will chose different political outcomes and different political systems. These 
individuals are predominantly female. The empirical data reveals that for women, 
remaining a part of Russia and instituting democratic institutions are dominant 
desired goals. 
 Political learning and expectations for the future can explain the gender-gap 
in both political objectives and preferences for governing institutions. I argue that 
Chechen refugees base their future goals on their past experiences, particularly the 
perceived lessons learned from living under past systems like Communism and then 
post-Communist rule. Chechen men and women experienced remarkably disparate 
social and economic opportunity structures in post-Soviet Chechnya. This translates 
directly into current political preferences. 
 
213 
Under the Soviet system, Chechen women, like most women in the state, 
were extended generous benefits and allowed a significant degree of social mobility. 
High-status occupations, like doctor, scientist, and engineer, were all available 
positions under Soviet philosophy, what some have called “Soviet-style Feminism”.  
Conversely, under the same rule Chechen men fared far worse.  Under the Soviets, 
the Caucasus, despite all its petroleum generated wealth, was one of the state’s most 
economically backward regions, faring only slightly better than the Central Asian 
republics. In this environment, many Chechen males sought out seasonal labor and 
migrated from one place to another, usually earning a pittance. To supplement their 
meager wages, the Chechen mafia emerged as a key and powerful player in the 
maintenance of the so-called “shadow economy” which propped up the Communists 
for so long.  The latter fact caused a great deal of umbrage among the ethnic 
Russians and helped to perpetuate the stereotype of Chechens as bandits and 
thieves.  
However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially in places like the 
economically backward northern Caucasus, women have been subject to a 
surprising trend in social regression. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse, 
Chechen society began to re-assert age-old, patriarchal traditions, 
disproportionately privileging males.  Once independent, Chechen men were able to 
achieve high positions in government and business.  For many men, although their 
wives, mothers and sisters have become the main breadwinners in the post-war 
economy, they are nonetheless pressured to “return to the home and the scarf.”  
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Clearly, many women accurately perceive living under a paternalistic form of 
government, especially with the rigid, dogmatic sharia law, as one in which their 
social advantages are decreased.  100% of displaced Chechen women rejecting 
religious authority as political authority did so because they viewed it as a 
repressive regime type.  In short, Chechen women have a material interest in a non-
Islamic world and this is expressed in the structured-interviews. 
 36 year old Female housewife from Agishty (Poland)  
I never want to see sharia again.  I have seen that time back home and it is 
more repressive than the Communists.  
 
35 year old Female lawyer at the Ministry of Internal Affairs from Grozny 
(Belgium)  
Chechnya must be free and must never have any sharia.  We saw how that 
worked and we did not like it.  I was a professional woman.  Who are these 
young boys to tell me what to do?  What right do they have?  I am a good 
Muslim and I know that Allah does not say that women should sit home all 
day or walk around in a sheet! 
 
 37 year old Female teacher from Grozny (Belgium)  
My parents had no opportunity to get good jobs, but in my day you could.  If 
you went slowly and earned your education and experience, you could get a 
better life in Russia as in any part of the world.  This was especially true for 
women.  Now?  Look at what they say.  They say we must wear scarves and 
sit at home.  These are modern times.  How can we go back to that? 
What about the gendered differences in regime type for males?  When the 
Soviet Union collapsed, although some Chechen males became part of the new rich, 
in reality the vast majority actually witnessed decreasing opportunities. Migrant 
work became especially difficult with new international borders and legal regimes.  
Most of the petroleum industry was dismantled in the anarchy of the early days, and 
as Soviet economic investments dried up, so too did many of the available 
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occupational opportunities. This, then, was how many Chechen males perceived 
their experience with democracy and as such, only 25% see democracy as 
legitimate.  For these respondents, democracy was a system that offered few 
comparative advantages.  The majority of displaced Chechen males who do support 
democracy (75%), however, do so out of perceived notions about traditional forms 
of political organization, a point of historical dispute according to other Chechen 
males as we observe below. 
Chechen refugee males fall into three categories when speak about religion 
and regime type.  First, 55.8% of Chechen refugee males favor sharia because they 
are Muslims and this is the law of Allah.  As mentioned above, many associate 
democracy with corruption, a view common among Muslims throughout the world.  
As such, 41.2% support sharia primarily because it is viewed as being the least 
corrupt form of regime type.56  Finally, 11.8% of Chechen men based their current 
regime type desires on perceptions of tradition.  However, it is important to note 
there is significant disagreement over Chechen history.  A number of individuals 
claimed that the Chechens have a history of democracy, while others are convinced 
that their traditions were based on sharia.  
 28 year old Male student from Grozny (Poland)  
I prefer sharia…we are Muslim people, and that is how Allah says we must 
govern ourselves, with His laws. 
 26 year old Male university student from Grozny (Belgium)  
Democracy is only good for corrupt people and rich people who want more 
money and power.  
 
                                                 
56 See 2008 Gallop Poll of ten Muslim countries.  
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 34 year old Male oil industry worker from Bamut (Azerbaijan)  
We are proud Muslims.  Democracy is not good for us Chechens.  When 
power goes to one person it will be a problem.  He will want all his own 
people to come to his side and help govern. 
 
 55 year old Male doctor from Cheri-Yurt (Belgium)  
In sharia, there is only good, and in democracy, there is nothing but bad.  
Sharia is our tradition. 
 
 47 year old Male doctor from Alkhan-Yurt (Belgium) 
I am in favor of democracy because of our Chechen traditions.  Many people 
here favor sharia, but sharia is not our tradition.  It has never been in our 
land.  To have sharia, one must study the Quran, and no one in Chechnya does 
that. 
GENDER AND GENERATIONAL CLEAVAGES 
It is important to explore the role of other factors in exploring the various 
potential sources of attitudes supporting political violence.  In particular, I 
disaggregated the data to examine the role of age and gender in determining 











Some Acts of 
Political 
Violence No Response 
Males  
18 to 24 30.3% 6.1% 36.4% 27.3% 
25 to 34 32.0% 13.4% 52.6% 2.1% 
35 to 55 23.0% 13.8% 50.6% 12.6% 
56 to 66 55.6% 0.0% 44.4% 0.0% 














Some Acts of 
Political 
Violence No Response 
Females  
18 to 24 5.3% 47.4% 26.3% 21.1% 
25 to 34 0.0% 39.1% 47.8% 13.0% 
35 to 55 3.9% 50.0% 19.2% 26.9% 
56 to 66 0.0% 42.9% 57.1% 0.0% 
Table 5.4B: Age, Gender, and Attitudes towards Political Violence – Females  




18 to 24 0.0% 12.1% 72.7% 15.2% 
25 to 34 0.0% 4.1% 67.0% 28.9% 
35 to 55 1.2% 8.1% 69.0% 21.8% 
56 to 66 0.0% 11.1% 33.3% 55.6% 
Table 5.5A: Age, Gender, and Political Goals – Males  
 




18 to 24 0.0% 47.4% 47.4% 5.3% 
25 to 34 0.0% 52.2% 39.1% 8.7% 
35 to 55 0.0% 23.1% 76.9% 0.0% 
56 to 66 0.0% 28.6% 57.1% 14.3% 




Age Groups Democracy Sharia 
Males  
18 to 24 60.6% 39.4% 
25 to 34 29.9% 70.1% 
35 to 55 56.3% 43.7% 
56 to 66 11.1% 88.9% 
Table 5.6A: Age, Gender, and Regime Type – Males  
Age Groups Democracy Sharia 
Females  
18 to 24 63.2% 36.8% 
25 to 34 82.6% 17.4%  
35 to 55 73.1% 26.9% 
56 to 66 57.1% 42.9% 
Table 5.6B: Age, Gender, and Regime Type – Females  
Table 5.4A and Table 5.4B look at the role of age, by gender, and the Support 
for Political Violence.  Once again, as shown in Chapter 4 there was little support for 
the idea that attacks on representatives of the state are more legitimate, and thus 
more popular, than attacks on civilians.  The most likely group to support political 
violence are males aged 25 to 34 (65.0%) and males aged 56 to 66 (77.8%).  As 
shown in Table 5.5A and Table 5.6A, this latter group is also the most likely to 
support a Caucasus Emirate (55.6%) and to reject Independence (33.3%) and 
Autonomy (11.1%).   Table 5.6A and Table 5.6B show the group most likely to 
support democracy are males aged 18 to 24 and 35 to 55 (60.6% and 56.3%, 
respectively); while males aged 25 to 34 and 56 to 66 are more likely to support 
sharia (70.1% and 88.9%, respectively).  
 
219 
As discussed previously, this generational split reflects current tensions 
within the Chechen resistance. Indeed, last year the high-profile split in the 
resistance leadership actually reflected an emerging generational cleavage, namely 
the older fighters, the onetime national secularists, are now more likely to support a 
Caucasus Emirate and sharia than the younger fighters who desire more nationalist 
goals.  If true, this fundamentally challenges the conventional wisdom about 
younger generation militants being more radical and certainly more likely to 
support transnational Islamic political goals. This is the conventional story from 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Yet this does not appear to be the case, as it pertains to 
political goals, with the Chechens and the data, as well as a recent research trip back 
to Pankisi Gorge underscores.  
What explains this?  In order to better understand these findings I looked 
back at these age groups and documented what age they were in 1989 (a period of 
glasnost and radical social changes in USSR), 1991 (independence), 1994 (first war 
begins), 1997 (inter-war years; sharia introduced in Chechnya), and 2000 (start of 
second war).   I contend that it is the timing of the wars which makes males aged 25 
to 34 particularly prone to express pro-violent attitudes. During this time, male 
respondents were 13 to 22 years old when the First Russo-Chechen War began and 
thus grew up in a world of war and violence and probably engaged in heavy fighting. 
Males aged 56 to 66 are from the generation which grew up on the frozen plains of 
Central Asia after being deported by Stalin.  This generation grew up with an intense 
hostility toward to the Russians, particularly after returning to Chechnya to find 
 
220 
their world occupied by Russians and their opportunities for social and economic 
advancement significantly impeded because of their ethnicity.  This group was 44 to 
54 during the First War and in their mid-fifties when the second began, thus making 
them less likely to be active fighters and more likely to be passive observers or 
victims.  This generation suffered again and again at the hands of Russia and it is 
therefore little surprise that they both endorse attacks against any Russians while 
simultaneously supporting a political system as alien to the one they perceived 
discriminated against them as possible.  Finally, there is the idea that time is 
running out. 
It is also important to note that 27.3% of all Non-Responses came from males 
aged 18 to 24.  All but one Non-Response occurred in Pankisi Gorge and Tbilisi, the 
location closest to the conflict.  As it is, 48.5% of this group expressed support for at 
least some acts of political violence; if social desirably is playing a role, total support 
for political violence would be 75.3%, thus making this group the most likely group 
to support political violence.  Although there is no interview data to support this 
claim, there is anecdotal evidence from my direct observations, spending countless 
hours with this demographic, watching violent video footage from jihadist websites 
on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya.  Given these experiences, I posit the vast 
majority, if not all, of Non-Respondents do indeed support at least some acts of 
political violence.57 
                                                 
57 The idea that studying Chechen refugees as the “next best thing” to studying actual Chechens in 
Chechnya (principally because conducting such work in Chechnya is dangerous and bound to fail 
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GENDER, GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY, LEVEL OF EDUCATION, AND SUPPORT FOR 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE  
There are many assumptions about the role of education in driving support 
for political violence and militant activity.  Some argue that lower education breeds 
both violence and support for violence (Berebbi, 2003; Kreuger and Maleckova, 
2003; Lochner, 2007)..  By this logic, higher education is viewed as a moderating 
force, exposing people to new ideas and, ideally, new solutions and alternatives to 
violence.  Conversely, others argue that higher education leads to greater awareness 
of social problems and, often, the inability of individual action, through normal 
channels, to effect change (Lerner, 1956; Shafiq and Sinno, 2010).  As such, it is 
claimed that higher education creates greater political dissatisfaction, a purported 
cause for both politically violent action and the support or tolerance of such 
behaviors.  A cursory reading of current events seems to give credence to each 
competing claim. What role, if any, do these factors play in determining political goal 
choice, regime type preference, and views on political violence?  Moreover, what 
about geographic setting?58  Again, there is a debate about whether rural individuals 
or urbanites are more likely to support violence (Johnson and Monkkonen, 1996).  
In the American context, the stereotypical expectation is that rural dwellers are 
                                                                                                                                                 
because of the extant political climate) is given some credence.  There does appear to be an emerging 
generational cleavage among the active resistance in Chechnya and this is reflected in attitudes 
among displaced Chechens.  In terms of theory and policy, more work needs to be done to better 
understand this phenomenon, but for now it is clear that what is happening in Chechnya and among 
displaced Chechens can help us better understand other protracted insurgencies.  
 
58 Urban versus rural dwelling is based on previous occupancy. Displaced Chechens were asked 
where they came from back in Chechnya. 
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more at home with guns and hunting and therefore have a culture acceptant of 
violence (Cohen and Nisbett, 1996).  To bolster this assertion, advocates of this 
approach point to the higher recruitment rate for rural men in the United States 
Armed Services (Cohen and Nisbett, 1996; Kleykamp, 2006).  Challenging this point, 
critics say rural dwellers are more religious and, in fact, it is the urban environment 
which destroys the social fabric of community and influences any number of 
criminal and deviant behaviors (see Anderson, 1999).  These socio-economic 
debates are well beyond the scope of the dissertation.  However, in the course of my 












Some Acts of 
Political 
Violence No Response 
Males  
University 30.8% 19.2% 50.0% 0.0% 
High School 29.0% 11.0% 49.0% 11.0% 














Some Acts of 
Political 
Violence No Response 
Females  
University 16.7% 83.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
High School 1.5% 42.0% 36.2% 20.3% 















Some Acts of 
Political 
Violence No Response 
Males  
Urban 30.1% 12.6% 46.2% 11.2% 
Rural 27.7% 10.8% 54.2% 7.2% 












Some Acts of 
Political 
Violence No Response 
Females  
Urban 2.4% 34.2% 31.7% 31.7% 
Rural 2.9% 58.8% 35.3% 2.9% 
Table 5.8B: Living Locale, Gender, and Attitudes towards Political Violence – 
Females  




Urban 0.7% 3.% 72.7% 23.1% 
Rural 0.0% 13.3% 57.8% 28.9% 
Table 5.9A: Living Locale, Gender, and Political Goals – Males  




Urban 0.0% 31.7% 63.4% 4.9% 
Rural 0.0% 47.1% 47.1% 5.9% 









University 0.0% 19.2% 53.9% 26.9% 
High School 0.5% 5.5% 69.0% 25.0% 
Table 5.10A: Level of Education, Gender, and Political Goals – Males  
Level of 




University 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
High School 0.0% 42.0% 52.2% 5.8% 
Table 5.10B: Level of Education, Gender, and Political Goals – Females  
 
Level of Education Democracy Sharia 
Males  
University 42.3% 57.7% 
High School 44.0% 56.0% 
Table 5.11A: Level of Education, Gender, and Regime Type – Males  
Level of Education Democracy Sharia 
Females  
University 83.3% 16.7% 
High School 71.0% 29.0% 




Living Locale Democracy Sharia 
Males  
Urban 45.4% 54.6% 
Rural 41.0% 59.0% 
Table 5.12A: Living Locale, Gender, and Regime Type – Males  
Living Locale Democracy Sharia 
Females  
Urban 68.3% 31.7% 
Rural 76.5% 23.5% 
Table 5.12B: Living Locale, Gender, and Regime Type – Females  
In regard to views on violence, it appears that neither Level of Education nor 
Living Locale plays a significant role in generating attitudes supporting political 
violence.  Views on violence between levels of education among males are closely 
matched.  Among females, university educated females are more likely to support all 
acts of political violence (16.7%) than high school educated females (1.5%).  Yet, the 
rest of university educated women, an overwhelming 83.3%, also reject all acts of 
political violence. Among high school educated women, 42.0% reject all acts of 
political violence while 36.2% supports some acts of political violence, mostly in 
favor of Nord-Ost (21.7%).   
What explains this relative support for all acts of political violence, on the 
one hand, and extremely high rejection of political violence on the other?  Although 
more research needs to be done, I believe a potential answer to this question can 
also be found in personal experiences.  Most university educated women came from 
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the cities and urban centers.  These were the places hardest hit by the Russian 
forces.  Many such women were forced to endure countless hours of bombardments 
huddled in dank cellars.  These women were also more likely to be isolated from 
their extended kin network, increasing feelings of isolation and desperation.  As a 
result, it is plausible to expect those witnessing the true horror of war would be less 
likely to support violent means to achieve political ends.  Conversely, it is also 
plausible to expect that a small percent of women experiencing such hardships may 
come to harbor extreme hatred and anger towards the perpetrators and, as such, 
support political violence as either a way to exact revenge for past suffering or as 
the only alternative to stop the continued suffering. 
  The final interesting point is that among both males and females, no 
university educated individual was reluctant to share views on political violence (all 
Non-Responses came from high school educated respondents).  Given that all but 
one Non-Response came from displaced Chechens in Georgia, we can glean 
important insights into the composition of the Chechen refugee community in Tbilisi 
and Pankisi Gorge.  
In regard to political goals, Table 5.10A and Table 5.10B show the difference 
in the support for political goals among university educated males.  Among this 
group, university educated men are more likely to support Autonomy (19.2%) than 
high school educated males (5.5%), while females with a university education 
overwhelmingly rejected Autonomy in favor of Independence (100.0%).  
Conversely, 42.0% of high school educated females supported Autonomy.   
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In regard to regime type preferences, males from both groups are, in general, 
more likely to support sharia (57.7% for university educated and 56.0% for high 
school educated males, respectively).  Both university and high school educated 
women are more likely to reject sharia (83.3% and 71.0%, respectively).  High 
school educated females, however, are more likely to support sharia (29.0%).  This 
number probably represents the youngest and oldest generation of women who 
were either too old or too young to benefit from Soviet gender equality.  
Table 5.8A and Table 5.8B show that geographic setting does not seem to 
play a significant role in driving either support or rejection of political violence.  For 
that matter, geographic setting does not seem to play a role in regime type 
preferences (see Table 5.12A and Table 5.12B).  Yet, as briefly discussed previously, 
there are differences related to political goals.  Table 5.9A and Table 5.9B reveal that 
in particular, the support for Independence and a Caucasus Emirate are similar, 
while views differ on moderate political goals like Autonomy.  Rural males are more 
likely to support Autonomy (13.3%) than urban males (3.5%).  Rural females 
exhibit the same pattern, thus making rural dwellers more likely overall (23.1%) to 
support moderate goals than urbanities (9.8%).   
What explains this finding?  I offer that such a difference can also be 
explained by personal experience during the Russo-Chechen Wars.  Much like the 
previous discussion of university students, the war was felt most in the cities and 
urban centers.  It is entirely plausible to suspect that individuals who suffered 
inordinate hardships at the hands of Russian forces would be enthusiastic about 
 
228 
remaining in Russian.  Perhaps these individuals, those who lost their entire homes, 
property, livelihoods, and often relatives would be willing to support a political that 
could be viewed as making such losses been in vain. Finally, rural dwellers are 
usually, by necessity, more independent and less reliant on the state for subsidies 
and commodities.  Perhaps these individuals view Autonomy as less threatening to 
their usual living routines.  Again, much more work must be done to better 
understand the nature of these relationships.  As discussed in previous chapters, at 
this point micro-comparative studies of political violence are still in the world of 
hypothesis-generating.  As such, I contend the field has a number of new avenues to 
explore and further flesh out and test relationships in the quest to develop new 
theories.  
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have explored the various aspects of gender among Chechen 
refugees.  It has been noted that in a number of ways the two post-Soviet Russo-
Chechen Wars have made Chechen women more independent and self-reliant.  This 
is especially true for Chechen women in the refugee communities scattered across 
the Caucasus and Europe.  However, in both environments Chechen women’s 
newfound freedom and responsibility has been met with hostility and derision by 
Chechen males.  It is not clear what the long-term implications of contested gender 
will have for Chechens.  On the one hand, Chechen women have a voice and many 
are not afraid to use it to articulate conflicting viewpoints from their husbands, 
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fathers, and brothers.  It has been argued that empowering women in post-conflict 
zones can help establish a more robust peace. Will this be the case for the Chechens?  
In Chechnya today, Kadyrov has sought to quell women’s rights and placate the men 
by establishing his vision of traditional Chechen culture and values, most of which 
rely heavily on reference to Islam.  However, there is no such counter-force in the 
refugee communities.  It is now evident that a significant majority of Chechen men 
strongly desire a change back to traditional patriarchal norms.  “They have decided 
to take revenge…demanding a return to centuries old traditions,” claimed the 
recently murdered human-rights activist, Natasha Estimirova in 2007 (Murphy, 
2010:270).  How this battle of genders will play out remains to be seen.  
The role of gender in both generating violence and attitudes supporting 
violence remains understudied, particularly in refugee communities.  As discussed 
in Chapter 2, refugees are often the victims of violence, but many often commit 
future acts of violence against the sending state.  Again to paraphrase Tilly, war 
often makes the refugee and the refugee often makes war.  Community support is 
integral for maintaining insurgencies and more work needs to be done to better 
understand the conditions under which political violence is accepted as legitimate. 
This dissertation gives us a window into contemporary Chechen refugee attitudes 
towards political violence and helps us better understand the factors which 
influence these sentiments.   
In the next chapter, I explore the relative influence of the so-called “country 
effects”.  Country effects are the general term used for the expected state of 
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displaced peoples.  In this chapter, I provide a brief history of the Chechen refugee 
populations in The Republic of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Poland, and Belgium.  The 
theoretical expectation is that refugees who live in the most squalid of refugee 
communities, those which have the least hope, will be more likely to produce more 
extreme views on political violence.  I then discuss daily life and living conditions 
and discuss the challenges and problems refugees endure.   
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Chapter 6:  Country Effects 
An insurgency often creates many groups of internally displaced persons and refugees 
on short notice. . . .  Nongovernmental organizations and other civilian agencies 
normally furnish this support to internally displaced persons and refugees.  However, 
conditions may prevent these agencies from providing these services quickly.  
Furthermore, in [counterinsurgency] operations, internally displaced person and 
refugee security may take on heightened military importance.  Traumatized and 
dislocated persons may become vulnerable to insurgent threats and recruitment.  
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual 
 
The expectation is that external conditions influence attitudes on political 
violence (Adelman, 1998:2; Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1992:277).  In refugee 
camps and communities, it is believed that the most salient grievances are those 
that arise from experience in the communities themselves (Lischer, 2006:18-30; 
Stedman and Turner, 2003:).  In communities where refugees perceive their 
conditions to be particularly squalid or comparatively worse than other 
communities, the expectation is that we will observe a higher proportion of 
individuals who view political violence as acceptable (Lischer, 2006:18-30; Stedman 
and Turner, 2003:179-190; Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1992).  .  Proximity also 
matters (Salehyan and Gleditch, 2006:335-344; Salehyan, 2007:791).  Refugee 
communities closest to the conflict are thought to be the most squalid and the most 
vulnerable to militarization and the creation of refugee-warrior communities 
(Lischer, 2006:38-40).  It is presumed that militants will seek to exploit these 
grievances as recruitment tools to bolster their own ranks.  Militants will also use 
these proximate communities for sanctuary and to re-supply (Adelman, 1998:2; 
Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1992:277).   The nature and actions of the host-state 
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also matter.  Host-states can have a significant influence on refugee communities 
within their borders (Lischer, 2006:18-30).  All of this, as discussed in Chapter 2 
increases the likelihood that new wars will erupt, increasingly regional insecurity.  
What are we to make of these assumptions?  Does the location and/or the condition 
of the refugee community matter in generating attitudes supporting political 
violence?   Does location play a role influencing the choice of political goals or 
regime type preferences?  This chapter explores these suppositions.  
In this chapter, I explore the relative influence of the so-called “country 
effects”.  Country effects are the general term used for the expected state of 
displaced peoples.  In this chapter, I provide a description of the Chechen refugee 
populations in The Republic of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Poland, and Belgium, exploring 
their living conditions, primary concerns, political desires, and attitudes towards 
political violence.  The theoretical expectation is that refugees who live in the most 
squalid of refugee communities, those which have the least hope, and those that feel 
the most desperate or isolated will be more likely to express support for political 
violence.  I then discuss daily life and living conditions and discuss the challenges 
and problems refugees endure.   
CASE SELECTION 
In making my case selections, I was attentive to proximity, host-state politics 
and religion, and host-state history.  The research design planned to use each 
country as a unique laboratory to explore how various factors might play a role in 
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influencing attitudes towards political violence.  To ensure the viability of my work, 
I conducted pre-fieldwork research trips to each country and made critical contacts 
in each respective Chechen refugee community.   
The Republic of Georgia is the only country that shares a border with 
Chechnya.  It is a highly nationalist, Christian country and was a part of the former 
Soviet Union. Relations with Russia today remain acrimonious.  The displaced 
Chechen community in Georgia resides mostly in the infamous Pankisi Gorge, 
although a smaller number live in Tbilisi.    
Living conditions for Chechen refugees in Georgia are, for the most part, 
deplorable, especially for those living in Pankisi Gorge.  The inhabitants in Pankisi 
live in one of six small villages.  Most local inhabitants are subsistence farmers, a 
formidable enterprise in the tough terrain, or sheep and cattle shepherds.  
Electricity in the gorge is rare and most live in small, dilapidated houses or shacks.   
Pankisi was already an economically depressed region before the first waves of 
Chechen refugees entered the gorge in 1999.  In the span of six months the 
population of Pankisi had swelled by 90,000 to 100,000 people.  The local 
inhabitants, known as Kists, (ethnic cousins of the Chechens) were initially 
hospitable to their northern brethren.  Over time, tensions rose, however.  A number 
of Chechen militants sought refuge in Pankisi and the presence of extern armed 
factions displeased the local criminal elements who worried their smuggling 
operations would be disrupted.  The criminal elements never enjoyed wide support 
from the Kist community and, as an act of thanks, several Chechen militants targeted 
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the criminal groups, leading to several high profile gun battles in the gorge.  The 
good will these efforts engendered was short-lived, however.  The Chechens began 
to resent the Kists for posing as Chechens to garner NGO and humanitarian aid 
supplies and the Kists began to resent what was increasingly becoming a permanent 
Chechen settlement.  Tensions were further strained after the terrorist attacks on 
America on September 11, 2001 when the United States sent Special Forces and 
Marines to Pankisi to train local units and search for purported Al Qaeda members.  
Displaced Chechens in Tbilisi often live better lives.  A small number are 
former political and business elites.  These individuals live in large, spacious flats 
with their extended families.  A number have opened businesses, like internet cafes, 
and operate import-export transactions from contacts in Turkey.  These families 
often send one or two children to the local universities, but younger children have 
little opportunity to attend secondary school.  Other refuges in Tbilisi are less 
fortunate.  A sizable number of Chechen refugees live in crowed shacks in the slums 
on the outskirts of town.  These shacks are built closely together and joined by thick 
mud paths.  Here, when possible, electricity is stolen from municipal generators.   
For all Chechens employment is a challenge.  They are not technically able to 
work because of their legal status, so many seek illegal employment, usually in 
construction.   This becomes a point of contention when employers refuse to pay 
Chechen laborers after a job is completed.  The same outcome occurs in Azerbaijan 
and Poland, where work is also scarce.  Finally, a number of refugees, especially 
those in Pankisi suffer a range of acute health problems.  Tuberculosis, kidney and 
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stomach ailments, skin rashes, and lice are all common afflictions.  A number also 
have war wounds.  When active militants are wounded in Chechnya they are usually 
brought back to Tbilisi for medical treatment.  The seriously wounded are taken to 
sympathetic doctors in Istanbul.  
Azerbaijan, is also a former Soviet Republic and proximate to the conflict.  
Azerbaijan is a Muslim country with great oil wealth, but also significant poverty.  
The Azeri government maintains close ties to the Kremlin and this relationship has 
caused a number of problems for the Chechen refugees in Baku, most of who exist in 
abject poverty and squalor and face continuous security threats, such as renditions 
and kidnappings, from the Russians.  The overwhelming majority of Chechen 
refugees in Baku live in truly abject poverty.  They have no access to employment, 
education, or health care.  Like those in Georgia, they suffer from a range of chronic 
illnesses and war-wounds, all of which are further exacerbated by the low standards 
of living.  Malnutrition and anemia are constant problems.  These problems are 
made worse by the recent decision by NGOs to stop aid.  As a result, a number of 
Chechens in Baku have had to move in together into already small dwellings.  These 
shacks are also in the slums and ghettos on the outskirts of Baku and one readily 
finds raw sewage flowing along the narrow paths.  The refugees have petitioned to 
construct tent-cities but have been denied.  For many the only option is to return 
home, where many have been killed or simply disappeared.  Of course, at noted 
previously, one need not return home to suffer such a fate.  There have been a 
number of renditions of Chechen refugees from both Azerbaijan and Georgia.  In 
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these operations men are taken off the street and not seen for months until their 
remains, bearing signs of extensive torture, are found back in Chechnya.  
Poland was a part of the Soviet sphere, but maintained its distinct culture 
throughout the Cold War.  Like Georgia, it too is a predominantly Christian country 
with less than cordial relations with Russia.   Poland is, for many Chechen refugees 
escaping along the northern route from Chechnya, the first stop.  Many Chechens 
arrive illegally, smuggled through the Ukrainian forests.  For all Chechens, life can be 
difficult.  They are consigned to old Soviet Army barracks or military bases.  The 
conditions are cramped and crowded. Chechen families are usually assigned to one 
room and must use communal kitchens and bathrooms, the latter causing 
considerable consternation among the Chechen people.  Health problems are less 
severe but employment remains a constant worry.  The refugees in Poland 
recognize that their life is better than it would be in either Georgia or Azerbaijan, 
but a number still try to make their way further west where they believe living 
conditions and opportunities will improve.   
In Belgium, refugees live in a comparative paradise.  Belgium is a non-Muslim 
country with a rich mix of ethnic groups.  Belgium is the only country in this 
dissertation that was not a part of either the Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact.  Firmly 
located in the “first world” Belgium has prospered economically.  Chechen refugees 
in Belgium are scattered across the state in a dozen or more cities and small villages.  
The Belgium government provides language and occupational training, a living 
stipend, and free flats.  The Chechen refugees in Belgium are well dressed and seem 
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to have none of the health problems plaguing their brethren elsewhere.  All refugees 
have access to employment and educational opportunities and many live in modest, 
comfortable flats; a sizeable number own personal automobiles.  In general, they 
claim good relations with the locals although violence has been documented 
between Chechens and refugees from North Africa, particularly Morocco, over 
perceived slights in public.  
YOUTH IN EXILE  
Much is written about the role of young, alienated Muslims in Europe and the 
Caucasus (Kepel, 2004; Roy, 2004).  This former group, above all, is seen as being 
especially vulnerable to transnational Islamic appeals (Wiktorowicz,, 2005).  In 
conducting this dissertation fieldwork, I spent considerable time with young 
Chechen males, usually aged 18 to 34.  These young men had the latest cell-phones 
and appeared to be highly computer literate.  The Chechens used computers to keep 
in contact with friends and relatives on-line and, like most young men, tried to 
attract the attention of young women, although Chechen women were always 
treated with respect.  They spend much of their free time, like most unemployed 
young men, hanging out or engaged in athletic activities, particularly martial sports 
like boxing, wrestling, judo, karate, kick-boxing, and the new mixed-martial arts.  I 
spent countless hours sparring with various individuals or watching internet videos.   
These young men especially enjoyed watching war footage from Chechnya as well as 
internet clips from Iraq and Afghanistan.  The footage from the latter was usually 
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gleaned from Islamic and jihadist websites, which many young men frequently 
visited.   
 
Country Security Economic Education Health Rights 
Georgia 73.3% 19.7% 4.2% 0.0% 2.8% 
Azerbaijan 39.5% 43.7% 7.0% 9.9% 0.0% 
Poland 0.0% 98.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Belgium 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Table 6.1: Primary Concerns by Country 
In the second part of my structured interviews, I asked respondents about 
their living conditions.  Table 6.1 reveals what displaced Chechens in each country 
location felt was the most pressing problem or concern.  In Georgia, the 
predominant concern is security; 73.3% expressed this as the most significant 
challenge they faced.  As stated previously, this is understandable given the 
proximity of Georgia, especially Pankisi Gorge, to Chechnya and the conflict.  There 
is evidence that active Chechen militants still operate from Pankisi, using it as a 
temporary sanctuary to rest and resupply.  The Russians have also bombed Pankisi 
Gorge in purported retaliation to cross-border militant attacks.  I have contended 
that this unique situation explains the disproportionately high levels of Non-
Response to questions about political violence from Chechen refugees in Georgia 
(See Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 for more detail).  For displaced Chechens in 
Azerbaijan, approximately 40.0% worry most about security.  This is most likely due 
to the shared fear both communities have about renditions back to Chechnya.  
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The most pressing concern for refugees in Azerbaijan and Poland (43.7% and 
98.0%, respectively) is the economic situation. This is the second concern of 
Chechens in Georgia with 19.7% of all respondents claimed that the inability to 
secure steady employment and afford essential goods was the most serious problem 
they faced.  Lesser concerns expressed by displaced Chechens in Georgia include 
lack of education (4.2%) and lack of human rights (2.8%), while displaced Chechens 
in Azerbaijan are also concerned about the lack of educational opportunities (7.0%) 
and health and health care (9.9%).  Finally, it is interesting to note that displaced 
Chechens in Belgium express no such worries or concerns.  When asked, Chechen 
refugees in Belgium consistently and uniformly reported no pressing concern or 
worry.  Respondents are satisfied with educational and occupational opportunities 
and access to health care.  The structured-interview data highlight these concerns.  
Here are samples of Chechen reactions to the issues they perceive as being their 
most pressing concerns.  
PRESSING CONCERNS  
Security 
 56 year old Male truck driver from Grozny (Georgia)  
Here we must be very careful.  There are Russian spies everywhere.  They 
steal our young men right off the street and kill them.  I am old now and not 
afraid.  I left all my fear back in Chechnya. 
 
 25 year old Male (unemployed) from Grozny (Azerbaijan)  
The situation is very bad here.  I am afraid to walk down the street.  I have 
lived through many terrible things.  I do not want to end up on the side of a 






 56 year old Male university student from Grozny (Azerbaijan)  
We have no jobs, no way to survive.  How can you tell a man he cannot work 
but you give him no food for his family?  Are we animals?  No, even animals 
are treated better than we are.  Here they want us to wait to die like chickens.   
 
Health 
 40 year old Female housewife from Grozny (Azerbaijan)  
I am sick and need an operation, but I cannot afford it.  My son, he was 
wounded in Chechnya and now has tuberculosis.  What are we to do?  No one 
cares about us.  We are waiting to die, simple as that.  
 
Human Rights 
 50 year old Male poet from Grozny (Georgia)  
This is all a game of chess and the Chechen people are the pawns.  We live in 
a civilized world, and we must above all be treated as human beings with 
respect and dignity.  Without such things, we are just killing one another.  But 
there are no rights here for the Chechens.  It must start with this, with the 
respect of us as fellow human beings.  
 
Education: 
 38 year old Female housewife from Grozny (Azerbaijan)  
There are no opportunities for my children to go to school.  They are not 
allowed into the public schools, and who has money for private schools?  I do 
not have enough money to pay my rent or buy food.  And my children do not 
speak Azeri.  What are we supposed to do?  
 
 43 year old Female university professor from Grozny (Georgia)  
My daughters have never been to school because of the war.  I have tried to 
teach them the best that I can but even I do not speak Georgian and they 
must know it to attend school.  Even the entrance exams for the university 
are in Georgian.  There is no hope for them.  
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Georgia 15.5% 84.5% 7.0% 53.5% 
Azerbaijan 2.8% 97.4% 2.9% 97.9% 
Poland 51.0% 49.0% 93.0% 65.0% 
Belgium 84.7% 15.3% 0.0% 25.0% 
Table 6.2: Everyday Life – Cultural Loss and Local Interactions by Country 
In addition to trying to ascertain the most salient concerns and problems of 
displaced Chechens, in the second part of my structured interviews I also asked 
about the daily lives of refugees.  In particular, I was attentive to a series of 
interactions with the local, host-state population.  I asked a series of questions about 
whether the respondent had been harassed by a local or by an authority figure.  I 
asked about perceptions on culture and tradition, specially asking Chechen refugees 
to evaluate whether they believed their traditions and values, their culture, was 
being lost as a result of their forced displacement.     
Table 6.2 shows that the vast majority of Chechen refugees in Georgia 
(84.5%) do not believe their culture is under threat or that they are losing their 
traditions.  This is not unexpected given that most displaced Chechens live in the 
Pankisi Gorge, surrounded by co-ethnics and living in places not markedly different 
from their previous homes in Chechnya.  The Kists speak a dialect of Chechen, eat 
the same foods, and share a number of cultural traditions, thus social isolation 
remains low.  
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Chechen refugees in Azerbaijan also feel secure in maintaining their culture 
and traditions.  97.4% of displaced Chechens in Azerbaijan reject the claim that they 
are losing their traditions; only 2.8% believe this to be true.   The Chechen people 
are Muslims and Azerbaijan is the only predominately Muslim country in my 
research study.  A number of Chechens claimed that, despite their deplorable living 
conditions, they feel some peace and solace for living among fellow Muslims.  Many 
claimed a sort of kinship bond between the two peoples, pointing out that dietary 
considerations were the same as were opportunities to pray or wear Islamic dress.  I 
believe an additional factor can be found in the maintenance of Chechen community 
in Baku.  The Chechens tend to live close to one another and congregate at one of 
two local Chechen community centers.  One center, previously operated by the 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), provided language (English, Russian, and 
Chechen) and technical skills, such as computer and cell phone repair, along with 
history, literature, and poetry classes.   Many refugees sent their children to the NRC 
center and spent much of the day there themselves.  Another center funded by Arab 
countries teaches religious instruction.  The more radical Chechen refugees in 
Azerbaijan tended to congregate at this latter center.  In all instances, the displaced 
Chechen refugee community remains close, and in doing so, constantly reinforces 
their traditions.  
Azerbaijan and Georgia are comparatively close to Chechnya.  As refugees 
move farther away we observe higher rates of cultural and traditional loss.  In 
Poland, 51.0% of the refugee community feels their way of life is being lost.  In 
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Belgium, the location farthest from Chechnya an overwhelming 84.7% feel they are 
becoming assimilated into the host country culture.  This is not surprising given the 
marked difference between life in Brussels or Antwerp and Grozny or Itum-Kale, a 
small village in southern Chechnya.  Displaced Chechen parents in Belgium 
lamented especially the assimilation of their children, noting they no longer adhered 
to even the most basic of Chechen norms.  As noted in Chapter 3, I have made the 
case that the displaced Chechen communities in many places, including in countries 
not included in this dissertation, are shifting away from being refugees, a term 
which denotes temporary status, and evolving into the more permanent presence of 
a diaspora community.  All migrants face the struggle and pull between assimilation 
into their new societies and maintenance of traditional norms and cultures.  It is not 
yet clear whether this trend will continue among displaced Chechens. 
To gauge Chechen relations with the host-state I asked questions about 
whether the respondent had been harassed by either a local or by an authority.  In 
most cases harassment by locals was low. There were no reports from Belgium, in 
Georgia 7.0% claimed to have suffered harassment by a local citizen, and in 
Azerbaijan only 2.9% acknowledged such behavior.  In Poland, however, a 
considerable number, 93.0% claimed to have been harassed by the local Polish 
people.  In almost all instances, the harassment in Poland was reported by displaced 
Chechen women.   The vast majority claimed that this usually occurred in stores or 
shopping centers where local merchants or their hired security continuously viewed 
the Chechens as potential thieves, even small children.  I observed this harassment 
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on a number of occasions.  It happens with such frequency that it is simply part of 
the daily routine for most Chechen refugees. 
Chapter 5 considered the role of gender in influencing attitudes towards 
political violence, political goals, and regime type preferences.  Gender also plays a 
role in harassment.  Displaced females are more likely to be harassed by average 
local citizens, while displaced males are more likely to be harassed by the local 
authorities.  Among the displaced males by country, 53.5% in Georgia, 97.9% in 
Azerbaijan, 65.0% in Poland, and 25.0% in Belgium claim to have been harassed by 
local authorities.  I observed and experienced this personally in each country visited 
during my fieldwork.  In Georgia, the harassment is more brutal in Pankisi.  
According to several human rights organizations, Georgian Special Forces patrolling 
the gorge seem to view harassing the Chechen males as a way to alleviate boredom.  
Often, for no apparent reason, Chechen males are forced to lie in the mud or snow 
for a prolonged period of time at the point of an AK-47.  They are occasionally 
beaten, sometimes severely.  These instances spiraled so far out of control in 2006 
that one young Chechen man threw several hand grenades at a passing police patrol, 
sparking a prolonged fire-fight.  
In Tbilisi, Azerbaijan, and Poland local authorities frequently harass Chechen 
males as a way to solicit bribes.  Several Chechens spoke of instances when local 
authorities tried to plant evidence, such as narcotics, as a way to solicit higher bribe 
fees.  These encounters are usually done under the guise of the ubiquitous 
document checks that most Chechen males endure on a daily basis.   In Belgium 
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document checks also occur, but no Chechen mentioned attempted bribery.  In most 
cases Belgium authorities were looking for illegal migrants or criminals.   
Here are a sample of Chechen reactions to the perceived loss of culture and 
traditions and their experience with local harassment.  
Loss of Culture and Traditions 
 48 year old Male former Rebel Commander from Grozny (Georgia)  
Here it is very easy to keep our old ways.  We live the same, eat the same 
dzdzgullnash (Chechnya’s national dish of boiled lamb and garlic in rendered 
fat), we pray the same.  Our children are respectful of the elders, as they 
should be.  We speak our language with our neighbors (Kists).  This part of 
life is good. 
 
 56 year old Male oil industry worker from Grozny (Belgium) 
He who forgets his traditions forgets his ancestors and he who forgets his 
ancestors forgets himself.  The Chechen people in Belgium are forgetting 
themselves.  My father gave me our tradition like it was, like he received from 
his father.  It is my duty to give it to my son, also unchanged.  Now we must 
physically stand against Russia and also stand in our traditions.  We will 
always say we are Chechens and we will always stick together.  
 
 34 year old Female teacher from Bamut (Poland)  
In my family we try very hard to eat the same meals, wear the same clothes, 
and keep our traditions, but there are many here who act like the Poles.  They 
dress like Poles and eat Polish food.  They smoke and drink.  What lesson is 
this for their children?  We have lost everything.  We cannot lose our ways as 
well.  
 
 55 year old Female housewife from Cheri-Yurt (Azerbaijan) 
We Chechens are like wild garlic.  No matter where you put us we still stink. 
 
 38 year old Female housewife from Bamut (Belgium)  
It is very hard to maintain our traditions here. The children are not 
respecting their elders.  They do not want to even speak Chechen.  Here we 
are unable to have proper wedding ceremonies or funerals.  It is very sad to 




Harassment by Locals 
 26 year old Male university student from Grozny (Belgium)  
The police harass us all the time.  They try to check our papers.  The real 
reason is that the police understand that we have special characteristics like 
fighting and they do not like that.  They do not let us fight with one another 
[sparring in public]. 
 
 44 year old Female housewife from Bamut (Poland)  
We are always harassed and bothered in the supermarket.  They recognize us 
immediately, and they make the security guards follow me.  One time my 
children had a small celebration at school, and on the way home, I stopped in 
the store.  It was the winter and very cold outside.  The security guard asked 
me why I brought my children inside with me.  I told him because of the 
weather.  He demanded that I leave my children in the cold and I refused.  I 
had to pay and leave.  He followed me the whole time, and even then he 
looked through all my bags and belongings.  They even checked my children’s 
bags.  Of course, they found nothing and they did not even apologize.  I have 
seen many things in this life and had many experiences, but I could not 
understand this behavior towards the children.  I cried the whole way home, 
and I still want to make that man [security guard] pay [for his actions].  
 
 55 year old Male farmer from Cheri-Yurt (Azerbaijan)  
Here the police are always looking for money.  What money?  I am a refugee.  
I have no money.  For the young boys, it is a big problem.  The police will put 
drugs in their pockets and threaten to arrest them without a fee.  The police 
are the real criminals.  
 
 47 year old Male oil industry worker from Grozny (Georgia)  
The police are much worse in Pankisi.  Here it just little things, but in the 
mountains they mean business. You can have serious problems up there. 
They like to wave their automatics and show how tough they are but really, 
they are cowards. I saw how they fought in Abkhazia. They are no soldiers.  
 
 23 year old Female teacher from Khasavyurt (Poland)  
The people here watch us like we are from another planet.  They do not like 
the scarves on my head and because we always wear scarves they at once 
recognize us and dislike us.  
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CHECHEN REFUGEE COMMUNITIES AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICAL VIOLENCE, 
POLITICAL GOALS, AND REGIME TYPE PREFERENCES  
My structured interviews used both open and closed ended questions and 
were broken down into three sections. Each respondent was asked the same 
questions in the same order. In the first section, I asked basic demographic and 
personal information:  date of birth; previous residency; previous occupation; levels 
of education; personal loss, status as a fighter or veteran, history of torture or 
personal injury, etc.  In the second part of the interview I asked a series of questions 
about life as a Chechen refugee and about the challenges of maintaining Chechen 
culture during displacement, especially into presumably alien host countries and 
cultures. I asked about their most pressing problems, about expectations and 
relative deprivation, about whether they were harassed by either the locals or local 
authorities, and about their general views and attitudes about life and family, 
religion and politics. In the final section, I asked questions specifically pertaining to 
politics and political life.  I asked about what Chechnya should be politically:  a part 
of Russia; a part of Russia, but Autonomous, like the republic of Tatarstan; 
Independent; or part of a Caucasus Emirate.  This latter political entity would be an 
Islamic state composed of Ingushetia, Dagestan, parts of northern Georgia and 
Azerbaijan with Chechnya at the political and administrative apex.  I then asked 
which form of governing institution was best for Chechnya. Finally, the last four 
questions asked about the legitimacy of four concrete acts of political violence, 
two directed at civilians and two directed at representatives of the state:  the 2002 
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hostage taking at the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow, the 2004 Beslan school tragedy, 
and the attacks on military and police personnel in Nazran in 2004 and Nalchik in 
2005.  Each of these events occurred after the respondent had settled into a refugee 
community.  
In Georgia, there are anywhere from 500 to 2,000 Chechen refugees (this 
population has decreased from a high of approximately 10,000 in 1999). In 
Azerbaijan, the refugee community ranges from approximately 1,000 to 3,000. In 
Poland there are between 1,000 and 3,000, and in Belgium there are approximately 
1,500.59  
I interviewed a total of 301 Chechen refugees.  Disaggregated by country, I 
conducted 71 interviews in Georgia, 71 in Azerbaijan, 100 in Poland, and 59 in 
Belgium.60  75% (226) were males and 25% (75) were females. 61% (184) came 
from rural areas, while 38.8 % (117) came from the urban centers and cities. Most 
had only secondary education 89.3% (269) with just 10.6% (32) reporting to have 
completed university or technical school. 15 were tortured, 6 were amputees.  
77.7% (234) were self-declared civilians and 21.9% (66) self-declared former-
fighters or veterans.61  4.3% (13) were verified political or economic elites. 
                                                 
59 Author’s confidential interviews with United Nations High Commission on Refugees officials, 
various human rights groups, non-governmental organizations, and intergovernmental agencies.  
60 These numbers represent the total number of refugees I could interview in the time allocated in 
each site.  
61 These numbers are not accurate representations of the number of former fighters in the various 
refugee communities. Given the security concerns, a number of individuals who I was later told had 
indeed fought still identified themselves as civilians caught up in the war. These numbers represent 
those who actually admitted to being a former fighter. 
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In the following tables, Chechen refugee respondents who believed that each 
of the four concrete acts (the 2002 attack on Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater during a 
performance of, Nord-Ost; the 2004 attack on School #1 in Beslan, North Ossetia; 
the 2004 attack on military and police personnel in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria; 
and the attack on military and police personnel in Nazran, Ingushetia) was 
legitimate are grouped under, Supports All Acts of Political Violence.  Respondents 
who rejected all four acts are grouped under, Rejects All Acts of Political Violence.  
Respondents who fell in-between the two extremes, Sup ports Some Acts of Political 
Violence, answered one of three ways:  1) Supports All Acts of Political Violence Not 
Targeting Civilians (Nalchik and Nazran); 2) Supports All Acts of Political Violence 











Some  Acts of 
Political 
Violence No Response 
Georgia (70) 7.1% 17.1% 25.7% 50.0% 
Azerbaijan (71) 60.6% 4.2% 35.2% 0.0% 
Poland (100) 10.0% 45.0% 45.0% 0.0% 
Belgium (59) 36.0% 15.0% 47.4% 1.6% 
Table 6.3: Attitudes towards Political Violence by Country  
Table 6.3 presents attitudes towards political violence by country.  As 
discussed previously, 50.0% of respondents in Georgia refused to answer questions 
about political violence.  This non-response was given in spite of freely speaking 
about all other issues including political goals and regime type preferences.   
Accordingly, it is impossible to know whether these individuals do support political 
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violence and, if so, to what degree.  As noted earlier, however, the fact that males 
aged 18 to 24 were the group most likely to not answer questions about political 
violence it is plausible to infer that they, like most other Chechen males, do indeed 
support at least some acts of political violence.  If so, this would tell a very different 
story about the levels of support in Georgia and about the role of proximity in 
generating pro-violence attitudes.   As reported, only 7.1% of displaced Chechens in 
Georgia support all acts of political violence, while 17.1% reject all acts.  Refugees in 
Azerbaijan express the highest level of support for all acts.  60.6% of displaced 
Chechens in Azerbaijan believe that each attack was legitimate.  Moreover, 95.8% of 
this population supports at least some violence, thus making the Chechen refugee 
community in Azerbaijan the most pro-violent of any other location.  In Poland, 
support for all acts is remarkably low; only 10.0% reported full support for all the 
attacks.  A significant number, 45.0% reject all acts of political violence although an 
equal number supports some acts, mostly Nord-Ost.  Finally, in Belgium, 36.0% of all 
respondents express support for all acts of political violence with only 15.0% 
rejecting all the attacks.  47.4% of displaced Chechens in Belgium support some acts 
of political violence. 
It appears that the anticipated “U-shaped” distribution in support for political 
violence has some validity.  This idea posited that the closer one is to conflict the 
higher the subsequent levels of support for violence.  Conversely, the farther one 
goes away from the conflict the higher the levels of support for violence will be as 
well.  The logic is based on the expected costs and consequences of supporting or 
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rejecting violence.  In locations proximate to the conflict the cost of support might 
be high; however, the conditions might make such support natural.  In contrast, the 
farther away one moves from the actual conflict the lower the perceived costs of 
supporting violence.   The expectation comes from the example of the so-called 
Boston Irish who, perceiving no cost to publically supporting IRA actions against the 
British, did so in greater numbers.  Another potential factor may be the role that 
proximity plays in engendering feeling of isolation among displaced Chechens.  As 
noted above in Table 6.2, a significant number of Chechen refugees in Belgium feel 
their traditions and culture are slipping away as they, as a community, fear 
becoming increasingly assimilated.  These perceptions may lead to higher support 
for political violence as a way to re-connect with the community.62  The feeling may 
well be that through the support of political violence they again become an active 
and vital part of the broader Chechen nation and share in its struggles and burdens.   
This might explain why the foiled 2010 terrorist plot against Western and Russian 
targets took place in Belgium.  At the time of the arrests, this group was also 
recruiting displaced Chechens to return to the homeland and fight.  Clearly, Chechen 
refugees in Belgium, more than any other refugee community in this dissertation, 
desire to play a greater active role in the Chechen struggle.  Finally, the 
comparatively better living conditions experienced by the Chechen refugees in 
Belgium might lead this community feel a sense of collective guilt, thus providing yet 
another motivation for supporting violence.  
                                                 
62 On the role of assimilation and violence, see Conversi, 1999.    
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It is important again to stress that as a micro-comparative study of political 
violence, this dissertation attempts to reveal and discover causal relationships.  This 
process of hypothesis-generation can be later used to test and develop new theories.  
At this point, we observe significant variation between different refugee 
communities in their attitudes towards political violence, and there are several 
plausible explanations for this variation.  This dissertation is a first cut at 
establishing a better understanding of the factors influencing such attitudinal 
outcomes is necessary for sound policy formation and theory building. 
Country Russia Autonomy Independence 
Caucasus 
Emirate 
Georgia 0.0% 1.0% 95.7% 1.0% 
Azerbaijan 0.0% 0.0% 47.8% 52.1% 
Poland 1.0% 37.0% 50.0% 13.0% 
Belgium 0.0% 11.9% 71.9% 16.8% 
Table 6.4: Attitudes towards Political Goals by Country 
Table 6.4 shows the choice of political goals among the respective Chechen 
refugee communities by country.  Overall, there is scant support for remaining an 
integral part of Russia.  In Belgium, support for Autonomy is 11.9%.  Support for 
Autonomy is highest in Poland with 37.0% of respondents desiring political life 
within the Russian Federation with significant control over local issues.  
Independence remains the most sought after political objective in each refugee 
community regardless country.  Half the refugee community supports Independence 
in Poland, 71.9% of displaced Chechens in Belgium desire Independence, and in 
Georgia, an overwhelming majority of Chechen refugees (95.7%) favor sovereignty.  
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Indeed, even 47.8% of displaced Chechens in Azerbaijan support Independence.  
The degree of support for Independence in Azerbaijan is surprising given that over 
half the population (52.1%) desire an Islamic Caucasus Emirate, making Azerbaijan 
home to the largest percent of respondents desiring both transnational political 
objectives and religious authority as political authority.  Support for the Caucasus 
Emirate is next highest in Belgium with 16.8% desiring an Islamic state.   
Country Democracy Sharia 
Georgia 62.8% 37.2% 
Azerbaijan 15.5% 84.5% 
Poland 66.0% 34.0% 
Belgium 42.4% 57.6% 
Table 6.5: Attitudes towards Regime Type by Country  
Table 6.5 reveals regime type preferences by country.63  In Georgia and 
Poland (62.8% and 66.0%, respectively), the majority of the displaced community 
prefers democratic institutions.  Support for democracy is lowest in Azerbaijan with 
only 15.5% of respondents desiring non-religious political institutions.  In Belgium, 
the community is more evenly divided in its regime type preferences with 42.4% 
preferring democracy and 57.6% wanting sharia.  Support for sharia is highest in 
Azerbaijan where an overwhelming 84.5% of the displaced Chechen community 
prefers religious authority as political authority.  The nature and evolution of 
                                                 
63 The definitional meanings of democracy and sharia were discussed earlier in Chapter 2, 




political goals among the Chechen people as a whole was discussed previously in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.   
What explains the variation between refugee communities by country?  
There are three alternative explanations.  First, one could argue that support for 
sharia is highest among Chechen refugees in Azerbaijan because they reside in a 
predominately Muslim country, albeit a fairly secular one.  The logic of this 
explanation is that religious identity becomes more salient in essentially 
homogenous co-religious enclaves.  The Chechen community is Azerbaijan is able to 
more freely express their Islamic identity through dress and custom and reside 
among fellow believers, many of whom share similar customs.  When Islamic or 
religious affiliation is the most salient in one’s hierarchy of identities, it is natural to 
expect support for sharia due to devotion and piety.  Second, the Chechen refugee 
community is Azerbaijan is cited as the poorest of all displaced Chechen settlements.  
The people live in abject poverty, suffer from a number of physical and mental 
ailments, and harbor little hope for the future.  As expected, individuals are more 
likely to seek spirituality in difficult times and supporting sharia could signal 
widespread desperation.  Finally, the controversial finding of a correlation between 
adherents of sharia and the support for political violence has been noted previously.  
Still, it may be true that this relationship has some validity.  It is not clear which way 
the causal arrow moves in this relationship and it may be that support for sharia is 
higher in Azerbaijan because an inordinately high number of individuals there 
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support political violence as legitimate.  Future research can further test these 
relationships. 
The rising support for sharia in Belgium may be product of opposite 
dynamics.  Belgium is neither a Muslim country nor an overtly religious one.  
Accordingly, Chechen refugees there may feel isolated and separated from their co-
religious brethren and seek to close the physical distance through increased 
piousness. In doing so, these refugees may begin to overcompensate in the face of 
perceived assimilation, resisting the pull into the local culture by exaggerating their 
own cultural symbols and behavior.  Similar to other Muslims in Europe, displaced 
Chechens in Belgium may actively seek out fellow Muslims and exhibit hyper-
Islamic dress and rhetoric, thus raising their awareness of being Muslim; desiring or 
supporting religious goals is one plausible outcome of this mechanism.   Moreover, 
as noted previously, geographic distance may spur a stronger desire to connect to 
the homeland and participate in the struggle, thus leading some displaced Chechens 
in Belgium to recruit militants back to the North Caucasus and plan attacks on 
Russian targets in the name of the struggle.   
CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored the relative influence of the so-called “country effects.” 
Country effects are the general term used for the expected state of displaced 
peoples.  In this chapter, I provided a description of the Chechen refugee 
populations in The Republic of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Poland, and Belgium, exploring 
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their living conditions, primary concerns, political desires, and attitudes towards 
political violence.  The lives of Chechen refugees are significantly influenced by their 
residence.  Chechen refugees closest to the conflict in Georgia and Azerbaijan face 
pressing security and economic challenges.  In Azerbaijan the abject poverty and 
deplorable living situations are leading to widespread health problems in the 
community.  Chechen males fear to walk down the streets and the community as a 
whole is becoming increasingly desperate, unable to return home and unable to 
improve their lives.  Theoretically, these are the conditions we expect to breed 
further discontent and, given the proximity to the on-going insurgency in the North 
Caucasus, perhaps renewed violence.  A number of Chechen refugees in Azerbaijan 
were former fighters and it is not unreasonable for a number of these disgruntled 
men to perceive life in the proverbial trenches as preferable to their current 
situation.  
In Poland, the primary concerns are economic.  The current global financial 
crises do not portend well for ameliorating these economic concerns any time soon.  
As in Azerbaijan, the expectation is that as conditions worsen frustration will 
increase, potentially leading to some form of violence.   The Chechen refugees in 
Poland do not express and fear over personal security.  It is entirely plausible that 
many may consider returning back to Chechnya, especially as life in Grozny appears 
to be normalizing.  
Finally, the life of a Chechen refugee appears to be one of relative comfort.  
They have access to most middle-class amenities and are in no danger of being 
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deported back to Chechnya.  Many live quiet and content lives.  However, the pull of 
assimilation and loss of traditions is a serious threat for many refugees.   A 
significant number feel a new kind of existential threat, one not emanating from 
Russian guns.   It is not yet clear how this community will respond to these 
pressures.  We do know that Belgium is producing terrorist plots and a desire, for 
some, to rejoin the insurgency back home in the Caucasus.  Time will tell whether 
other communities of displaced Chechens in Western European states also begin to 
travel back home to pick up the fight.  The implications for regional security in the 
North Caucasus are obvious.   
The next chapter concludes the dissertation by analyzing the meaning of the 
central findings.  I discuss the policy implications of my study and the potential 
avenues for future research, addressing the broader theoretical and policy questions 
this dissertation has raised. 
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
This dissertation began with a question. What drives refugees displaced by 
war to hold attitudes supporting violence to achieve political ends? The 
conventional wisdom suggests that refugee communities are breeding grounds for 
the emergence of political violence, terrorism, and radicalism, especially among 
displaced Muslims.  Yet, given the inherent difficulties of conducting primary 
research, the literature on refugees and political violence offers little empirical 
evidence of such a connection or systematic investigation of the root causes of 
attitudes toward political violence among refugees.  I believe this dissertation 
contributes to this literature and furthers our understanding of the political and 
material, rather than emotive or religious, nature of non-participant support for 
political violence and insurgent movements.   This is not to say that emotive factors 
play no role; indeed, these factors are not mutually exclusive, but rather it appears 
that material and instrumental factors play a more prominent role in influencing 
attitudes towards political violence.  More work must certainly be done and I believe 
this dissertation provides a template for future research endeavors.   
This challenging, inductive research study was conducted under extremely 
difficult and often dangerous circumstances.  The expectation prior to this research 
was that if we ever expected to find support for political violence it would be among 
Chechen refugees.  Indeed, the conduct of the two Russo-Chechen Wars and the 
historical animosities between the two peoples created the assumption of a 
homogenous, uniformly pro-violent community.  There was, however, significant 
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variation in the attitudinal support for political violence and there was significant 
variation between the various refugee communities.  The results from my 
dissertation suggest the following three main findings:  first, political goals do 
determine support for political violence.  Displaced Chechens desiring an Islamic 
Caucasus Emirate are more likely to support political violence than those desiring 
moderate political objectives, such as Autonomy.  Second, there is a correlation 
between regime type preferences and attitudes supporting political violence.  
Displaced Chechens who prefer religious authority (sharia) as political authority are 
more likely to support political violence than those who desire more pluralistic or 
secular political institutions, such as democracy.  Third, gender has an interactive 
effect.  Displaced Chechen males are more likely to desire maximal political goals.  
They are more likely to accept religious authority as political authority in the form 
of a sharia regime, and they are more likely to accept all forms of political violence.  I 
argue that these gender effects are driven by differential political goals between 
males and females based on social status.  Female Chechen refugees desire different 
political goals and regime types because, unlike males, they perceive that they will 
likely suffer in terms of social status in a Caucasus Islamic Emirate and/or under 
sharia.  Consequently, women’s material interests drive them to less extreme 
political goals, such as Autonomy in Russia, and less tolerance for political violence 
as a means.  This suggests a material basis for the support of political violence.  
Moreover, if women do have a moderating effect on views toward violence, policy 
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makers should consider empowering women in post-conflict settings64, an idea with 
some currency in contemporary policy circles regarding Iraq and the countries 
involved in the recent Arab Spring.   
In regard to location, in Georgia the displaced Chechen community prefers 
independence and democracy, yet the high levels of insecurity and the close 
proximity to Chechnya, especially in the Pankisi Gorge, left many Chechen refugees 
unwilling to share their attitudes on political violence.  In Azerbaijan, extremely 
poor living conditions, coupled with high levels of insecurity has left an entire 
community hostile and fearful for their future.  For these refugees, most desire an 
Islamic Caucasus Emirate and sharia.  Most also believe at least some acts of political 
violence are legitimate.  In Poland, economic issues are paramount and support for 
political goals and regime type preferences are evenly distributed across the 
spectrum.  Finally, in Belgium the comparatively better living conditions leaves most 
displaced Chechens satisfied with their everyday lives.  Chechen refugees in Belgium 
are more likely to desire independence, but a growing number express their 
preference for a Caucasus Emirate and religious authority (sharia) as political 
authority.  Cultural isolation and the perceived pull of assimilation have led many to 
fear a new kind of existential threat, however.  These conditions may be what 
prompted some individuals in the community to try and become active participants 
in the conflict.  
                                                 
64 See Hudson, Caprioli, Ballif-Spanvilli, McDermott, and Emmett, 2008; Nachtwey and Tessler, 2002. 
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Theoretically, this dissertation contributes to the broader literature on 
political violence, providing unique insights into the relationship between forced 
migration and international security and the strategic, material, and political nature 
of non-participant support for militant and insurgent activity.  These findings 
bolster the conclusions of several contemporary micro-comparative studies of 
political violence, all of which suggest instrumental rather emotive determinants.  
This dissertation further challenges the purported nature of ethnic war.  The 
prevailing wisdom in ethnic conflicts is that emotions play a preponderant role in 
driving violence and the support for violence.  Yet, as Fearon (1995) observed, even 
in such ostensibly emotional conflicts as these strategic considerations are usually 
the primary engines of violence.  This dissertation thus provides additional 
empirical evidence in support of Fearon’s argument about ethnic conflicts.   
The data in this dissertation also refutes cultural, emotive, and 
psychopathological explanations for Chechen attitudes towards political violence.  
These alternative explanations dominate the discourse on Chechnya and all expect a 
uniformly pro-violent community, particularly in regard to actions towards Russia 
and Russian targets.  Cultural arguments claim that Chechnya’s extant cultural 
views, namely the prevailing acceptability of violence as a form of social behavior, 
make all Chechens tolerate political violence carried out in their name.  The 
traditional Chechen institution of “blood feud”, mandating revenge for the infliction 
of any number of grievances, contributes to the assumption of a homogenously pro-
violent people.  These suppositions are closely tied to the emotive explanations, 
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which claim fear and revenge explain most support for political violence.  
Psychopathological explanations claim the acute trauma of war and forced 
displacement, coupled with the deplorable conditions most Chechen refugees 
endured in their initial time in exile, create a natural psychological acceptance of 
violence, particularly against the perceived perpetrators.  These conditions and 
experiences are universal to all displaced Chechens.  As such, according to these 
explanations we should expect to find only slight variation among displaced 
Chechens in their views on political violence.  Yet the data reveals significant 
variation in attitudes toward political violence.  These alternative explanations can 
perhaps help shed light on certain aspects of Chechen views on violence, yet they 
are unable to account for the considerable variation we observe among Chechen 
refugees.  I contend that we must look to political goal choices, regime type 
preferences, and even gender to account for this variation. Of course, in regard to 
the latter, in recent years the emergence of the Black Widows has created a 
perception that the stereotypical role of gender in influencing political violence (i.e. 
men are, by nature more violent than women) no longer holds among the Chechens. 
This assumption too has been proven false. 
In terms of policy, this dissertation has generated a number of significant 
foreign policy considerations.  First, the public and political discourse on 
displacement and political violence suggests a relationship between the greater 
community and militants carrying out acts of political violence in the name of the 
group.  Thus, in foreign policy discussions we often hear rhetoric about challenging 
 
263 
the “cults of martyrdom” or the necessity to influence the “Arab Street” or drain the 
swamps.  The policy world contends dampening popular support for militant 
activity dampens actual militant behavior and acts of political violence.  Yet, there 
are no rigorous studies demonstrating a direct linkage between popular support for 
militant activity and subsequent militant violence.  “That said, the fact that militant 
organizations cannot engage in meaningful levels of violence without some measure 
of popular support remains a first-order concern” (Shapiro and Fair, 2009:84).   
Although Shapiro and Fair claim that there is no evidence that decreasing 
non-participant support for militant activities reduces militant violence, in this 
dissertation I revealed how non-participant rejection of certain acts of political 
violence can decrease subsequent levels of militant activity, particularly in regard to 
target selection.  As we observed, the overwhelming rejection of the attack on 
schoolchildren in Belsan spurred a re-evaluation about targets and methods among 
Chechen militants that led to a three-year gap in all terrorist attacks against 
civilians.  This clearly illustrates the potential power of non-participants have on 
militant behavior and gives hope to foreign policy decision-makers that sound 
policies can be constructed.   
As noted, this dissertation has demonstrated a correlation between the 
support for religious authority (sharia) as political authority and a higher 
propensity to support political violence.  This is certainly a controversial finding.  
However, it is important for policy-makers to explore the true nature of this 
relationship as well as that of support for an Islamic Caucasus Emirate.  I have 
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argued that both these goals reflect more local concerns and grievances rather than 
signal Chechen support for transnational political objectives along the lines of 
groups like Al Qaeda.  This is a crucial insight for policy-makers and a warning to not 
conflate the two threats.  To do so is to create what Kilcullen calls “accidental 
guerillas” and protracted conflicts.  Once again, it is important that policy-makers 
recognize these key cleavages in crafting appropriate foreign policy strategies.  
This dissertation challenges the dominant views on generational changes in 
protracted insurgent campaigns.  The conventional wisdom is that in protracted 
insurgencies and civil conflicts younger generations of militants will purportedly be 
more radical and extreme than their elder counterparts in both desired political 
goals and the accepted means to achieve such goals.  Empirically, this has been true 
in places like Afghanistan.  However, this does not seem to be the case among the 
Chechens. Initial evidence suggests that although the older generation of Chechen 
separatists once supported national independence and democracy, they are now 
more likely to desire more maximal goals, like the establishment of an Islamic 
Emirate in the Caucasus, and support religious authority (sharia) as political 
authority.  This is especially puzzlingly since this generation experienced the secular 
world of the Soviet Union.  They spent significant time with ethnic Russians, serving 
together in the military or Communist Party, working in factories, competing in 
athletic endeavors, and sharing neighborhoods. This was the generation foreign 
fighters from the Middle East repeatedly condemned as “infidels” for drinking 
alcohol and smoking.  
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Unlike other regions, the younger generation of Chechens is ostensibly less 
interested in global jihad or any pan-Islamic, pan-Caucasian political unit. Indeed, 
the high-profile defection of young Chechen field-commanders last summer from 
current leader, Doku Umarov, himself a former “old guard” national secularist 
turned global jihadist, suggests the younger generation is interested in the 
comparatively moderate and exclusive goal of Chechen national sovereignty.  It is 
not clear if the younger generation is also moderating their views on political 
violence, but as of this writing there have been fewer terrorist attacks on Russian 
civilians in recent months.  Although much work needs to be done, I suspect the 
generational shift in political goals among non-participant Chechens is related to 
two factors, desperation and time.  The older generation has endured inconceivable 
trauma; many have lost members of their families, their homes, their honor and 
reputation, their livelihood, and any conceivable hope of a normal future. 
Supporting an Islamic Caucasus Emirate may be viewed as the best option to regain 
some material or ideational good. Second, each passing days brings the recognition 
that time is not on their side, and perceivably the quickest way to achieve the goal of 
a Chechnya free from Russian rule may be to untie together the disparate ethno-
national groups of the North Caucasus.  
This puzzle merits further inquiry.  Foreign policy decision-makers engaged 
in protracted insurgencies or civil wars often lament the paradox that although it is 
necessity to eliminate top militant leaders (many of whom may represent an older 
generation) doing so may stymie any subsequent attempts at negotiating peace 
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since younger militants will be purportedly less willing to compromise.  
Understanding the conditions under which generational political shifts occur in 
insurgency can plausibly help better inform foreign policy decision-makers and help 
us better understand the micro-level dynamics of non-participant support for 
militant activity. 
As stated previously, the so-called “micro-comparative turn” in the study of 
political violence is still in its nascent stages.  As such, scholars contend that such 
methods are still in the world of hypothesis-generating, rather than hypothesis 
testing.  Indeed, this dissertation has revealed that there are a number of 
relationships between variables which have yet to be tested or fully fleshed out.  In 
terms of endogeneity, is it that politically violent people desire an Islamic Caucasus 
Emirate and prefer sharia, or is it the other way around?  Does holding maximal 
political goals or preferring religious authority as political authority lead one to be 
more acceptant of political violence and militant activity?  This dissertation is a first-
cut at exploring these relationships.  In this inductive study, I employed 
systematically rigorous ethnographic research instruments to collect a unique 
dataset. Determining causality is an important and future endeavor. Ideally, future 
work would go back into the field to ask displaced Chechens to interpret the 
findings.  Such an endeavor is clearly beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Nonetheless, the data collected for this dissertation can speak to some of the 





H1:  Young men will be more acceptant of political violence than other 
demographic groups within Chechen refugee communities. 
Inconclusive. As discussed in Chapter 5, currently males aged 55 to 66 
(77.8%) are the most likely to support political violence.  The second most likely 
constituent is males aged 25 to 35 (65.0%).  48.5% of males aged 18 to 25 years old 
support violence, yet 27.3% of this group answered Non-Response. Again, as 
discussed previously, if these Non-Responses are, in actually, pro-violent 
sentiments, over 75.8% of the young males would support violence.  This is 
plausible, but not certain. Moreover, the data reveals that the overwhelmingly 
majority of Chechen men, regardless of age, support violence, thus casting doubt on 
the hypothesis.  
H2:   Chechen refugees who have lost immediate family members in the war 
will be more acceptant of political violence than other refugees. 
Inconclusive. It is a sad reality that virtually every displaced Chechen I 
interviewed or met lost immediate family members. The high percent of such loss is 
influenced by social and cultural considerations that tie even second cousins as 
“brother or sister.”  In the end, the loss of relatives, like the trauma and experience 
of war and displacement or the existence of cultural norms of revenge, is common to 
all Chechens and, as such, cannot account for the variation in attitudes towards 
political violence.  
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H3:  Chechen refugees who hold maximal political goals (e.g., support for a 
Islamic Caucasus Emirate) will be more acceptant of political violence than refugees 
who hold more modest political goals. 
True.  There is a relationship between those who support an Islamic 
Caucasus Emirate in the Caucasus.  However, as noted above, it is not clear, beyond 
the strategic rather than religious character of such support, the exact causal nature 
of this relationship.  For now, we can only say with certainty that individuals who 
support maximal political goals also are more likely to support political violence. 
H4:  Chechen refugees from rural areas and mountain teips (clans) will be 
more acceptant of political violence than other Chechen refugees. 
False.  As discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, there is no significant 
relationship between living location and support for political violence.  Moreover, 
there is no longer a geographic concentration of mountain clans in the southern 
mountains and plains clans in the north.  The plains clans do tend to still dominate 
the northern flatlands, yet the mountain clans have, since the 1970s and 1980s 
increasingly moved into the cities, thus removing the purported isolation and 
maintenance of highlander tradition as suggested in the original hypothesis.  
H5:  Chechen Refugees will be more likely to support acts of political violence 
directed at authorities and representatives of the state and reject acts directed 
exclusively at civilian targets.  
False. In fact, only 6.6% of all displaced Chechens expressed exclusive 
support for such actions.  Conversely, as discussed in Chapter 4, the act of political 
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violence which engendered the most support was the attack on civilians in the 
Dubrovka Theater in Moscow.  Target selection does play a role, however, in driving 
rejection of certain demographics.  As the overwhelming rejection of the Beslan 
attack underscores, significant numbers of displaced Chechens, while exhibiting 
sophisticated views on political violence, seem to reject any action which targets 
children.  
H6:  Chechen refugees with higher education will be more acceptant of political 
violence than other less educated Chechen refugees. 
False.  As discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, there is no significant 
relationship between level of education and support for political violence. This 
hypothesis could have been posed inversely; a number of socio-economic theories 
suggest that lesser educated individuals are more likely to support and actually 
commit violence.  Of course, other evidence suggests that high education creates 
more awareness and, consequently, more political dissatisfaction (see Chapter 4), a 
purported cause of supporting political violence.  In regard to displaced Chechens, 
the level of education plays no significant role in the support of political violence.  
Level of education did play a role in Non-Responses; university educated 
respondents were uniformly willing to answer all questions on political violence.  All 
Non-Responses came from those with a high school education of less.  
Environmental Hypotheses: 
 H7:  Chechen refugees living in communities closest to the conflict and farthest 
from the conflict will be more likely to have attitudes acceptant of political violence as 
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a legitimate means to achieve political goals than refugees living in other 
communities. 
Inconclusive.  It is true that displaced Chechens in both Azerbaijan and 
Belgium are more likely to support political violence.  However, Chechen refugees in 
Georgia reside directly adjacent to Chechnya and the conflict.  As discussed 
previously, all but one Non-Response came from the Chechen refugee community in 
Georgia and, as such the accurate level of support for political violence is unclear.  
H8:  Chechen refugees living in communities located in non-Muslim countries 
will be more acceptant of political violence than their counterparts living in 
communities located in Muslim countries. 
False. The highest levels of support for political violence came from Chechen 
refugees living in Azerbaijan.  The logic does perhaps still hold, however.  In 
Belgium, 84.7% of the population feels their culture and traditions are under threat.  
This sentiment is expressed at higher rates in Belgium than in any other site visited 
for this dissertation.  Yet, at this point it is not clear what role, exactly, feelings of 
cultural loss play in driving individual support or rejection of political violence.  
 H9:  Chechen refugees living in larger refugee communities will be more 
acceptant of political violence than refugees living in smaller ones. 
Inconclusive.  As discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, it is impossible to 
accurately ascertain refugee community size.  Nonetheless, the underlying logic of 
this hypothesis may still hold, namely that the larger the refugee community, the 
more deplorable the living conditions; thus, higher levels of support for political 
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violence (Berrebi, 2007; Kreuger, 2002; Kreuger and Maleckova, 2003).  Displaced 
Chechens in Azerbaijan do live in deplorable conditions, the purported driving 
factor in larger refugee communities, and do express disproportionate support for 
political violence.  Clearly, more work needs to be done to better understand this 
relationship, although, to paraphrase Trotsky, if poverty alone were enough to spark 
revolution and rebellion the masses would always be in a state of revolt.  As the 
findings in this dissertation suggest, violence may be driven more by material and 
strategic consideration, although economic stress could easily be considered part of 
the former.  
H10:  Chechen refugees who rate the conditions of their camp as worse than 
they expected will be more acceptant of political violence than refugees who hold more 
favorable views of camp conditions.   
Inconclusive.  As discussed in Chapter 6 and in Hypothesis 9 above, displaced 
Chechens do not hold uniform views on grievances.  The main grievance in each 
country differs.  Of course, in Belgium, no grievances are expressed, yet support for 
political violence is substantial.  
 
Understanding refugee attitudes towards political violence has policy 
implications for international security and for host nations.  For better or worse, 
there are large numbers of Chechen refugees throughout Eurasia and Eastern and 
Western Europe and many will presumably remain for the foreseeable future as 
third country repatriation remains a glacial process and return home is viewed as 
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undesirable and dangerous.  If governments are to have any hope of implementing 
policies  that dampen the attractiveness of political violence as a socially acceptable 
form of behavior the first step must be identifying the factors that give rise to 
violent attitudes.     
What does the future portend for the North Caucasus?  Today a growing and 
protracted insurgency plagues the region.  High levels of unemployment among the 
local youth, endemic corruption among the indigenous elites, and the incessantly 
harsh hand of the Russian authorities has prompted many to “go to the forests”, the 
local euphemism for joining the militants.  In the summer of 2011 the Kremlin 
acknowledged that hundreds of amnestied fighters also rejoined the insurgent 
ranks.   It now appears certain that, as it was in the times of Sheik Mansur and Imam 
Shamil, the Chechen militants will launch new offensives once the winter snows 
melt, thus allowing the insurgents free range under the cover of the thick birch 
forests.  This has always been the Chechen way of war, utilizing the same tactics 
against the same enemy, Russia.  
The optimism and relative calm in the mid-2000s under Russian President 
Dmitri Medvedev was dashed with the spring 2010 suicide bombing in the 
Domodedova International Airport in Moscow.  This attack, the first of its kind 
directed primarily at foreigners rather than ethnic Russians, was carried out by 
Dagestanis, signaling a further spread in the regional turmoil.  Indeed, Chechnya 
today under the iron-rule of Ramzan Kadyrov has become a comparative island of 
peace in an increasingly hostile neighborhood.  Ingushetia and Dagestan have 
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witnessed ever increasingly levels of militant activity in the past six years and now 
both Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia are hotbeds of Islamic militancy.  
The 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi will certainly prove an attractive target for 
Caucasus militants eager to spread their message to a global audience.  
At one time the modern conflicts in Chechnya could have been classified as a 
tale of two wars.  The military disaster in the First Russo-Chechen War, from 1994 
to 1996, was extremely unpopular and a political handicap for then President, Boris 
Yeltsin.  Three years later, Vladimir Putin was catapulted to national prominence 
with his successful prosecution of a new and popular Second Russo-War.  In those 
early days Putin used his tough stance on Chechnya as a political tool to garner 
supporters and crush potential rivals.  Today the North Caucasus has again become 
a political issue, but not in the way Vladimir Putin expected.  Indeed, it now appears 
that the Russian adventures in Chechnya appear more likely to be the story of just 
one war, and an extremely costly and unpopular one at that. The Russian people 
have grown frustrated with both the lack of progress and with the amount of blood 
and treasure expended in the volatile south.  For the first time, a significant number 
of Russians prefer to let the entire region break-away from Russia proper. The 
financial implications in particular have become a significant political thorn for 
Putin in his re-election campaign with the vast majority of Russians viewing the 
extravagance at Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent birthday gala as an affront to their own 
socio-economic hardships.  It is not yet clear how Putin’s political machine will 
manage this crisis, nor how his military will solve the crisis in the Caucasus.  The 
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Kremlin policies thus far have been complete failures.  If what is past is indeed 
prologue, the future of Chechen and the North Caucasus will remain one of 
continuous struggle.  In this, the role of the displaced Chechen community remains 
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